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This thesis is comprised of four substantive essays on consent. More specifically, they 
concern individual permissive consent—that is to say, consent by which one person 
intentionally and directly gives another person moral or legal permission to perform 
an action. What follows is a brief outline of each of those essays. 
 Essay One  is  titled ‘An Introduction to the Importance of Consent in Our Sex 
Lives’. In this essay, I explore three themes. The first is whether consent is necessary 
or sufficient for morally permissible sex. The second theme is how someone’s consent 
relates to whether that person is wronged or harmed by another person having sex 
with them. The third theme concerns how all this relates to the principles that govern 
the legitimate scope of the criminal law. 
Essay Two is titled ‘Conditional Consent’. In this essay, I distinguish two ways 
for someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent. The first is to place 
conditions on the moral scope of their consent—whereby they waive some moral claim 
rights but not others. The second is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition 
affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. I suggest that understanding 
this distinction helps makes progress with debates about so-called ‘conditional consent’ 
to sexual intercourse in English law, and with understanding how individuals place 
conditions on their morally valid consent in other contexts. 
Essay Three is titled ‘Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together’. In this essay, 
I defend what I call the Commonsense View of sexual consent. The Commonsense 
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View states that if you have sex with someone without that person’s consent, you 
thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. Perhaps surprisingly, John Gardner, 
Catharine MacKinnon, and Tanya Palmer all deny the Commonsense View. 
According to their view, if sex is in some sense ideal, then each partner’s consent is 
unnecessary—that is to say, even absent each partner’s consent, neither partner 
infringes the other’s moral rights. On the contrary, I defend the Commonsense View. 
In so doing, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account of Consent. The Hybrid Account 
retains the benefits of two existing accounts of consent while avoiding their 
shortcomings. I close by suggesting some benefits of my alternative picture and some 
implications for law reform. 
Essay Four is titled ‘Children, the Unconscious, and the Dead: Consent and 
the Will Theory of Rights’. In this essay, I defend the Will Theory of Moral and Legal 
Rights from what I call the Impossibility Objection. The Impossibility Objection 
alleges that if the Will Theory is correct, then it is impossible for children, the 
unconscious, and the dead to have moral and legal rights. I formulate a version of the 
Will Theory, and use insights about the timing of consent to argue that this version can 
avoid the Impossibility Objection. This leaves the Will Theory with better extensional 
adequacy than is widely supposed to be possible. 
The four substantive essays are followed by a brief chapter titled ‘Summary 
and Directions for Future Research’. 
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This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified 
in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or is being 
concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or any other qualification at the 
University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as 
declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part 
of my dissertation has already been submitted, or is being concurrently submitted for 
any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any 
other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified 




Recognising my interest in the philosophy (or perhaps just the scepticism of my teenage 
self), a schoolteacher once recommended that I read The Meditations. I dutifully went to 
a bookshop, found the philosophy section, located a book called The Meditations, 
purchased it, and read it. 
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It was not until many years later, when I started my philosophy degree, that I 
realised that the teacher had doubtless meant to recommend The Meditations of 
mathematician and philosopher René Descartes, a staple of first year philosophy syllabi. 
While at school, I had instead purchased The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the Roman 
philosopher-Emperor. 
 To date, Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations have influenced my philosophical work 
only indirectly—by teaching me a valuable lesson about the importance of 
unambiguous referencing. But Marcus was good at writing acknowledgements. I could 
do no better than to borrow his words here: ‘To the gods I owe good grandparents, 
good parents, a good sister, and teachers, comrades, kinsmen and friends’.1 Let me try 
to be more specific. 
I could not have written this thesis without the boundless love of my parents, 
Manjit Chadha and Nita Chadha, my sister, Ankita Chadha, and my wife, Francesca 
Chadha-Day. My deepest thanks to them. 
Special thanks to my primary supervisor, Tom Dougherty. Tom’s work 
sparked my philosophical interest in consent. As a PhD supervisor, Tom has held me 
to a higher standard than I thought I could achieve. I am unsure whether I have yet 
met that standard, but I am confident that aspiring to it has made me a better 
philosopher than I had thought possible. 
 
1 Book 1 Meditation 17. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (Maxwell Staniforth tr, New Ed edition, Penguin 
2004). 
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 Thanks also to my secondary supervisor, Rae Langton. In addition to her 
philosophical guidance, I am especially grateful for Rae’s encouragement throughout 
the PhD, and for keeping on top of the paperwork I sent her way at various stages, 
most notably at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
I have been lucky enough to have not only a primary and secondary supervisor, 
but also—if I may put it that way—a tertiary supervisor. My thanks to Matthew 
Kramer for taking an interest in my work and in me. I have benefitted from Matt’s 
kindness since the start of my PhD. I have additionally benefitted from Matt’s very 
helpful comments and discussions, especially in the latter half of my PhD. The fourth 
essay in this thesis, ‘Children, the Unconscious and the Dead: Consent and the Will 
Theory of Rights’ is strongly influenced by Matt’s work. 
 Thanks to Findlay Stark, who—before we had ever met—generously emailed 
me comments on an early draft of ‘Conditional Consent’. I am confident that 
responding to Findlay’s comments greatly improved not only that essay, but the overall 
quality of my philosophical thinking about the law. I am also very grateful for his 
support and counsel when navigating the job market in legal academia. 
Thanks also to the many academics both in Cambridge and beyond for useful 
discussions and feedback: Larry Alexander, Adam Bales, Matthew Bennett, Simon 
Blackburn, Thom Brooks, Tim Button, Clare Chambers, Mark Dsouza, John 
Gardner, Mollie Gerver, Leslie Green, Alexander Greenberg, Richard Holton, Heidi 
Hurd, John Hyman, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, John Filling, Rachel Elizabeth Fraser, 
Chloë Kennedy, Nikhil Krishnan, Iain Law, Catharine MacKinnon, Neil Manson, 
Michael Moore, David Owens, Tom Parr, Peter Schaber, Shyane Siriwardena, Adam 
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Marschall, Lucy McDonald, Rebecca Metzer, Jack Wearing, Ralph Weir, Wes 
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 For helping me to navigate the Cambridge bureaucracy, thanks to Charlie 
Evans in the Philosophy Faculty and Sheila Ellis at Trinity College. For helping me to 
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Lewy Library. Thanks also to Sandy Paul for arranging special access to the Trinity 
College Law Library for the duration of the UCU strikes. This allowed me to access 
important material without crossing a picket line. 
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Work on the Ethics of Consent, European Research Council Roots of Responsibility 
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This thesis is comprised of four substantive chapters. Each of these substantive chapters 
is—as the title of the thesis suggests—an essay on consent. 
The word ‘consent’ is used to pick out several distinct phenomena, not only in 
ordinary language but also in moral and political philosophy and legal theory. For 
example, in moral philosophy we might say that if two people agree to swap seats on a 
flight, they consent to doing so.2 In political philosophy, it is sometimes said that the 
justification for a sovereign’s authority over citizens in some sense derived from the 
consent of the citizens. This sort of view was prominent among the early social contract 
theorists. For example, Thomas Hobbes says, ‘The Right of all Soveraigns [sic] is 
derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to be governed.’3 
Similarly, in his Second Treatise on Government, John Locke claims that ‘Men being … by 
 
2 See Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, ‘Moral Risk and Communicating Consent’ (2019) 47 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 179, 180. A rather different issue of consent arises in the context of Immanuel Kant’s 
moral philosophy. There, the possibility of consenting to a maxim is a one test for whether that maxim 
meets the requirements of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. For a discussion of the Kantian project, see 
Thomas E Hill, ‘Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism’ (2001) 18 Social Philosophy and 
Policy 300. For a discussion of how we might use the possibility of consent to think about moral 
permissibility outside the bounds of the Kantian project, see Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol 1 (Samuel 
Scheffler ed, Oxford University Press 2011) 177–211. My focus in this thesis will be actual, rather than 
possible consent. 
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (WG Pogson Smith ed, Clarendon Press 1965) 448. 
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nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and 
subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.’4 More recently, 
Joseph Raz has claimed that ‘consent to a political authority entails a promise to obey 
it (as well as perhaps an obligation to support it in other ways)’.5 In legal theory, some 
authors write of a ‘consent theory of contract’.6 
My primary focus in this thesis will not be on any of these phenomena. These 
other phenomena all involve the individuals who give ‘consent’ thereby undertaking 
duties—the duty to swap seats, to obey the sovereign, or to perform the contract. 
Instead, my primary focus will be permissive consent—consent that (merely) releases 
others from pre-existing moral or legal duties they owe the consent-giver.7 
More specifically, my primary focus will be on what is sometimes called 
individual permissive consent. It is individual in two senses: it is both given by one 
individual and given to another individual. Relatedly, my focus will be on cases in 
which an individual consents on their own behalf. It is sometimes maintained, for example, 
that it is possible for parents to validly consent to surgery on behalf of their young 
children. I will address such cases only in passing. 
 
4 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Thomas Hollis ed, A Millar and others 1764) 279. 
5 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 83. 
6 See, e.g., Randy E Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269. 
7 Consent only releases individuals from such duties if the consent is valid. For a person’s consent to be 
valid, I assume they must at least be an adult of sound mind whose consent is not induced by serious 
coercion or deception. I discuss validity conditions further in the essays that follow. 
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With these clarifications in mind, let us turn to an outline of the four substantive 
essays. 
The first essay is ‘An Introduction to the Importance of Consent in Our Sex 
Lives’. A version of this essay is under editorial consideration for publication in the 
Routledge Handbook of Sex and Sexuality, edited by Clare Chambers, Brian Earp, and Lori 
Watson.  This essay provides an introduction to the importance of consent in the sexual 
domain. It begins by considering what I call Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy regarding sexual 
consent. According to Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy, it is morally permissible for one 
person to have sex with another if and only if that other person consents. I argue that 
Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy is implausible and that we should reject it, because sex is 
sometimes morally impermissible due to its effects on third parties. However, there is 
a Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy regarding sexual consent that is more plausible. 
According to Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy, one person does not wrong another by 
having sex with her if and only if she gives morally valid consent to his doing so. I 
suggest that we should interpret Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy in light of the liberal 
commitment to the maxim volenti non fit iniuria—roughly, that no wrong is done to 
someone who consents. I evaluate the plausibility of Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy 
interpreted this way by breaking it down into two steps: the Sufficiency of Consent and 
the Necessity of Consent. 
I first consider the plausibility of the Sufficiency of Consent. According to the 
Sufficiency of Consent, if one person gives morally valid consent to another person 
having sex with her, then he does not wrong her by doing so. I survey the existing 
literature and suggest that neither arguments for the Sufficiency of Consent nor the 
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arguments against it are decisive. To make progress, I suggest we might resort to 
broader theoretical considerations about the relationship between sexual morality and 
morality more generally. Given a plausible assumption about this relationship, we can 
say that the Sufficiency of Consent is true only if the following more general principle 
is true: If one person gives morally valid consent to another person doing something, 
then he does not wrong her by doing that thing. This principle is the volenti maxim. To 
work out whether the Sufficiency of Consent is true, then, we need to work out whether 
the volenti maxim is true. And to do this, we need to consider morality outside the sexual 
domain. 
Next, I consider the plausibility of the Necessity of Consent. According to the 
Necessity of Consent, if one person has sex with another person without her morally 
valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby wrongs her. To many, the Necessity of 
Consent is on its face extremely plausible. However, there is an increasingly influential 
argument against it. According to that argument, individuals engaged in ideal sex do 
not need each other’s morally valid consent, because they have something better than 
consent—namely, the kind of mutuality that makes sex a joint action. I argue that this 
argument is mistaken, because such sexual joint action involves individual sub-actions 
for which each person needs the other’s morally valid consent. 
Finally, I distinguish the Necessity of Consent from the Sexual Harming Claim. 
According to the Sexual Harming Claim, if one person has sex with another person 
without her morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby harms her. I suggest 
that the Sexual Harming Claim is plausible only if we have a notion of harm that covers 
more than merely experiential harms. I explore why it matters whether the Sexual 
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Harming Claim is true. I suggest that it matters for those who accept two claims. The 
first is that it is legitimate for the state to criminalise the behaviour of someone who has 
sex with another person without that person’s consent, even if that person suffers no 
experiential harm. The second is the Harm Principle, which states that it is legitimate 
for the state to criminalise a person’s behaviour only if that behaviour harms another 
person. 
The second essay is ‘Conditional Consent’. This essay is published online in 
Law and Philosophy (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-020-09400-8). This essay 
distinguishes two ways for someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent. 
The first is to place conditions on the moral scope of their consent—whereby they waive 
some moral claim rights but not others. The second is to conditionally token consent—
whereby the condition affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. I 
suggest that understanding this distinction helps makes progress with debates about so-
called ‘conditional consent’ to sexual intercourse in English law, and with 
understanding how individuals place conditions on their morally valid consent in other 
contexts. 
I first distinguish issues of conditional consent from issues of consent induced 
by deception. Next, I outline the familiar picture of how one person gives morally valid 
consent to another person’s action. According to the familiar picture, it is possible for 
someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent by restricting the scope of 
the actions to which they give their morally valid consent. For example, they might 
give their morally valid consent to another person operating on them, but not to that 
person having sex with them. This is all correct. However, I suggest that there is a 
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second—hitherto unexplored—way for someone to place conditions on their morally 
valid consent to another person’s action. This second way is to conditionally token consent. 
I present two reasons to believe that it is possible for someone to conditionally token 
consent. The first concerns the possibility of conditionally performing certain speech 
acts, including the speech act of tokening consent. The second concerns the nature of 
rights. Finally, I suggest some implications for reforming sexual offences law. 
The third essay is ‘Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together’. This essay is 
published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 40, Issue 3, Autumn 2020, pages 
619-644 (https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa011). In this essay, I show that some 
influential theorists have recently argued that if sex is in some sense ideal, then each 
partner’s consent is unnecessary: even absent each partner’s consent, neither partner 
infringes the other’s moral rights. I challenge a key premise in their argument for this 
alarming conclusion. I instead defend the Commonsense View: If you have sex with 
someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. In the 
course of defending the Commonsense View, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account 
of Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of two existing accounts of 
consent while avoiding their shortcomings.  I close by suggesting some benefits of my 
alternative picture and some implications for law reform. Notably, I argue that 
thinking about sexual morality in terms of consent does not—as some theorists 
suggest—commit us to objectionable views about women being sexually passive. 
The fourth essay is ‘Children, the Unconscious, and the Dead: Consent and 
the Will Theory of Rights’. In this essay I defend a well-known theory of the function 
of moral and legal rights—the Will Theory—from what I call the Impossibility 
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Objection. If the Will Theory is correct, so goes the Impossibility Objection, then it is 
impossible for young children, the unconscious, and the dead to have moral and legal 
rights. I formulate the Contemporary Will Theory of Rights—a Hartian theory of the 
function of moral and legal rights. I argue that if it is possible for someone to give valid 
prior consent to actions that occur while they are unconscious or after they die, then 
according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for the unconscious and the 
dead to have moral and legal rights. Moreover, I argue that if it is possible for adults 
to give valid subsequent consent to actions that occurred when they were children, 
then according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for children to have 
moral and legal rights. Since the notion of valid subsequent consent is more contentious 
than that of prior consent, children provide, in Neil MacCormick’s words, a ‘test-case’ 
for the Will Theory—though not in the way that MacCormick envisaged. 
The final chapter of the thesis is titled ‘Summary and Directions for Future 
Research’. The contents of that chapter are twofold. First, it offers a recap of the four 
substantive essays on consent. Second, the chapter makes explicit some questions 
which arise from the four substantive essays, but which are not answered in those 
essays. I suggest that these questions are important and ought to be addressed in future 
research on individual permissive consent. 
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Essay One 
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An Introduction to the Importance of Consent in Our Sex 
Lives 
 
Abstract: This essay examines what it takes for one person to give 
morally valid consent to another having sex with them. It explores 
whether such consent is necessary or sufficient for morally permissible 
sex, and how it relates to whether someone is wronged or harmed by 
another having sex with them. Finally, it explores how these features 
relate to whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalise the 
behaviour of someone who has sex with another person without that 
person’s morally valid consent to their doing so.  
 
1. Introduction 
Since #MeToo went viral on Twitter in 2017, there has been an explosion in public 
discussions about the importance of sexual consent.8 These public discussions highlight 
the centrality of consent in our sex lives. Participants in these discussions often hold a 
popular view of liberal sexual morality. The popular view of liberal sexual morality is 
 
8 The MeToo movement was started by activist Tarana Burke in 2007 to express solidarity with girls 
and women who experienced sexual assault. In 2017, #MeToo went viral on Twitter following a tweet 
from actor Alyssa Milano.  Elizabeth C Tippett, ‘The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement’ 
(2018) 103 Minnesota Law Review 74, 231. 
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neatly captured in a catch phrase from a viral video on the importance of sexual 
consent. When it comes to sex, the catch phrase goes, ‘consent is everything’.9 
Consent plays an important role in liberal morality generally. However, we 
might wonder whether there is something specific about the importance of consent in 
liberal sexual morality. Is there anything that makes sexual consent distinctively morally 
important? A useful way to answer this question is by comparing and contrasting sexual 
consent with consent outside the sexual domain. 
Let us start by comparing sexual consent with property consent. Generally, it 
is morally important to get consent when using someone else’s property. For example, 
it is morally important to get someone’s consent when borrowing their lawn mower. 
However, sexual consent differs from property consent in at least two important 
respects. First, you may need someone’s consent to using their property even if they 
are at some distance. Even if someone is halfway across the world, you may 
nevertheless need to borrow their lawn mower. If the distance makes it impossible to 
contact them, this may license you to make certain inferences about whether they 
permit you to borrow it. For example, have they let you borrow their lawn mower 
before in similar circumstances? If yes, perhaps you are justified in inferring that they 
permit you to use it in similar circumstances. Sexual consent is not like this. You will 
tend to need someone’s sexual consent only if they are nearby. It follows that 
communication will be easier, and so your unilateral inferences will not be justified. In 
 
9 Tea Consent (Blue Seat Studios 2015) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQbei5JGiT8> accessed 
15 September 2020. 
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short, to work out whether someone consents to you having sex with them, you can ask 
them. 
Second, whereas consent to someone borrowing your lawn mower is consent 
to them interacting with your property, sexual consent is consent to them interacting 
with your person. It is generally more important for us to control interactions with our 
person than with our property. We can say that sexual consent involves higher stakes 
than consent over our property. It is worse for one person to have sex with another 
without their consent than it is for them to borrow their lawn mower without their 
consent. The higher the stakes, the more certain a person needs to be that they have 
the other’s consent to their action. This is another reason why it is unjustified to assume 
without communication that someone consents to sex, whereas it may in some cases 
be justified to assume that someone consents to you borrowing their lawn mower even 
without communication. 
Another natural comparison is with medical consent. Like sexual consent, 
medical consent concerns interactions with our person.  However, there are again 
some important differences. First, doctors have special expertise that patients tend to 
lack about treatment options. By contrast, sexual partners tend not to be so 
asymmetrically situated in their knowledge of sex. This is plausibly why doctors tend 
to have additional duties to provide their patients with information—in the medical 
domain we speak not only of consent but of informed consent. Second, the need for 
medical consent tends to arise in relatively formal environments such as hospitals. In 
such environments, there is often a need for clear and operationalizable rules for 
professionals such as doctors to follow, especially where the presence of many patients 
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makes it unfeasible to spend large amounts of time with each one. These feasibility 
constraints tend not to apply in the sexual context, where there is no requirement for 
individuals to engage in sexual interactions with many individuals in a short time 
frame.10 Third, medical intervention is sometimes required even when someone is not 
in a position to consent. For example, it might be morally required to perform a blood 
transfusion on a patient who is currently unconscious and therefore unable to consent, 
to prevent death or serious long-term injury. The justification for proceeding without 
consent is that it would be extremely bad for the patient if they were to go untreated. 
These considerations do not apply when it comes to sexual consent; there is no sexual 
equivalent to emergency medical treatment. Fourth, and similarly, it is sometimes 
possible for one person to give medical consent on behalf of another. For example, a 
parent can sometimes give medical consent on behalf of a child because the child is too 
young to consent for themselves. Again, the justification for proceeding without the 
child’s consent is that it would be extremely bad for the child if they were to go 
untreated. But there are no equivalent considerations in the sexual domain. 
Both sexual consent and medical consent concern high stakes interactions with 
our person. However, one distinctive feature of sexual consent is that, in our actual 
world, the victims of non-consensual interactions in the sexual domain are 
disproportionately women and girls.11 These non-consensual interactions are plausibly 
 
10 Things may be different (and more morally complicated) in the context of certain kinds of sex work. 
11 For a brief overview of statistics from England and Wales, see Rape Crisis England and Wales, 
‘Statistics about Sexual Violence’ <http://rapecrisis.org.uk/get-informed/about-sexual-
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both symptoms and causes of a social structure that oppresses women. Such 
interactions affect not only their direct victim, but also perpetuate this oppression of 
women and girls.12 
 Despite these important differences between sexual consent and consent in 
these other domains, I suggest that we can still think profitably about consent across 
several domains. Indeed, much of this essay will discuss consent in general rather than 
sexual consent in particular. This is because the core function of consent is common 
across these domains. Roughly speaking, consent gives individuals control over how 
others may permissibly interact with them (we will make this rough idea more precise 
as the essay proceeds). 
Having contrasted sexual consent with property consent and medical consent, 
let us return to the claim that when it comes to sex, consent is everything. What does 
this mean? On one understanding, the claim expresses what David Archard calls the 
‘liberal moral orthodoxy’ regarding sexual consent.13  For reasons that will become 
clear, I suggest we instead call it the Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy regarding sexual 
consent: 
 
violence/statistics-sexual-violence/> accessed 12 May 2021. For the United States, see Rape, Abuse, 
and Incest National Network, ‘Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics’ 
<https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence> accessed 12 May 2021. 
12 See Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989); 
Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press 1984). 
13 David Archard, ‘Sexual Consent’ in Andreas Müller and Peter Schaber (eds), The Routledge Handbook 
of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018) 174. 
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Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy. It is morally permissible for one person to have 
sex with another if and only if that other person consents. 
 
Though perhaps initially plausible, Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy is not strictly true. 
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this is to point out that sex between two individuals 
sometimes generates what Alan Wertheimer calls ‘externalities’—effects on individuals 
other than those engaged in the sex. Consider Adultery:14 
 
Adultery. Ali promises their spouse Charlie that Ali will not have sex 
with anyone else. Ali then has sex with Baljit with Baljit’s consent.15 
 
14 This case is adapted from Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press 
2003) 131. 
15  Some people think it is odd to talk of one person having sex with another, because they think this 
implies that sex is something that one person does to another. For views like this, see John Gardner, 
‘The Opposite of Rape’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 48; Tanya Palmer, ‘Distinguishing 
Sex from Sexual Violation: Consent, Negotiation and Freedom to Negotiate’ in Alan Reed and others 
(eds), Consent: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2017); Rebecca Kukla, ‘That’s What She 
Said: The Language of Sexual Negotiation’ (2018) 129 Ethics 70. Elsewhere, I have suggested that this 
is not as odd as it might seem, because people have sex together by doing things to each other. Karamvir 
Chadha, ‘Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together’ (2020) 40 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 619. 
This essay is reproduced as Essay Three in this thesis. I return to related issues in section 3, ‘The 
Necessity of Consent’, below. 
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Given the promise that Ali makes to Charlie, it may seem that it is morally 
impermissible for Ali to have sex with Baljit, even though Baljit consents. If this is 
correct, then Adultery is a counterexample to Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy, because Baljit’s 
consent is insufficient to make it morally permissible for Ali to have sex with Baljit. If 
Adultery is a counterexample, then Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy is false. 
Suppose that Adultery is a counterexample, and that Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy 
is indeed false. Still, the liberal has available the following natural response. We should 
indeed accept that in Adultery it is morally impermissible for Ali to have sex with Baljit. 
However, the response continues, the explanation for why it is morally impermissible 
for Ali to do is because Ali’s doing so wrongs Charlie, rather than Baljit. By promising 
Charlie that they will not have sex with anyone else, Ali places themselves under a 
moral duty not to have sex with anyone else.16 Importantly, Ali owes this duty to Charlie. 
By having sex with someone else, Ali breaches this duty and thereby wrongs Charlie, 
morally speaking. The view that Ali wrongs Charlie (rather than, say, Baljit) is 
supported by two observations. First, Charlie can legitimately demand an apology 
from  Ali. Second, it is Charlie who is uniquely placed to forgive Ali’s behaviour, if 
Charlie chooses to do so. 
 
16 I am assuming that Ali’s promise is morally valid. I assume that for Ali’s promise to be morally valid 
requires Ali to be an adult of sound mind, whose promise is not induced by coercion or deception. For 
a discussion of the ethics of sexual promises, see Hallie Liberto, ‘The Problem with Sexual Promises’ 
(2017) 127 Ethics 383. 
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In light of this response, the liberal might instead resort to what we can call 
Revised Liberal Orthodoxy: 
 
Revised Liberal Orthodoxy. One person does not wrong another by having 
sex with them if and only if that other person consents. 
 
A proponent of Revised Liberal Orthodoxy can accept that Ali’s behaviour in Adultery 
is morally impermissible, while nevertheless insisting that it does not wrong Baljit. I 
speculate that proponents of the Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy will readily accept this 
amendment. Indeed, Archard himself suggests a similar amendment on the liberal’s 
behalf.17 
Revised Liberal Orthodoxy is in keeping with what I take to be the liberal’s 
guiding principle, which is sometimes expressed in the Latin maxim volenti non fit iniuria 
(the ‘volenti maxim’). Roughly translated, the volenti maxim means ‘no wrong is done to 
a person who consents’. Philosophers disagree about precisely how we should interpret 
the volenti maxim.18 To properly understand the volenti maxim, we need to understand 
 
17 Archard, ‘Sexual Consent’ (n 13) 175. 
18 See Joel Feinberg, ‘Legal Paternalism’ (1971) 1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 105; Michelle 
Madden Dempsey, ‘Victimless Conduct and the Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works’ (2013) 7 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 11; Peter Schaber, ‘The Volenti Maxim’ (2020) 24 The Journal of Ethics 
79. 
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what we mean by ‘wrong’ and what we mean by ‘consent’. Let us briefly consider what 
we mean by ‘wrong’ before turning to what we mean by ‘consent’. 
What is it for one person to wrong another? Perhaps surprisingly, philosophers 
have found it hard answer this question.19 For our purposes, we can simply generalise 
our observations about why Ali wrongs Charlie in Adultery. We can say that, morally 
speaking, one person wrongs another if and only if they breach a moral duty they owe 
to that person. Typically, two moral consequences follow if someone breaches such a 
duty. First, if the duty is breached, the person to whom the duty is owed can 
legitimately demand an apology from the person who breaches the duty. Second, the 
person to whom the duty is owed is uniquely placed, if they choose to do so, to forgive 
the person who breaches the duty. Now that we have a working account of what means 
for one person to wrong another, let us turn to what we mean by ‘consent’. 
 
2. What is consent? 
What does ‘consent’ mean in the volenti maxim? Philosophers tend to think that it 
cannot just mean saying, ‘I consent’. After all, if that were true, the volenti maxim would 
just mean that no wrong is done to someone who says they consent. But that is not very 
plausible. After all, someone might say they consent only because they are threatened 
at gunpoint. Instead, philosophers tend to think that the volenti maxim means this: if 
 
19 For discussion, see Michael Thompson, ‘What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice’ in R 
Jay Wallace and others (eds), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Clarendon 
Press 2004). 
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someone gives morally valid consent to another person doing something then they are not 
wronged by that person doing that thing. In this section, we examine what it means for 
someone to give morally valid consent to another person doing something. 
Philosophers tend to think that three things must be true for someone to give 
morally valid consent to another person doing something. The first thing that must be 
true is that the person giving consent must perform some action that constitutes an act 
of consent. The second thing that must be true is that the person’s consent must be 
morally valid. The third thing that must be true is that the person’s consent must be 
consent to what the other person does rather than to something else. Let us look at each of 
these requirements in more detail. 
First, for someone to give morally valid consent to another person doing 
something, the person giving the consent must perform some action that constitutes an 
act of consent.20 This raises a question: what does it take to perform an act of consent? 
I will discuss two prominent answers to this question, the ‘purely mental’ view and the 
‘successful communication’ view.21  
 
20 What I call an act of consent is what some others writers call a token of consent. Wertheimer (n 14) 2. 
Still others call this assent, and reserve the word consent for what I call morally valid consent. Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan and Peter Westen, ‘How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape’ (2017) 11 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 759. These differences are purely terminological. 
21 A third prominent view of what it takes to perform an act of consent charts an intermediate position 
between the mental state view and the successful communication view. According to the ‘attempted 
communication’ view, for someone to perform an act of consent, that person must hold a particular 
mental attitude and attempt to communicate that attitude to the recipient of their consent, even if that 
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Let us start with the ‘purely mental’ view. According to the purely mental view, 
for a person to perform an act of consent requires only that they hold a particular 
mental attitude or perform a particular mental act. There is room for disagreement 
about exactly which mental attitude or act is required. Candidate attitudes include 
intending or desiring whatever is to be consented to, or thinking to themselves that 
whatever is to be consented to is ‘okay with me’.22 As a placeholder for the relevant 
attitude or act, let us say that someone consents to another person doing something if 
they are willing for that person to do that thing. Importantly, according to the purely 
mental view, communication is not required to perform an act of consent.  
Perhaps the best motivation for the purely mental view distinguishes between 
two kinds of case:23 
Unexpressed. Yang is willing for Zoey to have sex with him, but does not 
communicate this to Zoey because he is worried it will make him seem 
 
communication is unsuccessful. Victor Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford University Press 2016) 209; 
Neil C Manson, ‘Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account’ (2016) 173 Philosophical 
Studies 3317. For reasons of space, I do not engage with the attempted communication view in this 
essay. 
22 See, respectively, Heidi M Hurd, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121; Peter 
Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to Criminal Conduct (Ashgate 
2004); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ (2016) 13 Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 43. 
23 These cases are adapted from Tom Dougherty, ‘Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence’ (2018) 46 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 90, 96–97.  
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sexually inexperienced. Though Zoey is unsure whether Yang is 
willing for Zoey to have sex with him, Zoey has sex with Yang. 
 
Unwilling. Yang is not willing for Zoey to have sex with him, but does 
not communicate this to Zoey because he is worried it will make him 
seem sexually inexperienced. Zoey has sex with Yang. Though Zoey 
is unsure whether Yang is willing for Zoey to have sex with him, Zoey 
has sex with Yang. 
 
As Tom Dougherty points out, there is an important moral difference between these 
two kinds of case.24 In Unwilling, Zoey perpetrates an especially serious kind of sexual 
offence against Yang: she has sex with him against his will. But in Unexpressed, Zoey 
does not perpetrate that kind of offence, because in that variant Yang is willing for 
Zoey to have sex with him. 
Perhaps the most plausible way to understand the purely mental view is as 
claiming that Yang’s consent that makes the difference between the two variants. Yang 
consents in Unexpressed but not in Unwilling. If that is correct, then performing an act of 
consent does not require communication.  
We can contrast the purely mental view with the ‘successful communication’ 
view. According to the successful communication view, for someone to perform an act 
 
24 ibid 97.  
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of consent requires not only that they hold a particular mental attitude, but also that 
they successfully communicate this attitude to the recipient of their consent.25 Those 
who adopt the successful communication view need not insist that the communication 
always be verbal. In some contexts, gestures may be sufficient to successfully 
communicate an attitude of consent. For example, in the context of a certain kind of 
long-term relationship, placing a condom on one’s partner’s penis may be sufficient to 
constitute an act of consent. 
To see the motivation for the successful communication view, we can reflect 
further on Unexpressed. We saw above that in Unexpressed, Zoey does not have sex with 
Yang against his will. However, Zoey’s behaviour should still give us pause. After all, 
she is unsure whether Yang is willing for her to have sex with him, but goes ahead 
anyway. By doing so, Zoey expresses disrespect for Yang, because she has sex with him 
despite being unsure about whether he is willing for her to do so.26 That disrespect is 
absent in the following variant: 
Expressed. Yang is willing for Zoey to have sex with him. Yang 
successfully communicates his willingness to Zoey. Zoey is sure that 
Yang is willing for Zoey to have sex with him. Zoey has sex with Yang. 
Perhaps the most plausible motivation for the successful communication view is that 
consent distinguishes cases like Expressed from those like Unexpressed. If that is correct, 
 
25 Tom Dougherty, ‘Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication’ (2015) 43 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
224. 
26 See Dougherty, ‘Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence’ (n 23). 
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the successful communication view provides us with one way to understand the claim 
that sexual consent is about respect for sexual autonomy. For Zoey to respect Yang’s 
sexual autonomy, her behaviour must be appropriately sensitive to whether Yang 
consents. Zoey’s behaviour can be appropriately sensitive to whether Yang consents 
only if Zoey reliably knows whether Yang consents. Zoey can reliably know whether 
Yang consents only if Yang’s consent involves him successfully communicating his 
willingness for Zoey to engage in the relevant behaviour.27 
 We can think of the purely mental view and the successful communication view 
as capturing different functions we might want consent to play. On the purely mental 
view, the function of consent is to distinguish cases like Unexpressed from those like 
Unwilling. This is the function that consent tends to play in sexual offences law such as 
the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003. On the successful communication view, the 
function of consent is to distinguish cases like Unexpressed from those like Expressed. This 
is arguably the function of consent in the ‘affirmative consent’ policies that are 
increasingly common on university campuses.28 
In this essay, I will reserve the word ‘consent’ for the purely mental view of 
what it takes for someone to perform an act of consent. On this way of talking, consent 
 
27 On Mollie Gerver’s view, it is sometimes possible for one person to reliably know whether another is 
willing for them to perform an action even if that person has not communicated their willingness. If that is 
correct, then performing an act of consent may not require communication. Mollie Gerver, ‘Inferring 
Consent Without Communication’ (2020) 46 Social Theory and Practice 27. 
28 For a discussion of affirmative consent policies, see Dougherty, ‘Affirmative Consent and Due 
Diligence’ (n 23). 
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performs the first of the two functions outlined above. However, we can also 
accommodate the insight of the successful communication view by saying ‘affirmative 
consent’ plays the second of the two functions. 
It is worth noting all interactions in which there is affirmative consent will also 
involve consent. In these interactions, a person has the mental state or attitude required 
to perform an act of consent (and thereby performs an act of consent), and successfully 
communicates that attitude to its intended recipient (and thereby performs an act of 
affirmative consent). 
 For someone to give morally valid consent to another person doing something, 
it is not enough for them to perform an act of consent—their consent must also be 
morally valid. Philosophers tend to agree that for someone’s consent to be morally valid, 
that person must be an adult of sound mind whose consent is not induced by serious 
coercion or deception.29 However, there is room for disagreement about exactly how 
to interpret each of these requirements. Consider first the requirement that the 
consent-giver must be an adult. At what age does someone become an adult? Everyone 
should agree that a very young child cannot give morally valid consent to someone 
having sexual intercourse with them. But can a 17-year-old give morally valid consent 
their 18-year-old partner having sex with them?30 We saw above that sexual consent is 
 
29 Some philosophers also believe that there are some things to which it impossible for anyone to give 
morally valid consent, such as being enslaved, or being subject to very serious physical harm. See Victor 
Tadros, ‘Consent to Harm’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 23. 
30 For a discussion of the age of valid consent to sexual intercourse, see David Archard, Sexual Consent 
(Westview Press 1998) 116–29. 
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like medical consent insofar as both concern high stakes interactions with our person. 
A natural suggestion, then, is that the age at which someone can give morally valid 
consent to sex should plausibly track the age at which they can give morally valid 
consent to medical treatment. 
Consider next the  requirement that the consent-giver be of sound mind. What 
does it mean for someone to be of sound mind? We might all agree that someone with 
very severe cognitive disability is not able to give morally valid consent to another 
person having sex with them. But  can someone with dementia give morally valid 
consent to their spouse having sex with them?31 
Now consider the issue of coercion. When does coercion undermine the validity 
of someone’s sexual consent?32 Philosophers typically agree that threatening someone 
with serious physical violence undermines the validity of that person’s consent. 
However, there might be disagreement about other cases. For example, if a boyfriend 
threatens to break up with his girlfriend unless she consents to him having sexual 
intercourse with her, does this undermine the validity of the girlfriend’s consent?33 In 
addition to being coerced by particular individuals, we might worry about structural 
 
31 For a discussion of whether it is possible for those with dementia to give morally valid consent to 
sexual intercourse, see Samuel Director, ‘Consent’s Dominion: Dementia and Prior Consent to Sexual 
Relations’ (2019) 33 Bioethics 1065. 
32 See Japa Pallikkathayil, ‘The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with Coercion’ 
(2011) 11 Philosophers’ Imprint 1; Tom Dougherty, ‘Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future’ 
[forthcoming] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
33 See Sarah Conly, ‘Seduction, Rape, and Coercion’ (2004) 115 Ethics 96. 
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coercion or oppression. We saw earlier that one feature of our actual world is the 
structural oppression of women and girls, especially in the sexual domain. In these 
circumstances, we might wonder whether it is possible for women to validly consent to 
others, especially men, having sex with them. Victor Tadros has recently suggested 
that we can distinguish between different causes of such consent, with only some kinds 
of causes having consent-invalidating effects.34 This idea deserves more consideration 
than we can give it here. 
Finally, consider the issue of deception. Can deception ever undermine the 
moral validity of someone’s consent? To illustrate the issue, consider the legal case of  
Boro v Superior Court.35 In Boro, the defendant deceived the complainant into believing 
that she had contracted a deadly disease, but that he had been injected with a serum 
which would cure her if he had sex with her. On that basis, the complainant consented 
to the defendant having sexual intercourse with her. In Boro, it seems that the 
complainant performed an act of consent to the defendant having sexual intercourse 
with her. At least arguably, however, the defendant in Boro had sex with the 
complainant without her morally valid consent. If this is correct, then a natural 
explanation for why is that the complainant’s consent was not morally valid.36 
So far, we have seen that for someone to give morally valid consent to another 
person doing something, two things must be true: first, the person trying to give consent 
 
34 Victor Tadros, ‘Consent to Sex in an Unjust World’ (2021) 131 Ethics 293. 
35 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1985) 
36 For a discussion of how deception might affect the validity of someone’s consent, see Joel Feinberg, 
‘Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent’ (1986) 96 Ethics 330. 
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must perform an act of consent; and second, that act of consent must be morally valid. 
We now turn to the third thing that must be true—namely, that the consent must be 
to what the other person does rather than to something else. To illustrate, consider the 
following case: 
 
Penetration. Bernice consents to Ace inserting his penis into her vagina. 
Bernice is an adult of sound mind whose consent is not induced by 
coercion or deception. Ace instead inserts his penis into Bernice’s anus. 
 
In Penetration, Bernice plausibly gives her morally valid consent to Ace doing something—
namely, inserting his penis into her vagina. However, Ace does something else—
namely, insert his penis into her anus.  Similar issues arose in some nineteenth century 
legal cases. For example, in R v Flattery,37 the complainant arguably gave morally valid 
consent to the defendant performing a surgical operation on her, whereas the 
defendant instead had sexual intercourse with her.38 In a later case, a judge reviewing 
Flattery and other similar cases said that in such cases, ‘the act consented to is not the 
 
37  (1877) 1 QBD 410. 
38 It is arguable that the complainant in Flattery did not give morally valid consent even to the defendant 
performing a surgical operation on her, for two reasons. First, the complainant may have been a minor 
rather than an adult and therefore unable to give morally valid consent. Second, the defendant deceived 
the complainant into consenting, which may have undermined the validity of her consent.   
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act done. Consent to a surgical operation… is not consent to sexual [intercourse]’.39 In 
other words, even if the complainant in each of these cases gave morally valid consent 
to the defendant doing something, the defendant did something else. As a result, the 
complainant did not give morally valid consent to what the defendant did. Philosophers 
sometimes say that in such cases, what the defendant does is outside the moral scope of 
the complainant’s consent.40 
 Importantly, cases like Penetration are different from cases like Boro. In Boro, the 
complainant performed an act of consent to the defendant having sexual intercourse 
with her, but this act of consent was induced by deception and arguably on that basis 
was not morally valid. By contrast, in Penetration, Bernice plausibly gives her morally 
valid consent to Ace doing something—namely, inserting his penis into her vagina. 
However, Ace does something else—namely, insert his penis into her anus. 
 What determines the range of actions to which someone consents? For 
example, in Penetration, what determines that Bernice gives morally valid consent to 
vaginal but not anal penetration? The purely mental view outlined above offers a 
natural answer. According to that view, someone consents to another person doing 
something if and only if they are willing for that person to do that thing. To determine 
what Bernice consents to, then, we need to ask what she is willing for Ace to do. In 
Penetration, Bernice is willing for Ace to penetrate her vagina with his penis but not for 
 
39 R v Clarence [1889] 22 QBD 23, 44. 
40 On the moral scope of consent, see Tom Dougherty, The Scope of Consent (Oxford University Press 
forthcoming). 
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Ace to penetrate her anus with his penis.41 This will sometimes mean that someone is 
unsure whether their sexual partner gives morally valid consent to some things rather 
than others. For example, if in Penetration Bernice says she consents to sex with Ace, this 
may leave Ace unsure about whether Bernice consents to vaginal penetration or anal 
penetration. If Ace is unsure, he should ask Bernice about what she is willing for him 
to do. 
Having considered what it takes for someone to give morally valid consent to 
another person doing something, we are now in a position to understand the volenti 
maxim. We can state the volenti maxim, properly understood, as follows: 
 
Volenti maxim. If one person gives morally valid consent to another 
person doing something, then he does not wrong her by doing that 
thing. 
 
Why might someone believe the volenti maxim, so understood? Recall that one person 
wrongs another if and only if they breach a moral duty they owe to that person. 
Philosophers tend to agree that individuals owe each other default moral duties not to 
do certain things to them. However, a person’s morally valid consent to another 
person’s doing these things releases that person from these default moral duties. For 
 
41 For more detailed discussion of the scope of consent, see Neil M Manson, ‘The Scope of Consent’ in 
Andreas Müller and Peter Schaber (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018); 
Dougherty, The Scope of Consent (n 40). 
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example, when it comes to sex, philosophers tend to agree that by default, individuals 
owe each other moral duties not to have sex with each other. However, if someone 
gives their morally valid consent to another person having sex with them, they release 
that person from this default moral duty. As a result, if that person were to have sex 
with them, that person would no longer breach that duty, and consequently would not 
wrong the consent-giver. 
Applying the volenti maxim to the sexual domain we can say this: one person 
does not wrong another by having sex with her if that she gives her morally valid 
consent to his doing so. We can put this in more natural language as follows: 
 
Sufficiency of Consent. If one person gives morally valid consent to 
another person having sex with her, then he does not wrong her by 
doing so.42 
 
We should distinguish the Sufficiency of Consent from a different claim, which we can 
call the Necessity of Consent: 
 
Necessity of Consent. If one person has sex with another person without 
her morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby wrongs her. 
 
42 The Sufficiency of Consent, the Necessity of Consent, and Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy use 
gendered pronouns only for economy of expression. Either person could be of any gender.  
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We should apply our understanding of morally valid consent not just to the volenti 
maxim but also to Revised Liberal Orthodoxy. If we do this, we get what we can call 
Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy: 
 
Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy. One person does not wrong another by 
having sex her if and only if that she gives morally valid consent to his 
doing so. 
 
Taken together, the Sufficiency of Consent and the Necessity of Consent are equivalent 
to Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy. Accordingly, we can assess whether Sophisticated 
Liberal Orthodoxy is true in two steps. The first is to assess whether the Sufficiency of 
Consent is true. The second step is to assess whether the Necessity of Consent is true. 
Let us take each step in turn. 
 
3. The Sufficiency of Consent 
In this section, we will examine the first element of Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy—
the Sufficiency of Consent. We will first briefly consider an argument for the 
Sufficiency of Consent. We will then consider an argument against it. We will see that 
neither argument is decisive. To make progress, I suggest we might resort to broader 
theoretical considerations about the relation between sexual morality and morality 
more generally. 
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Let us start by considering an argument for the Sufficiency of Consent, made 
by Igor Primoratz.43 Primoratz considers and rejects various conditions, besides 
morally valid consent, that other people claim must be satisfied for it to be true that 
one person does not wrong another by having sex with them. For example, Primoratz 
considers and rejects what we can call the procreative marital sex condition, according 
to which the sex must be for procreation within a monogamous marriage between the 
two individuals. Primoratz also considers and rejects the mutual romantic love 
condition, according to which the two individuals must share certain intentional 
attitudes characteristic of mutual romantic love. Let us assume that Primoratz is correct 
that we should reject both the procreative marital sex condition and the mutual 
romantic love condition. 
Even if  Primoratz is correct that we should reject the conditions he considers, 
this is not enough to establish the truth of the Sufficiency of Consent. To see this, 
consider the following example, which is adapted from Seiriol Morgan’s discussion of 
the Vicomte de Valmont’s seduction of Madame de Tourvel in Pierre Laclos’ novel, 
Les Liaisons Dangereuses:44 
 
Dangerous Liaisons. Madame de Tourvel has built her identity around 
being chaste. She has never given her morally valid consent to anyone 
 
43 Igor Primoratz, ‘Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?’ (2001) 4 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
201. 
44 Seiriol Morgan, ‘Dark Desires’ (2003) 6 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 377, 381. 
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having sex with her. For the Vicomte, this makes her particularly 
appealing target for seduction. Madame de Tourvel is an adult of 
sound mind. Without using coercion or deception, the Vicomte 
convinces her to perform an act of consent to his having sexual 
intercourse with her. The Vicomte then has sex with Madame de 
Tourvel, and this destroys her sense of her own identity. 
 
Morgan seems to believe that the Vicomte wrongs the Madame de Tourvel by having 
sex with her. Suppose this is correct.45 Morgan also believes that the Madame de 
 
45 In the main text, I have focused on  Morgan’s argument because it is the best developed in the 
philosophical literature. However, in sexual ethics, individuals often differ in their intuitions about 
particular cases. Not everyone will agree that the Vicomte wrongs Madame de Tourvel in Dangerous 
Liaisons despite having her morally valid consent to sex. For them, the specifics of Morgan’s argument 
will be unpersuasive. However, there are plausibly other examples in which someone has another 
person’s morally valid consent to sex but nevertheless wrongs that person by having sex with them. 
Consider ‘race play’. Race play is ‘a subset of BDSM where the focus of the imbalance of the role play 
stems from the races of the people in question. In practice, this often presents as people of colour role 
playing as slaves, or people of Jewish heritage role playing as prisoners’. Rebecca Reid, ‘Exploring the 
Controversial Fetish of Race Play’ Metro (3 November 2017) 
<https://metro.co.uk/2017/11/03/exploring-the-controversial-fetish-of-race-play-7051288/>. 
Plausibly, a person of colour, Amardeep,  can give valid consent to sex involving race play with Bart. 
After all, if they have sex involving race play, it does not seem that the Bart wrongs Amardeep in the 
same way as he would if, for example, he coerced Amardeep into sex (and for that reason lacked 
Amardeep’s valid consent to sex). It is also plausible that despite having Amardeep’s valid consent to sex 
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Tourvel gives her morally valid consent to the Vicomte having sex with her. After all, 
she has an adult of sound mind whose act of consent to the Vicomte having sex with 
her is not induced by coercion or deception. On Morgan’s view, then, Dangerous Liaisons 
is a counterexample to the Sufficiency of Consent. If that is correct, then the Sufficiency 
of Consent is false. 
Morgan suggests the following explanation for why the Vicomte wrongs the 
Madame de Tourvel. According to Morgan, the Vicomte owes the Madame a duty of 
benevolence, and the Vicomte breaches this duty by having sex with the Madame 
despite knowing that it will destroy her sense of identity. On Morgan’s view, the 
Madame’s morally valid consent to the Vicomte’s having sex with her cannot release 
him from this duty of benevolence. 
 In response to this suggestion, a defender of the Sufficiency of Consent might 
insist that the Madame’s morally valid consent could in principle release the Vicomte 
from the duty of benevolence he owes her, but that the Madame does not really give 
her morally valid consent to his having sex with her. For this response to succeed, 
 
involving race play, Bart nevertheless wrongs Amardeep by engaging in such sex. It is difficult to say 
precisely why Bart wrongs Amardeep, but perhaps it is because he disrespects her on racial grounds. If 
something like this is correct, then this is another example where someone has another person’s morally 
valid consent to sex but nevertheless wrongs that person by having sex with them. Ultimately, however, 
it seems unlikely we will decisively settle whether the Sufficiency of Consent is true exclusively by relying 
on individuals’ intuitions about particular cases. Another strategy is to resort to broader theoretical 
considerations about the role of consent and other so-called ‘normative powers’. For a preliminary 
exploration of this strategy, see Victor Tadros, ‘Appropriate Normative Powers’ (2020) 94 Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume 301. 
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however, there must be more conditions on morally valid consent than the ones 
outlined above—after all, the Madame is an adult of sound mind whose act of consent 
to the Vicomte having sex with her is not induced by coercion or deception. 
 In light of this response, we have two options. On the one hand, we might add 
further conditions into what it takes for someone to give morally valid consent to 
another person having sex with them. The more conditions we add, the more plausible 
the Sufficiency of Consent becomes. On the other hand, we might say that all it takes 
for someone to give morally valid consent to another person having sex with them is 
that they are an adult of sound mind whose consent is not induced by coercion or 
deception. If we say this,  then—assuming the Vicomte wrongs the Madame in 
Dangerous Liaisons—the Sufficiency of Consent is false. 
 How should we decide which option to choose? There is no straightforward 
argument that decisively favours one option over the other. However, one way to make 
progress is to shift our focus to broader theoretical considerations. For example, we 
can consider the relation between sexual morality and morality more generally. 
Plausibly, sexual morality is governed by the same principles that govern morality more 
generally.46 If that assumption is correct, then the Sufficiency of Consent is true only if 
the following more general principle is true: If one person gives morally valid consent 
 
46 For a similar argument in the context of Just War Theory, see Helen Frowe, ‘The Just War 
Framework’ in Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford University 
Press 2018). 
- 46 - 
 
to another person doing something, then he does not wrong her by doing that thing. 
Note that this more general principle is the volenti maxim. 
Some philosophers press this argument even further, claiming that most people 
deny this more general principle.47 This is equivalent to claiming that most people deny 
the volenti maxim. These philosophers claim most people believe that non-sexual 
morality is governed not only by considerations of morally valid consent, but also by 
considerations such as duties of benevolence.48 If a person’s morally valid consent 
cannot release others from the duties of benevolence that others owe that person 
outside the sexual domain, these philosophers conclude, then nor can it release them 
from the duties of benevolence they owe them within the sexual domain. To work out 
whether the Sufficiency of Consent is true, then, we need to work out whether the 
volenti maxim is true. And to do this, we need to consider morality outside the sexual 
domain.  
 In this section, we have seen that neither Primoratz’s argument for the 
Sufficiency of Consent nor Morgan’s argument against it is decisive. I have suggested 
that given a plausible assumption, we can say that the Sufficiency of Consent is true 
only if the following more general principle is true: If one person gives morally valid 
consent to another person doing something, then he does not wrong her by doing that 
thing. This more general principle is the volenti maxim. To work out whether the volenti 
maxim is true, we need to consider morality outside the sexual domain. 
 
47 Jonathan Webber, ‘Sex’ (2009) 84 Philosophy 233. 
48 Piers Benn, ‘Is Sex Morally Special?’ (1999) 16 Journal of Applied Philosophy 235. 
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4. The Necessity of Consent 
In this section, we turn our attention to the Necessity of Consent, which is the second 
element of Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy. 
 Recall that Necessity of Consent states: 
 
Necessity of Consent. If one person has sex with another person without 
her morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby wrongs her. 
 
The Necessity of Consent is extremely plausible. Recall that one person wrongs 
another if and only if they breach a duty they owe to that person. Recall also that 
individuals owe each other default moral duties not to have sex each other. If one 
person has sex with another person without her morally valid consent to his doing so, 
he breaches the duty he owes her not to do so. It follows that he thereby wrongs her. 
The two consequences that typically follow from such wronging are again present. 
First, she is entitled to demand an apology from him. Second, she is uniquely placed 
to forgive him, if she chooses to do so. (Indeed, we will see later that his behaviour 
should subject to criminal punishment.) 
Despite the plausibility of the Necessity of Consent, some philosophers have 
recently denied it. They argue that it is a kind of category mistake to conceptualise 
sexual morality in terms of consent, because consent is something you give to actions 
that others do to you rather than with you. 
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This view requires some explanation. Perhaps its clearest formulation is in the 
work of John Gardner.49 According to this view, one person needs another person’s 
morally valid consent only if the first person do something to the second. To illustrate, 
think of a non-sexual situation in which one person needs another person’s morally 
valid consent. If a doctor injects a patient with a vaccine, the doctor needs the patient’s 
morally valid consent to her doing so—otherwise, she wrongs the patient. The injection 
is something that the doctor does to the patient. In respect of the injection, the doctor 
is active, and the patient is passive. She is the agent, and he is quite literally the patient. 
So, the argument continues, if sex as something for which one needs another person’s 
morally valid consent, then sex is something that the first person does to the second—
something in respect of which the first person active and the second is passive. 
However, the argument continues, the best sexual interactions are not properly 
characterised as one person doing something to another. Rather, the best sexual 
interactions are those involving the kind of mutuality that makes sex a joint action—
interactions in which two people have sex together. In such interactions, the argument 
goes, consent is both inapposite and unnecessary. Consent is inapposite because neither 
person is doing anything to the other. Consent is unnecessary because the interaction 
involves something better than consent—namely, the kind of mutuality that makes sex 
a joint action. 
As I have argued elsewhere, I believe this view is mistaken.50 For even if we 
accept that the best sexual interactions are characterised as joint actions, these joint 
 
49 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15). 
50 Chadha (n 15). The material for this article is reproduced as Essay Three in this thesis. 
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actions involve individual sub-actions. For example, where a cis-man and a cis-woman 
engage in the joint action of having sex together, this characteristically involves him 
penetrating her vagina with his penis, and her enveloping his penis with her vagina. 
These sub-actions are things that each of them does to the other. In respect of the 
penetration, he is active and she is passive. In respect of the envelopment, she is active 
and he is passive. To avoid wronging the other, each person needs the other’s morally 
valid consent to the sub-action in respect of which they are active and the other is 
passive. To avoid wronging her, he needs her morally valid consent to his penetrating 
her vagina with his penis. To avoid wronging him, she needs his morally valid consent 
to his enveloping his penis with her vagina. Provided we are clear about the sub-actions 
for which consent is necessary, then, the Necessity of Consent is true—or rather, the 
argument from sexual joint action gives us no reason to believe that it is false. 
 
5. Consent, Harm, and Criminalisation 
In the previous section, we examined the plausibility of the Necessity of Consent, and 
I argued that it is true. Notice that the Necessity of Consent is a claim about whether 
one person wrongs another by having sex with her. We should distinguish the Necessity 
of Consent from a similar claim, which concerns whether one person harms another by 
having sex with her. Let us call this other claim the Sexual Harming Claim: 
 
Sexual Harming Claim. If one person has sex with another person 
without her morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby 
harms her. 
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Like the Necessity of Consent, the Sexual Harming Claim is, on its face, extremely 
plausible. To see why it is plausible, recall that one person might lack another’s consent 
to his having sex with her for three reasons. First, she might not even perform an act 
of consent, as when she is not willing for him to do anything. Second, she might 
perform an act of consent which is not morally valid, either because she is not an adult 
or because the act of consent is induced by serious coercion or deception. Third, she 
might give her morally valid consent to him doing something other than having sex 
with her, such as performing surgery on her. According to the Sexual Harming Claim, 
if in any one of these three situations he has sex with her, he thereby harms her. To 
many, these will seem like paradigmatic cases of one person harming another.  
Despite the plausibility of the Sexual Harming Claim, some philosophers deny 
that it is true. These philosophers tend to distinguish carefully between the Sexual 
Harming Claim and the Necessity of Consent. This may seem puzzling. After all, non-
philosophers tend not to distinguish carefully between harming someone and wronging 
them. If we treat these two notions as equivalent, then the Sexual Harming Claim is 
equivalent to the to the Necessity of Consent.  However, moral philosophers do tend 
to distinguish between wronging someone and harming them. To help us understand 
the distinction, let us take a closer look at the Sexual Harming Claim. 
To understand the Sexual Harming Claim, we need to understand what it is 
for one person to harm another. Harm has been conceptualised a number of different 
ways by different philosophers. But one especially influential account says that to harm 
someone is to set back or undermine their interests, where an interest just means an 
- 51 - 
 
aspect of their wellbeing.51 Wellbeing, too, is understood in various ways, but we can 
think of an ‘aspect of a person’s wellbeing’ as something that is good for that person—
something that makes that person’s life go better. Now, in some ways, this just kicks 
the can further down the road, because there is a lot of disagreement among 
philosophers about precisely what things are good for people, or what makes something 
good for a person—that is, what their wellbeing consists in—and therefore about what 
their interests actually are.52 However, some interests will feature on any plausible list. 
For example, most people would agree that we all have an interest in being free from 
arbitrary or extreme physical pain, especially if it is not serving some instrumental 
purpose. In other words, our lives tend to go better to the extent that we are not 
subjected to such pain. Similarly, it is plausible that we have an interest being free from 
psychological trauma and emotional distress.  
 We can now see why the Sexual Harming Claim is plausible. It is typically true 
that if one person has sex with another without her morally valid consent to his doing 
so, then he thereby harms her. Typically, he sets back her interests in being free from 
physical pain, psychological trauma, and emotional distress. 
 
51 For classic discussions, see Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 1987); Raz (n 
5). 
52 For a useful introduction to some key accounts of wellbeing, see Roger Crisp, ‘Well-Being’ in Edward 
N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University 2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/> accessed 27 
May 2020. 
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It might seem implausible that there are any cases in which one person has sex 
with another without her morally valid consent to his doing so, without thereby 
harming her. To illustrate what those who deny the Sexual Harming Claim have in 
mind, consider Unconscious Rape:53 
 
Unconscious Rape. Ashley is unconscious. Bob has sexual intercourse 
with Ashley, using a condom while doing so. Since Ashley is 
unconscious, Ashley suffers no physical pain, no psychological trauma 
and no emotional distress. Neither Ashley nor anyone else ever 
discovers what has happened. 
 
We should all agree that Bob wrongs Ashley in Unconscious Rape. Bob clearly breaches a 
moral duty he owes Ashley. Moreover, we should all agree that the state can 
legitimately criminalise Bob’s behaviour.54 In addition to wronging Ashley, does Bob 
also harm her? Some philosophers believe that he does not. If that is correct, then the 
Sexual Harming Claim is false. These philosophers do not say explicitly why they 
believe that Bob does not harm Ashley in Unconscious Rape. However, if those who deny 
the Sexual Harming Claim are correct, it must be because Bob does not set back any 
interest of Ashley’s in this case. As we will see later, because the legal system should 
 
53 This example is adapted from John Gardner and Stephen Shute, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’, Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 2000). 
54 See Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 106–07; ibid 201–03. 
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criminalise and punish Bob’s behaviour, the way we think about Unconscious Rape has 
significant implications for the principles that constrain legitimate criminalisation and 
punishment.  
 It is true that none of the interests we identified above is set back in Unconscious 
Rape. Bob does not set back Ashley’s interest in being free from physical pain: after all, 
Ashley is not in pain because Ashley is unconscious. For the same reason, Bob does not 
set back Ashley’s interest in being free from psychological trauma or emotional distress. 
Whether those who deny the Sexual Harming Claim are correct, therefore, depends 
on whether there is any other interest of Ashley’s which Bob does set back in Unconscious 
Rape. 
 Can we identify an interest of Ashley’s that Bob sets back in Unconscious Rape? 
To do this, we need to consider a broader range of interests than the ones we have 
identified so far. So far, all the interests we have identified have been experiential interests. 
Ashley’s interest in being free from pain is Ashley’s interest in not experiencing pain. 
Similarly, Ashley’s interest in being free from psychological trauma is Ashley’s interest 
in not experiencing psychological trauma, and Ashley’s interest in being free from 
emotional distress is Ashley’s interest in not experiencing emotional distress. However, it 
is plausible that not all interests are experiential interests. And this point is not limited 
to the sexual domain. To illustrate, consider the following example from Roger Crisp:55 
 
 
55 Roger Crisp, ‘Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy’ (1990) 17 Journal of 
Law and Society 77, 81. 
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Committee. At the age of twenty-two years, you are approached by a 
committee composed of middle-aged friends and members of your 
family. They point out to you a number of serious wrong turns you 
have made in your life so far (you left school too early, embarked on a 
tedious and unfulfilling career, bought a time-share in a hovel, and so 
on), and tell you that, purely out of love and respect for you, they are 
prepared to take over the running of your life. In future, you will be 
protected from the sort of mistakes which you are now regretting. 
Your first reaction is likely to be doubt. But the committee can point 
to various other people whom it has helped. On reflection, you realize 
that the committee will run the remainder of your life better than you, 
in the sense that there will be fewer wrong turns. The question is: will 
you surrender control of your life? 
 
Crisp speculates that many of us would be reluctant to hand over control of our lives 
in such circumstances. If that is correct, then we implicitly accept that there is more to 
our wellbeing than an education, a job, and holidays. As Crisp puts it, ‘one’s wellbeing 
is constituted partly by the very living of one’s life oneself, as opposed to having it led 
for one by others’.56 Crisp and others call this our interest in autonomy. 
 If Ashley has an interest in autonomy, then in Unconscious Rape, Bob harms 
Ashley. This is because Ashley’s interest autonomy includes controlling whether others 
 
56 ibid 82. 
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have sex with Ashley, and Bob sets back this interest by having sex with Ashley without 
Ashley’s morally valid consent to his doing so. Matthew Gibson holds just such a view. 
On Gibson’s view, one person harms another in cases like Unconscious Rape by setting 
back that person’s interest in ‘sexual autonomy’—that is to say, their interest in 
autonomy over their sex life.57 
 Some people might deny that we have an interest in autonomy. This might be 
because, for example, they insist that there are no non-experiential components to 
wellbeing. If that is correct, then in Unconscious Rape, Bob does not harm Ashley, and 
the Sexual Harming Claim is false. 
At this point, we might ask why it matters whether the Sexual Harming Claim 
is true. After all, non-philosophers tend not to distinguish between wronging someone 
and harming them, and we have already accepted that Bob does wrong Ashley. 
The truth of the Sexual Harming Claim is important for those who accept an 
influential view of the relationship between liberal political philosophy and the criminal 
law. That view has its roots in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, who famously 
claimed in his book, On Liberty, that ‘the only purpose for which power can rightfully 
be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
 
57 Matthew Gibson, ‘Deceptive Sexual Relations: A Theory of Criminal Liability’ (2020) 40 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 82, 100–01. For more on how consent protects sexual autonomy, see Stephen 
J Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex (Harvard University Press 2000). 
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harm to others’.58  Philosophers disagree about precisely how to interpret this claim.59 
However, they tend to agree that the criminal law is one way in which the state 
exercises power over its citizens. As a result, liberal political philosophers tend agree 
that on the best interpretation, Mill’s claim is at least partly about when it is legitimate 
for the state to criminalise someone’s behaviour.  For our purposes, we can interpret 
Mill’s claim as follows: 
 
Harm Principle. It is legitimate for the state to criminalise a person’s 
behaviour only if that behaviour harms another person. 
 
For those who accept the Harm Principle, the Sexual Harming Claim is important. 
According to the Harm Principle, it is legitimate for the state to criminalise a person’s 
behaviour only if that behaviour harms another person. Almost everyone agrees that 
it is legitimate for the state to criminalise a person’s behaviour where he has sex with 
another person without her morally valid consent to his doing so. Indeed, this seems 
to be a paradigm case in which it is legitimate for the state to criminalise someone’s 
behaviour. If all this is correct, then the Sexual Harming Claim must be true. It must 
be true that if one person has sex with another without her morally valid consent to his 
doing so, then he thereby harms that person. 
 
58 John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol 18 (University of Toronto 
Press 1977) 281. 
59 See James Edwards, ‘Harm Principles’ (2014) 20 Legal Theory 253. 
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 Even those who deny the  Sexual Harming Claim should accept that it is 
legitimate for the state to criminalise Bob’s behaviour in Unconscious Rape. However, to 
accept this, those who deny the Sexual Harming Claim must reject the Harm Principle 
as it is formulated above. One option is to reinterpret the Harm Principle. For example, 
we might suggest that it is legitimate for the state to criminalise someone’s behaviour 
where not  criminalising that behaviour would lead to more harm overall. This is the 
strategy that Gardner and Shute pursue, and it leads them to suggest that it is legitimate 
for the state to criminalise the behaviour of people like Bob.60 Another option is to 
replace the Harm Principle altogether with another principle governing when it is 
legitimate for the state to criminalise a person’s behaviour. For example, one 
suggestion is to replace the Harm Principle with a Sovereignty Principle, and to say 
that the requirements of the Sovereignty Principle are satisfied in cases like Unconscious 
Rape.61 To evaluate whether this is plausible, we would need to know more about the 
Sovereignty Principle. I will not pursue that task here. A third option is, roughly 
speaking, a mix of the first two. This third option both reinterprets the Harm Principle 
and adds at least one other principle that provides a sufficient condition for when it is 
legitimate for the state to criminalise someone’s behaviour, even if that behaviour does 
not harm another person. For example, we might say that it is legitimate for the state 
to criminalise someone’s behaviour if that behaviour either (a) harms another person, 
or (b) seriously wrongs another person, even if it does not harm that person.62 This third 
 
60 Gardner and Shute (n 53). 
61 See Arthur Ripstein, ‘Beyond the Harm Principle’ (2006) 34 Philosophy & Public Affairs 215. 
62 For a view like this, see Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 107.  
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option is especially attractive where one person’s behaviour seriously wrongs another 
even though it does not harm them. Those who deny that Bob harms Ashley tend to 
believe that Unconscious Rape is just such an example. If that is correct, then according 
to this third option it is legitimate for the state to criminalise Bob’s behaviour because 
it seriously wrongs Ashley, even if it does not harm her.63 
 
6. Conclusion 
We began by considering what we called Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy regarding sexual 
consent. According to Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy, it is morally permissible for one 
person to have sex with another if and only if that other person consents. I argued that 
Naïve Liberal Orthodoxy is implausible and that we should reject it, because sex is 
sometimes morally impermissible due to its effects on third parties. However, we have 
seen that there is a Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy regarding sexual consent that is 
more plausible. According to Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy, one person does not 
wrong another by having sex with her if and only if she gives morally valid consent to 
his doing so. I have suggested that we should interpret Sophisticated Liberal 
Orthodoxy in light of the liberal commitment to the volenti maxim. We evaluated the 
plausibility of Sophisticated Liberal Orthodoxy interpreted this way by breaking it 
down into two steps: the Sufficiency of Consent and the Necessity of Consent. 
 
63 Interestingly, according to some recent scholarship, Mill himself may best be interpreted as claiming 
that, in deciding whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalise someone’s behaviour, whether the 
supposed victim gives is morally valid consent to the behaviour is more important than whether that 
person is harmed. See Ben Saunders, ‘Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle’ (2016) 125 Mind 1005. 
- 59 - 
 
We first considered the plausibility of the Sufficiency of Consent. According to 
the Sufficiency of Consent, if one person gives morally valid consent to another person 
having sex with her, then he does not wrong her by doing so. We saw that neither 
Primoratz’s argument for the Sufficiency of Consent nor Morgan’s argument against 
it is decisive. To make progress, I suggested, we might resort to broader theoretical 
considerations about the relationship between sexual morality and morality more 
generally. Given a plausible assumption about this relationship, we can say that the 
Sufficiency of Consent is true only if the following more general principle is true: If one 
person gives morally valid consent to another person doing something, then he does 
not wrong her by doing that thing. This principle is the volenti maxim. To work out 
whether the Sufficiency of Consent is true, then, we need to work out whether the 
volenti maxim is true. And to do this, we need to consider morality outside the sexual 
domain. 
Next, we considered the plausibility of the Necessity of Consent. According to 
the Necessity of Consent, if one person has sex with another person without her 
morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby wrongs her. We noted that the 
Necessity of Consent is on its face extremely plausible, but there is an increasingly 
influential argument against it. According to that argument, individuals engaged in 
ideal sex do not need each other’s morally valid consent, because they have something 
better than consent—namely, the kind of mutuality that makes sex a joint action. I 
argued that this argument is mistaken, because such sexual joint action involves 
individual sub-actions for which each person needs the other’s morally valid consent. 
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Finally, we distinguished the Necessity of Consent from the Sexual Harming 
Claim. According to the Sexual Harming Claim, if one person has sex with another 
person without her morally valid consent to his doing so, then he thereby harms her. 
We saw that the Sexual Harming Claim is plausible only if we have a notion of harm 
that covers more than merely experiential harms. We then asked why it matters 
whether the Sexual Harming Claim is true. We saw that it matters for those who accept 
that it is legitimate for the state to criminalise the behaviour of people like Bob in 
Unconscious Rape, while also accepting the Harm Principle, which states that it is 
legitimate for the state to criminalise a person’s behaviour only if that behaviour harms 
another person. 
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Essay Two 




Abstract: There are two distinct ways for someone to place conditions on 
their morally valid consent. The first is to place conditions on the moral scope 
of their consent—whereby they waive some moral claim rights but not 
others. The second is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition 
affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. Understanding this 
distinction helps make progress with debates about so-called ‘conditional 
consent’ to sexual intercourse in English law, and with understanding how 
individuals place conditions on their morally valid consent in other contexts. 
 
1. Introduction 
An English court recently had to decide whether to extradite WikiLeaks founder Julian 
Assange to Sweden to face rape charges.64 Discussing Assange’s interactions with a 
woman known as AA, the court said, ‘if AA had made it clear that she would only 
consent to sexual intercourse if Mr Assange used a condom,’ then a jury could hold 
that ‘there would be no consent if … he did not use a condom’.65 Subsequent legal 
judgments appear to suggest that it is possible for someone to consent to sexual 
 
64 This essay is published as Karamvir Chadha, ‘Conditional Consent’ [2021] Law and Philosophy 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-020-09400-8> accessed 19 February 2021. 
65 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) at [86]. 
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intercourse on the condition that their partner does not ejaculate inside them,66 or on 
the condition that their partner is a cisgender man.67 According to the Crown 
Prosecution Service, these judgments suggest a ‘developing concept of conditional 
consent’. But the CPS notes the ‘absence of clear authority as to how far the concept 
extends’.68 Legal commentators likewise observe that the courts must now address 
‘whether the concept of conditional consent ought to be extended to other situations’.69 
The recent judgments cast doubt on previous judgments, in which the courts 
took the view that the defendant had the complainant’s legally valid consent to sexual 
intercourse despite breaching the complainant’s condition that he not have HIV,70 or 
that the two be married beforehand.71 
Perhaps the most famous of these older judgments is Linekar, in which a 
prostitute consented to Linekar having sexual intercourse with her on the condition 
 
66 R (on the application of F) v DPP and A [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin). 
67 R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051. 
68 Crown Prosecution Service, Rape and Sexual Offences, Chapter 3: Consent, 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/rape-and-sexual-offences-chapter-3-consent> (accessed 13 
October 2020). 
69 Gavin A Doig and Natalie Wortley, ‘Conditional Consent? An Emerging Concept in the Law of 
Rape’ (2013) 77 The Journal of Criminal Law 286, 291.  
70 R v Dica (Mohammed) [2004] EWCA Crim 1103; R v Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 
71 R v Papadimitropoulos (1957) 98 CLR 249 (High Court of Australia). 
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that he paid her £25 afterwards.72 After having sexual intercourse with the prostitute, 
however, Linekar absconded without paying her. The court took the view that the 
prostitute had given legally valid consent to Linekar having sexual intercourse with 
her. 
Should the law of conditional consent be extended to cases like Linekar? The 
existing academic literature leaves the answer to this question unsettled, because 
contributors to that literature differ in their intuitions about cases like Linekar. Some 
commentators have the intuition that there is an important difference between cases 
like Assange and those like Linekar.73 They might be prepared to believe that a defendant 
who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in breach of a condom-wearing 
condition lacks the complainant’s valid consent to his having sexual intercourse with 
 
72 R v Linekar (Gareth) [1995] QB 250 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division). The case report leaves the 
precise details of the condition unclear. One leading criminal law textbook describes it as a case in which 
‘payment was the condition of consent’. AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: 
Theory and Doctrine (6 edition, Hart Publishing 2016) 794. But others describe Linekar as a case in which 
it was not payment, but rather Linekar’s promise of payment, which was the condition of consent. G 
Syrota, ‘Rape: When Does Fraud Vitiate Consent?’ 25 Western Australia Law Review 334. See also the 
discussion in R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA 1699 at [27]. Since the former view is more common, I assume it 
for simplicity. 
73 See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford University Press 1986) 300. See also Joan McGregor, Is It 
Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women’s Sexual Consent Seriously (Routledge 2005) 186; Wertheimer 
(n 14) 207. Each of these authors discusses consent induced by deception rather than conditional 
consent, but I speculate that their position would be similar with respect to both issues. Indeed, as I say 
in n 77, below, the existing literature does not always clearly distinguish these two issues. 
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her. But they find it hard to believe that the same is true of a defendant who has sexual 
intercourse with a complainant in breach of a payment condition. Other 
commentators have different intuitions about cases like Linekar. They believe that there 
is no relevant difference between someone consenting on the condition that their 
partner wears a condom, and someone consenting on the condition that their partner 
pays them afterwards. A defendant who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in 
breach of either condition lacks the complainant’s valid consent to his action.74 Liberal 
sexual morality, they say, requires us to respect ‘individuals’ freedom to set their own 
limits to their consent, be these wide or narrow.’75 On this view, it is illiberal to treat 
sexual intercourse in breach of some conditions but not others as lacking valid consent. 
Individuals should, in light of their own conception of the sexual good, be able to place 
whatever conditions they like on their sexual consent. 
In this essay, I advance two theses. The first, and most important, is that there 
are two distinct ways for A to place conditions on her morally valid consent. One is for 
A to restrict the moral scope of her consent—whereby she waives some moral claim rights 
but not others. The other is for A to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition 
affects whether A waives any moral claim rights at all. 
 
 
74 Jonathan Herring, ‘Does Yes Mean Yes? The Criminal Law and Mistaken Consent to Sexual 
Activity’ (2002) 22 Singapore Law Review 182; Jonathan Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Criminal Law 
Review 511. Herring is concerned primarily with consent induced by mistake, though in ‘Does Yes 
Mean Yes?’ he often writes in terms of conditions on consent. 
75 Simon Gardner, ‘Appreciating Olugboja’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 275, 281. 
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My second thesis is that understanding the distinction between moral scope 
restriction and conditional tokening helps make progress with legal debates about so-
called ‘conditional consent’ to sexual intercourse in English law. To help make progress 
with those legal debates, I start by assuming that if B has sexual intercourse with A 
without A’s morally valid consent to B’s doing so, then B’s action constitutes a moral 
wrong that ought to be criminalised.76 More generally, I make what I shall call the 
Tracking Assumption: 
Tracking Assumption: Whether A gives legally valid consent to B’s action 
ought to track whether A gives morally valid consent to that action. 
I argue that, given some plausible assumptions, the defendant acts without the 
complainant’s morally valid consent to his action both in Assange and in cases like 
Linekar. Accordingly, I argue that it ought to be the case that he lacks the complainant’s 
legally valid consent to his action. We shall see, however, that it does not follow 
automatically that the defendant’s behaviour should be criminalised using the same 
offence in each kind of case. Indeed, I suggest that each set of commentators on cases 
like Assange and Linekar plausibly gets something right. One set of commentators is 
correct that in both kinds of case, the defendant acts without the complainant’s morally 
valid consent to his action. But the other set of commentators may be correct that there 
is an important moral difference between the two kinds of case―a difference in why 
the defendant lacks the complainant’s morally valid consent to his action. If that is 
 
76 See Tom Dougherty, ‘Consent, Communication, and Abandonment’ (2019) 38 Law and Philosophy 
387, 387–88. 
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correct, the difference should, I suggest, be reflected in different offences in the criminal 
law. 
The essay is arranged as follows. In section 1, I distinguish the issue of conditional 
consent from the issue of consent induced by deception. In section 2, I outline the 
familiar picture of how A gives morally valid consent to B’s action, and how this picture 
explains how A places conditions on such consent. On this picture, A places conditions 
on her morally valid consent to B’s action by restricting the moral scope of her consent, 
thereby waiving some moral claim rights but not others. In section 3, I introduce the 
notion of A conditionally tokening consent—a distinct and hitherto unnoticed way for A 
to place conditions on her morally valid consent to B’s action. I argue that there are 
two reasons to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally token consent to B’s 
action. In section 4, I suggest how the law of conditional consent to sexual intercourse 
should develop in light of the distinction between moral scope restriction and 
conditional tokening. 
 
2. Conditional consent or deception? 
Importantly, I am concerned with whether the law of conditional consent should be 
extended to cases like Linekar.77 I am not in this essay concerned with the 
distinct―though important―issue of deception in these cases. Assange at least 
 
77 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to spell out the distinction between 
conditional consent and deception. The existing academic literature does not always clearly distinguish 
these two issues. See, e.g., Herring (n 74); Hyman Gross, ‘Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights’ [2007] 
Criminal Law Review 220, 223–24. 
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arguably deceived AA about whether he was wearing a condom when having sexual 
intercourse with her. And Linekar deceived the prostitute insofar as he never sincerely 
intended to pay her.78 Deception is at least sometimes sufficient to prevent a 
complainant from giving morally valid consent to the defendant having sexual 
intercourse with her. While clearly important, the issue of deception is distinct from 
the issue of conditional consent. 
To illustrate how the issues of conditional consent and deception can come 
apart, we can consider a fictional variant of Assange called Condom. 
Condom. Amrit tells Bilal, ‘I consent to your having sexual intercourse 
with me on the condition that you wear a condom.’ Without noticing 
that the condom has come off, Bilal has sexual intercourse with Amrit. 
If Assange really does involve a concept of conditional consent (rather than merely being 
a case about consent induced by deception), then that concept applies in Condom. Bilal 
has sexual intercourse with Amrit without her legally valid consent. This is not due to 
any deception on Bilal’s part. Indeed, Bilal’s behaviour is not deceptive. Rather, it is 
because Bilal has sexual intercourse with Amrit in breach of her condition that he wear 
a condom. I believe that this is the correct analysis of Condom. I believe that Bilal lacks 
Amrit’s legally valid consent to his having sexual intercourse with her. I also believe 
that this is how the law ought to be. This is because Bilal lacks Amrit’s morally valid 
consent to his having sexual intercourse with her, and according to the Tracking 
Assumption, legally valid consent ought to track morally valid consent. 
 
78 Similar things can be said of R (on the application of F) v DPP and A and R v McNally. 
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Importantly, this analysis does not commit us to criminalising Bilal’s behaviour. 
In having sexual intercourse with Amrit without her legally valid consent, Bilal 
commits the actus reus of a sexual offence. Precisely which sexual offence depends on 
precisely which acts the sexual intercourse involves.79 To warrant criminalisation, Bilal 
must have committed the actus reus with the relevant culpability or mens rea.80 There is 
a substantive question about what level of culpability the law should require before 
holding a defendant criminally liable, i.e., about how to calibrate the mens rea 
requirement. One option is to hold a defendant criminally liable only if he acted 
intentionally. Other options include holding a defendant liable only if he acted 
recklessly, or perhaps even negligently. If a defendant is truly innocent, then he should 
not be subject to criminal liability. However we calibrate the mens rea requirement, the 
law should still recognise that Bilal commits the serious moral wrong of having sexual 
intercourse with Amrit without her morally valid consent, even if he does so non-
culpably. The Tracking Assumption enables the law to do just this, by recognising that 
Bilal commits the actus reus of a sexual offence.81 
 
 
79 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 1 (rape), 2 (assault by penetration), and 3 (sexual assault). 
80 For helpful discussion of the relationship between mens rea and actus reus in criminal offences, see 
Simester and others (n 72) 19–20. 
81 Thanks to the reviewers for encouraging me to spell out the implications of my view for when we 
should hold a defendant criminally liable. 
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3. A’s giving morally valid consent to B’s action 
Having clarified that I am concerned with conditional consent, I turn in this section to 
summarising a familiar picture of the role of morally valid consent and its relation to 
our moral rights. This includes outlining three requirements for A’s giving morally 
valid consent to B’s action, and how the familiar picture explains how A places 
conditions on this consent. 
The familiar picture starts with the idea that each of us possesses general moral 
rights over our person and property. These general moral rights consist in more specific 
rights against specific interactions by specific individuals. For example, each of us 
possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [others-have-sexual-
intercourse-with-us], and others owe us the correlative moral duty not to have sexual 
intercourse with us. Likewise, each of us possesses a claim right against it being the case 
that [others-enter-our-home], and others owe us the correlative moral duty not to 
enter. These claim rights create moral defaults: if others have sexual intercourse with 
us or enter our homes, the moral default is that they infringe our moral claim rights 
and breach the correlative moral duties. By giving our morally valid consent to others 
performing these actions, we displace the moral default. We waive the relevant moral 
claim right and release others from the correlative moral duty.82 
 
82 This picture of morally valid consent broadly follows that of Judith Jarvis Thomson in Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press 1990). Thomson herself builds on Wesley 
Hohfeld’s account of legal rights. For a broadly Thomsonian account of morally valid consent in the 
sexual domain, see Tom Dougherty, ‘Sex, Lies, and Consent’ (2013) 123 Ethics 717. 
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For A to give morally valid consent to B’s action, three requirements must be 
satisfied. First, A must token consent. Second, A’s token must be morally valid. Third, B’s 
action must fall within the moral scope of A’s consent. Let us consider each of these 
requirements in turn, before turning to the issue of how A places conditions on this 
consent. 
 
a. The tokening requirement  
First, A must token consent.83 For A to token consent is for A to perform an act 
that constitutes an act of consent. There are differing views about precisely what A 
must do to token consent. According to the mental state view, it is possible for A to token 
consent purely mentally. For A to token consent, proponents of the mental state view 
maintain, it is sufficient for A to hold some purely mental attitude or to perform some 
purely mental act. Proponents of the mental state view disagree about the particular 
mental attitude or act required of A. For example, according to one suggestion, for A 
to token consent to B’s action, A must intend B’s action.84 According to another, A must 
 
83 For the language of ‘tokening’ consent, see Franklin G Miller and Alan Wertheimer, ‘Preface to a 
Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent’, The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford 
University Press). Other writers call this ‘assent’, though this is a purely terminological difference. See 
Ferzan and Westen (n 20). 
84 Hurd (n 22). 
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think to herself that B’s action is ‘okay with me’.85 Proponents of the speech act view 
disagree with proponents of the mental state view. According to the speech act view, 
for A to perform a token of consent requires not only that A holds a particular mental 
attitude, but also that A communicates that attitude to B. On this view, tokening 
consent requires the performance of a speech act (though performance of the speech 
act does not necessarily require ‘uptake’ from B).86 The relevant speech act will often 
involve A verbally communicating with B, though it need not. For example, it is 
possible for a thumbs up to constitute a speech act of consent, if A intends it to 
communicate an attitude of consent. 
In this essay, I shall assume that the speech act view is correct, because the 
speech act view makes it easiest to illustrate the idea of conditionally tokening consent. 
However, I believe it may be possible to conditionally token consent on at least some 
versions of the mental state view—an issue to which I shall briefly return below.87 
 
 
85 Ferzan, ‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ (n 22). For other suggestions, see, e.g., Larry 
Alexander, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 165; Larry Alexander, ‘The 
Ontology of Consent’ (2014) 55 Analytic Philosophy 102. 
86 See, e.g., Dougherty, ‘Yes Means Yes’ (n 25); Monica R Cowart, ‘Understanding Acts of Consent: 
Using Speech Act Theory to Help Resolve Moral Dilemmas and Legal Disputes’ 32; HM Malm, ‘The 
Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on Rape’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 147. 
On the issue of ‘uptake’ from B, see Manson, ‘Permissive Consent’ (n 21); Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 
21) 205–209; Dougherty, The Scope of Consent (n 40). Ch. 6. 
87 See fn. 98, below. 
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b. The validity requirement  
The second requirement is that A’s token of consent must be morally valid. For A’s token 
of consent to be morally valid, I assume that A must be an adult of sound mind whose 
token of consent is not induced by coercion or deception.88 I shall assume that this 
requirement is satisfied in all the fictional cases I discuss. 
 
c. The moral scope requirement  
Third, B’s action must fall within the moral scope of A’s consent.89 To illustrate, consider 
Gynaecologist: 
Gynaecologist. Patient says to Doctor, ‘I consent to your inserting a 
medical instrument into my vagina.’ Patient is an adult of sound 
mind whose token of consent is not induced by coercion or 
 
88 On coercion, see, e.g., Pallikkathayil (n 32). On deception, see, e.g., Dougherty, ‘Sex, Lies, and 
Consent’ (n 82). Dougherty’s argument concerns the moral scope of consent induced by deception. 
However, it has sometimes been interpreted as an argument about the validity of such consent. See, e.g., 
Campbell Brown, ‘Sex Crimes and Misdemeanours’ (2020) 177 Philosophical Studies 1363, 1374; 
Chloë Kennedy, ‘Criminalising Deceptive Sex: Sex, Identity and Recognition’ (2021) 41 Legal Studies 
91, 95. fn. 22. It is partly to avoid such confusions that I address tokening, validity, and moral scope 
separately in this essay. 
89 For a detailed discussion of the moral scope of consent, see Dougherty, The Scope of Consent (n 40). 
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deception. Instead of inserting a medical instrument into patient’s 
vagina, however, Doctor inserts his penis.90 
In Gynaecologist, Patient does give morally valid consent to Doctor’s doing 
something―namely, inserting a medical instrument into Patient’s vagina. But Doctor 
does something else, outside the moral scope of Patient’s consent. As one nineteenth 
century judge put it, ‘the act consented to is not the act done. Consent to a surgical 
operation or examination is not consent to sexual connection’.91 
Reflecting on Gynaecologist might lead us to assume that the moral scope of A’s 
consent is given simply by the descriptive content of A’s consent token.92 After all, in 
Gynaecologist, the moral scope of Patient’s consent includes Patient’s moral claim right 
against it being the case that [Doctor-inserts-a-medical-instrument-into-Patient’s-
vagina], but excludes Patient’s moral claim right against it being the case that [Doctor-
inserts-his-penis-into-Patient’s-vagina]. And the descriptive content of Patient’s 
consent token includes Doctor’s inserting a medical instrument into Patient’s vagina, 
 
90 For a similar legal case, see, e.g., R v Flattery (1877) QBD 410. Flattery has at least two complicating 
features which Gynaecologist avoids. First, the complainant in Flatttery may have been a minor and so 
incapable of giving morally valid consent. Second, Flattery deceived the complainant about his intentions, 
which may also have undermined the moral validity of her consent. 
91 R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23, 44. 
92 Since I assume that a consent token is a speech act, I assume that the descriptive content of the token 
is given by the content of that speech act. However, proponents of the mental state view may hold that 
the descriptive content of a consent token is fixed by the content of the relevant mental attitude. For 
example, if for A to token consent to B’s action is for A to intend B’s action, then the content of A’s 
consent token may be fixed by the content of A’s intentions. 
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but excludes Doctor’s inserting his penis into her vagina. These two features of 
Gynaecologist might lead us to assume that the moral scope of A’s consent is given simply 
by the descriptive content of A’s consent token. 
But this is not quite right.93 To see this, consider Pen: 
Pen. Penelope owns a car and mistakenly believes she also owns a 
pen. The pen actually belongs to Rex. Pointing to each item in turn, 
Penelope says to Quintin, ‘I consent to your borrowing this car and 
using this pen.’ 
In Pen, the descriptive content of Penelope’s token of consent includes both Quintin’s 
borrowing the car and Quintin’s using the pen. However, the moral scope of 
Penelope’s consent—the set of moral claim rights she waives by tokening consent—
covers only her claim right against it being the case that [Quintin-borrows-the-car]. 
Penelope lacks a moral claim right against it being the case that [Quintin-uses-the-
pen], because Rex rather than Penelope is the pen’s true owner. Since Penelope lacks 
any moral claim rights over the pen, she cannot waive any such rights by consenting. 
It is true that if Quintin were to use the pen, he would not infringe Penelope’s rights. 
But this is not because Penelope gives morally valid consent to Quintin’s using the pen. 
Rather, it is because Penelope lacks any moral claim rights over the pen in the first 
place. The lesson from Pen is this: it is possible for A to waive a moral claim right against 
 
93 See Neil C Manson, ‘How Not to Think about the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex’ (2017) 127 Ethics 
415, 423–28; Manson, ‘Permissive Consent’ (n 21) 3319–3320. 
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B’s action only if A initially possesses a claim right against B’s performing that action.94 
Provided A’s consent token is morally valid, A’s consent token waives a moral claim 
right against B’s action if and only if two requirements are satisfied. First, B’s action 
must be within the descriptive content of A’s consent token. Second, A must initially 
possess a claim right against B’s performing that action. 
 
d. The familiar picture and conditions on morally valid consent 
Reflecting on the familiar picture of morally valid consent, we can see that A’s morally 
valid consent to B’s action always involves conditions. For example, in Gynaecologist, 
Patient gives morally valid consent to Doctor inserting something into her vagina on the 
condition that it is a medical instrument. On  the familiar picture, such conditions restrict 
the moral scope of consent. Patient waives her moral claim right against it being the case 
that [Doctor-inserts-a-medical-instrument-into-Patient’s-vagina], but not her moral 




94 This is true at least where A consents on her own behalf. Things may be different, for example, where 
a parent gives morally valid consent to a surgeon operating on their infant. Since one cannot give 
morally valid consent to sexual intercourse on behalf of another person, I leave this complication aside in 
this essay. 
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4. Conditionally tokening consent 
In this section, I introduce a second way for A to place conditions on her morally valid 
consent to B’s action. The second way is for A to conditionally token consent. Since A’s 
tokening consent is a requirement for A’s giving morally valid consent to B’s action, 
A’s placing conditions on her consent token is a way for A to place conditions on her 
morally valid consent to B’s action. If the condition on A’s tokening is not satisfied, 
then A does not token consent. And if A does not token consent, then A does not give 
her morally valid consent to anything at all. In this section, I first illustrate the idea of 
conditionally tokening consent. I then argue that there are two distinct reasons to 
believe that it is possible for A to conditionally token consent to B’s action—one based 
on what it takes to token consent, and another based on A’s rights. 
 
a. Conditionally tokening consent: An illustration 
To illustrate the idea of conditionally tokening consent, consider Mother: 
Mother. On Monday, Aliyah says to Beau, ‘If you visit your mother 
on Wednesday, I hereby consent to your entering my apartment on 
Friday.’  
In Mother, a condition of Aliyah’s tokening consent to Beau’s entering her apartment 
on Friday is that he visits his mother on Wednesday. If Beau does not visit his mother 
on Wednesday, then Aliyah does not token consent. If Aliyah does not token consent, 
then Aliyah does not give her morally valid consent to Beau’s entering her apartment. 
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Let us now turn to the two reasons to believe it is possible for A to conditionally 
token consent. 
 
b. Speech acts 
This first reason to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally token consent 
concerns what it takes to token consent. I have assumed that the speech act view of 
consent is correct—that a consent token requires a speech act. If this is correct, then 
we should expect consent tokens to function like other speech acts. More specifically, 
if consent is a speech act by which we exercise a normative power, we should expect it 
to function like other speech acts by which we exercise normative powers.95 Other 
speech acts by which we exercise normative powers include commands and promises. 
Some work in the philosophy of language suggests that it is possible for A to 
conditionally token commands and promises. If this is correct, then this gives us reason 
to believe that it is also possible for A to conditionally token consent. 
To see why some philosophers of language believe it is possible to conditionally 
token a command, consider Bandages: 
Bandages. Doctor says to Nurse, ‘If the patient is alive in the morning, 
change the bandages.’ 
One possible way to think of Bandages is as a case in which Doctor tokens command of 
a conditional. On this picture, Doctor tokens his command unconditionally. But the 
 
95 On normative powers, see David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford University Press 
2012). 
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descriptive content of the token is conditional. However, if the conditional involved is 
the ordinary material conditional from propositional logic, then this has unhappy 
implications. On this picture, Bandages involves Doctor commanding Nurse to make it 
the case either that Nurse changes the bandages in the morning, or that the patient is 
not alive in the morning. On this picture, Nurse could obey the command by killing 
the patient. To avoid this unhappy conclusion, Dorothy Edgington advances a view of 
Bandages according to which Doctor conditionally performs the speech act of 
commanding the Nurse to change the bandages—the condition being that the patient 
is still alive in the morning. If the patient is not alive in the morning, then, on 
Edgington’s view, Doctor has not performed the speech act of commanding Nurse to 
change the bandages.96 If a speech act of command is what it takes to token a 
command, then if the condition on Doctor’s speech act is not satisfied, then Doctor 
does not token command Nurse to change the bandages. Since tokening a command 
is a requirement for giving a morally valid command, it follows that if the patient is not 
alive in the morning, Doctor does not give Nurse a morally valid command to change 
the bandages. 
Likewise, some philosophers believe it is possible to conditionally token a 
promise. Margaret Gilbert calls this phenomenon an externally conditional promise. As she 
explains, ‘The condition of an externally conditional promise is a condition for the existence 
 
96 Dorothy Edgington, ‘On Conditionals’ (1995) 104 Mind 235, 287. Indeed, Edgington holds the 
stronger view that ‘[a]ny kind of speech act can be performed unconditionally or conditionally. There 
are conditional questions, commands, promises, agreements, offers, etc.’ See also, Dorothy Edgington, 
‘Conditionals’ in Lou Goble (ed), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic (Blackwell 2001) 410. 
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of the [speech act of] promise as such.’ Gilbert gives the following example: ‘On the 
condition that you do the laundry today, I promise to mow the lawn tomorrow.’97 This 
constitutes my speech act of promising to mow the lawn tomorrow, conditional on it 
being the case that you do the laundry today. If you do not do the laundry today, then 
I have not performed the speech act of promising to mow the lawn tomorrow. Now, 
performing the speech act of promising is a requirement for tokening a promise, and 
tokening a promise is a requirement for my giving you a morally valid promise. 
Accordingly, if you do not do the laundry today, then I have not given you a morally 
valid promise to mow the lawn tomorrow. 
If it is possible for A to conditionally token commands and promises, then we 
have reason to believe that it is also possible for A to conditionally token consent.98 
 
97 Margaret Gilbert, ‘Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?’ (1993) 90 The Journal of Philosophy 
627, 633. See also Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (Harvard University Press 1981) 46–47. 
98 I have assumed both that tokening consent requires a speech act, and that Edgington and Gilbert’s 
analyses of conditional speech acts is correct. Both these assumptions might be challenged. First, 
Edgington and Gilbert’s analyses of conditional speech acts might be incorrect. (See, respectively, 
Angelika Kratzer, Modals and Conditionals (Oxford University Press 2012). and Luca Ferrero, ‘Conditional 
Intentions’ (2009) 43 Noûs 700. fn. 30.) If Edington and Gilbert’s analyses are incorrect, this would show 
at most that the correct account of conditionally tokening consent is not the one that follows naturally 
from their analyses. It would not be fatal to the main thesis of this essay, which is that moral scope 
restriction and conditional tokening are two distinct ways to place conditions on morally valid consent. 
This becomes even clearer when we consider the possibility that tokening consent does not require a 
speech act. We can ask: if the mental state view is correct, is it nevertheless possible for A to conditionally 
token consent to B’s action? The answer depends on precisely which mental attitude or mental action is 
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c. Rights 
There is a second reason to believe that it is possible for A to conditionally token 
consent. The second reason is especially important for those who deny the Conjunction 
Thesis: 
Conjunction Thesis. If A possesses a moral claim right against it being 
the case that [p], then it follows that for any proposition q, A also 
possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [both p 
and q].99 
To understand the issue, consider first those who accept the Conjunction Thesis. 
Those who accept the Conjunction Thesis do not need to invoke conditional tokening 
for their view to be extensionally adequate, for they can explain any condition in terms 
of moral scope restriction. On their view, if A wants to give morally valid consent to it 
being the case that p if and only if it is the case that q, then A can waive her moral claim 
right against it being the case that [both p and q]. To illustrate, consider Aliyah’s 
position in Mother. Aliyah wants to give morally valid consent to Beau entering her 
apartment on Friday if and only if Beau visits his mother on Wednesday. Aliyah 
possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-
 
sufficient for tokening consent. For example, according to one version of the mental state view, for A to 
token consent to B’s action is for A to intend B’s action. (See n 84, above.) If this is correct, then it may 
be possible for A to conditionally token consent to B’s action if A conditionally intends B’s action. (On 
conditional intentions, see ibid.) 
99 Strictly speaking, these rights are always held against another individual, B. To state this explicitly on 
every occasion would complicate the discussion without adding to the analysis. 
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apartment-on-Friday]. Those who accept the Conjunction Thesis believe that it 
follows that Aliyah also  possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [both 
Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-
Wednesday]. Consequently, those who accept the Conjunction Thesis have no 
problem explaining Mother as a case of moral scope restriction: Aliyah restricts the 
descriptive content of her consent token to waive this moral claim right, leaving intact 
her moral claim right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-
apartment-on-Friday and Beau-does-not-visit-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. 
The problem arises for those who the deny the Conjunction Thesis. For them, 
it does not necessarily follow from the fact that Aliyah possesses a moral claim right 
against it being the case that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday] that Aliyah 
also possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-
Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. As we 
learned from our discussion of Pen, for A to waive a moral claim right, A must initially 
possess that moral claim right. Consequently, if Aliyah does not possess a moral claim 
right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and 
Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday], then Aliyah cannot waive this right, and so it 
is not possible to explain Mother as a case of moral scope restriction. 
Does Aliyah possesses a moral claim right against it being the case that [both 
Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-
Wednesday]? According to those who deny the Conjunction Thesis, she might not. To 
see this, consider a view recently advanced by Hallie Liberto, which implicitly denies 
the Conjunction Thesis. Liberto considers a case in which Jo and Casey are having 
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sexual intercourse—or, as Liberto puts it, ‘having sex’. Jo does not want Casey to have 
sexual intercourse with Jo if Casey is in pain. On Liberto’s view, Jo possesses a moral 
claim right against [Casey-having-sex-with-Jo], but Jo lacks a moral claim right against 
[Casey-having-sex-with-Jo-while-Casey-is-in-pain].100 Putting Liberto’s view in the 
terminology of this essay, Jo cannot waive a claim right against it being the case that 
[both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo and Casey-is-not-in-pain] while leaving 
intact her claim right against it being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-
with-Jo and Casey-is-in-pain], because Jo does not possess these rights.101 
There are different possible accounts of why someone might deny the 
Conjunction Thesis. According to one possible account, which we can call the 
Reasonable Demands account, whether A possesses a moral claim right against it being 
the case that [p] depends on whether it is reasonable for A to demand that not-p.102 On 
the Reasonable Demands account, whether Jo possesses  a moral claim right against it 
being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo and Casey-is-not-in-
pain] depends on whether it is reasonable for Jo to demand that Casey not have sexual 
intercourse with Jo while Casey is in pain. Let us assume for the sake of argument that 
it is not reasonable, so that Jo lacks this right. We can now ask whether Jo possesses a 
moral claim right against it being the case that [Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo]. 
 
100 Hallie Liberto, ‘Intention and Sexual Consent’ (2017) 20 Philosophical Explorations 127, 136–38. 
101 Liberto’s view is formulated in terms of the right that remains intact, whereas I have formulated my 
examples in terms of the right that is waived. 
102 For an account of rights along these lines, see Jonathan Quong, ‘Rights Against Harm’ (2015) 89 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 249. 
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Since it reasonable for Jo to demand that Casey not have sexual intercourse with Jo, 
Jo possesses this right. Reasonableness determines whether Jo possesses this right. 
However, once Jo possesses the relevant right, Jo can choose whether or not to waive 
it for a range of reasons. For example, Jo can decide not to waive her moral claim right 
against it being the case that [Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo] because Casey is 
in pain, or because Casey does not share Jo’s taste for pop music. According to the 
Reasonable Demands account, reasonableness constrains which rights an individual 
possesses, but it does not constrain how an individual can exercise those rights.103 
According to another possible account of which rights A possesses—the 
account that Liberto herself advances—whether A possesses a right depends on the 
scope of A’s realm of legitimate discretion. Call this the Legitimate Discretion account. (If 
A’s realm of legitimate discretion is equivalent to what A can reasonably demand of 
others, then the Legitimate Discretion account is equivalent to the Reasonable 
Demands account.) Now, whether Casey has sexual intercourse with Jo is within Jo’s 
realm of legitimate discretion. This explains why Jo possesses a right against it being 
the case that [Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-Jo]. By contrast, Liberto maintains, 
whether Casey is in pain while having sexual intercourse with Jo is something that falls 
outside of Jo’s realm of legitimate discretion.104 On Liberto’s view, this explains why 
Jo lacks a right against it being the case that [both Casey-has-sexual-intercourse-with-
 
103 For a discussion of related issues, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Right to Do Wrong’ (1981) 92 Ethics 21. 
104 Liberto (n 100) 135. This is easiest to imagine if Casey’s pain is caused by something other than the 
intercourse itself—for example, by Casey’s pre-existing headache. Whether Casey has sexual intercourse 
while he has a headache seems like it is in Casey’s realm of legitimate discretion rather than Jo’s. 
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Jo and Casey-is-not-in-pain]. Despite all this, Liberto maintains that if, while having 
sexual intercourse to which Jo has initially given morally valid consent, Jo comes to 
know that Casey is in pain, then Jo can revoke her morally valid consent because Casey 
is in pain. Liberto maintains that it is possible for Jo to do this even though whether 
Casey is in pain while having sexual intercourse is outside Jo’s realm of legitimate 
discretion. Moreover, Liberto maintains, if Casey tries to initiate sexual intercourse 
with Jo, Jo can withhold her morally valid consent because Casey is in pain. Speaking 
generally, Liberto says that ‘A can refuse to waive her… right against B having sex 
with A in light of finding out about any feature of the sexual encounter, even those 
outside her own realm of discretion.’105 
I suspect that many people subscribe to the Reasonable Demands account, the 
Legitimate Discretion account, or some similar account of which rights A possesses—
and, as a result—deny the Conjunction Thesis. That said, which if any of these possible 
accounts is correct is a difficult and contentious issue. Rather than take a stand on 
which of these possible accounts is correct, I shall assume for simplicity that those who 
deny the Conjunction Thesis accept that Mother is a case in which Aliyah possesses a 
right against it being the case that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday] 
without Aliyah possessing a right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-
Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. After all, 
both the accounts just canvassed seem to generate this result. It seems reasonable for 
Aliyah to demand that Beau not enter her apartment on Friday, but at least arguably 
unreasonable to demand that he also visits his mother on Wednesday. Likewise, 
 
105 ibid 138. 
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whether Beau enters Aliyah’s apartment on Friday seems within Aaliyah’s realm of 
legitimate discretion, but whether Beau also visits his mother on Wednesday seems 
outside this realm. Those who disagree with this verdict about Mother should feel free 
to substitute another case in which A possesses a moral claim right against it being the 
case that [p] but lacks a moral claim right against it being the case that [both p and 
q].106 
Now, if moral scope restriction is the only way for A to place conditions on her 
morally valid consent to B’s action, then A cannot place a condition on her morally 
valid consent to B’s action unless A initially possesses the relevant right. We have 
assumed Aliyah lacks a right against it being the case that [both Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-
apartment-on-Friday and Beau-visits-his-mother-on-Wednesday]. Accordingly, if 
moral scope restriction is the only way for Aliyah to place conditions on her morally 
valid consent, then Aliyah cannot give her morally valid consent to Beau entering her 
apartment on Friday if and only if he visits his mother on Wednesday. But this is 
counterintuitive. Intuitively, this is possible. This gives those who deny the Conjunction 
Thesis reason to believe that there is another way for A to place conditions on her 
morally valid consent to B’s action. A natural suggestion is that it is possible for A to 
conditionally token consent. On that picture, Aliyah would waive her moral claim right 
against it being the case that [Beau-enters-Aliyah’s-apartment-on-Friday], but would 
do so conditionally on Beau’s visiting his mother on Wednesday. 
 
106 If the reader believes that there are no such cases, then the reader accepts the Conjunction Thesis. 
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d. Can A make the truth of any proposition a condition of A’s tokening consent? 
The idea of conditionally tokening consent raises a question: Is it possible for A to make 
the truth of any proposition a condition on A’s tokening consent?107 For many 
propositions, making their truth a condition of A’s tokening consent seems 
unproblematic. For example, it seems unproblematic for Aliyah to token consent to 
Beau’s entering her apartment on Friday conditional on the truth of the proposition 
‘Beau visits his mother on Wednesday’. But other propositions might raise concerns—
consider, ‘Beau murders his mother on Wednesday’ or ‘Beau believes that Aliyah does 
not consent to his entering her apartment on Friday’. Here is a problematic example 
from the sexual domain: 
Climax. Agnes tokens consent to Barry’s having sexual intercourse with 
Agnes on the condition that Agnes reaches sexual climax before Barry. 
Barry has sexual intercourse with Agnes. Barry reaches sexual climax 
before Agnes. 
If it is possible for Agnes to make the proposition ‘Agnes reaches sexual climax before 
Barry’ a condition of her tokening consent to Barry’s having sexual intercourse with 
her, then this seems to yield some concerning results. First, Barry has sexual intercourse 
with Agnes without her morally valid consent to his doing so. Second, in light of the 
Tracking Assumption, it ought to be the case that Barry lacks Agnes’s legally valid 
consent to his having sexual intercourse with her. Third, if Barry acts with the relevant 
mens rea (perhaps because he knows he is an unskilled lover), then it follows that it ought 
 
107 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address this question, and for the Climax 
case that follows. 
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to be the case that Barry commits a criminal offence. This will strike many—including 
myself—as an undesirable overreach of the criminal law. 
Given the diversity of possible conditions, answering the general question of 
whether it is possible for A to make the truth of any proposition a condition on A’s 
tokening consent would require at least another essay. However, as we shall see shortly, 
we can make progress with the legal debates about conditional consent to sexual 
intercourse without answering this general question here. 
 
5. Legal implications 
Let us now return to the law of conditional consent to sexual intercourse. We began 
with the question of whether that law ought to be extended to cases like Linekar. We 
then made the Tracking Assumption, which states that whether A gives legally valid 
consent to B’s action ought to track whether A gives morally valid consent to that 
action. We then saw that there are two distinct ways for one person to place conditions 
on her morally valid consent to another’s action. It follows that there are two distinct 
ways for a complainant to place conditions on her morally valid consent to a 
defendant’s having sexual intercourse with her. In this section, I use this distinction to 
argue that the law of conditional consent ought to be extended to cases like Linekar, 
outlining two possible suggestions for how the law might do this. I also briefly suggest 
that the distinction helps us to understand how individuals place conditions on their 
morally valid consent in other contexts. 
Let us start by considering Assange. AA possessed a moral claim right against it 
being the case that [Assange-had-sexual-intercourse-with-AA]. Plausibly, AA also 
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possessed a moral claim right against it being the case that [both Assange-had-sexual-
intercourse-with-AA and Assange-wore-a-condom]. In more natural language, we can 
say that AA plausibly had a right against it being the case that [Assange-had-protected-
sexual-intercourse-with-AA]. If that is correct, then AA plausibly waived this right, 
leaving in place her moral claim right against it being the case that [Assange-had-
unprotected-sexual-intercourse-with-AA]. If in these circumstances Assange had 
unprotected sexual intercourse with AA, then he did something other than that to 
which she gave her morally valid consent. If Assange did something other than that to 
which AA gave her morally valid consent, then Assange did not have AA’s morally 
valid consent to what he did. If this is correct, then Assange involves moral scope 
restriction just like Gynaecologist, in which Patient gives her morally valid consent to 
Doctor’s inserting a medical instrument into Patient’s vagina, but Doctor instead 
inserts his penis. What Doctor does is outside the moral scope of Patient’s consent. 
Similarly, what Assange did was outside the moral scope of AA’s consent. 
Now consider Linekar. The prostitute possessed a moral claim right against it 
being the case that [Linekar-had-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute]. Did she also 
possess a moral claim right against it being the case that [both Linekar-had-sexual-
intercourse-with-the-prostitute and Linekar-paid-the-prostitute-£25]? In more natural 
language, we might ask, did the prostitute possess a right against it being the case that 
[Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute]? 
Those who accept the Conjunction Thesis must answer yes. According to them, 
the prostitute’s possession of a moral claim right against it being the case that [Linekar-
had-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute] follows from her possession of the 
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right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-sexual-intercourse-with-the-
prostitute]. If that is correct, then we can explain Linekar in terms of moral scope 
restriction. By tokening consent to paid sexual intercourse, the prostitute restricted the 
moral scope of her consent so as to waive only her right against it being the case that 
[Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-prostitute], leaving intact her right 
against it being the case that [Linekar-had-unpaid-sexual-intercourse-with-the-
prostitute]. If that is correct, then Linekar involves moral scope restriction just like 
Assange and Gynaecologist. The prostitute gave her morally valid consent to Linekar 
having paid sexual intercourse with her, but he instead had unpaid sexual intercourse 
with her. Since what Linekar did was something other than that to which the prostitute 
gave her morally valid consent, Linekar did not have the prostitute’s morally valid 
consent to what he did. 
Those who reject the Conjunction Thesis might answer no: The prostitute did 
not possess a right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-paid-sexual-intercourse-
with-the-prostitute]. What if the prostitute lacked this right? Even if those who reject 
the Conjunction Thesis believe that the prostitute lacked this right, they should agree 
that she possessed a right against it being the case that [Linekar-had-sexual-
intercourse-with-the-prostitute]. This is where the discussion of conditionally tokening 
consent comes into play. Earlier, we put off answering the general question of whether 
it is possible for A to make the truth of any proposition a condition of A’s tokening 
consent. Accordingly, if we are to invoke the notion of conditional tokening in Linekar, 
we must now make the following assumption: 
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Payment Assumption: It is possible for A to token consent to B’s having 
sexual intercourse with A conditional on the truth of the proposition ‘B 
pays A’. 
The Payment Assumption is plausible. Indeed, many regard payment as among the 
most plausible conditions for A to place on A’s consent to B’s sexual intercourse with 
A.108 
Provided the Payment Assumption is true, we can think of Linekar as a case in 
which the prostitute conditionally tokened consent to Linekar having sexual 
intercourse with her, with the condition being the truth of the proposition ‘Linekar 
paid the prostitute £25 afterwards’. On this view, Linekar’s paying the prostitute £25 
was a condition on her speech act of consent. Since tokening consent requires a speech 
act, conditionally performing a speech act of consent amounts to conditionally 
tokening consent. If the condition on the speech act is not satisfied, then the prostitute 
has not tokened consent. Since her tokening consent is a requirement for her giving 
morally valid consent to Linekar’s having sexual intercourse with her, it follows that 
she did not give her morally valid consent to Linekar’s having sexual intercourse with 
her. On this picture, Linekar had sexual intercourse with the prostitute without her 
morally valid consent. 
If this picture is correct, then Linekar is a case of conditional tokening just like 
Mother. Recall that in Mother, Beau’s visiting his mother on Wednesday was a condition 
 
108 See, e.g., Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (University of California Press 
2019) 112. 
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of Aliyah’s speech act of consent to Beau’s entering Aliyah’s apartment on Friday. 
Since tokening consent requires a speech act, conditionally performing a speech act of 
consent amounts to conditionally tokening consent. If the condition on the speech act 
is not satisfied, then Aliyah does not token consent. Since her tokening consent is a 
requirement for her giving morally valid consent to Beau’s entering her apartment on 
Friday, it follows that Aliyah does not give her morally valid consent to Beau’s entering 
her apartment on Friday. If Beau enters her apartment on Friday, he does so without 
Aliyah’s morally valid consent to his action. 
The preceding discussion might help to explain the different intuitions about 
Assange and Linekar. Recall that some commentators have the intuition that there is an 
important difference between cases like Assange and those like Linekar. We can now see 
why philosophical argument might vindicate those intuitions as correct. Whether those 
intuitions are correct depends on whether the complainants in each kind of case possess 
the relevant moral claim right. If A possess a right against [B-having-protected-sexual-
intercourse-with-A] but not against [B-having-paid-sexual-intercourse-with-A], then 
cases like Assange are cases of moral scope restriction, whereas cases like Linekar are cases 
of conditionally tokening consent. This is an important difference. 
Recall that the commentators in the second set have the intuition that a 
defendant who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in breach of either 
condition—whether payment or condom use—does so without the complainant’s valid 
consent to what he does. My argument in this essay has been that this, too, is correct. 
Even if there is an important difference between the conditions in the two cases—
namely, that one is a restriction on moral scope and the other is a condition on 
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tokening—a defendant who has sexual intercourse with a complainant in breach of 
either kind of condition does so without her morally valid consent to his action. 
Currently, the law treats sexual intercourse in breach of a condition as non-
consensual only where what the defendant does falls outside the moral scope of the 
complainant’s consent. But if I am correct, then a defendant who has sexual intercourse 
with a complainant in breach of a condition she places on her consent token also has 
sexual intercourse with the complainant without her morally valid consent to his 
action. In light of the Tracking Assumption, it ought to be the case that the defendant 
in such cases lacks the complainant’s legally valid consent to what he does. 
Should the law treat sexual intercourse in breach of a condition on tokening in 
any way differently from sexual intercourse in breach of a restriction on moral 
scope?109 I suggest the answer is yes. I have argued that there are three distinct ways in 
which a defendant might lack a complainant’s morally valid consent to his having 
sexual intercourse with her. First, the complainant might not token consent—for 
example, where she is unconscious throughout the relevant period. Second, the 
complainant’s consent might not be valid—for example, if it is induced by coercion. 
Third, the complainant might give morally valid consent to something other than his 
having sexual intercourse with her—for example, his performing surgery on her. I 
suggest that these different ways in which a defendant might lack the complainant’s 
morally valid consent to sexual intercourse should be reflected in the law. 
 
109 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this explicit. 
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Currently, English criminal law does not make such distinctions. For example, 
it uses the same offence to criminalise the behaviour of the defendant who has sexual 
intercourse with an unconscious complainant, the defendant who coerces a 
complainant into sexual intercourse, and the defendant who engages in sexual 
intercourse instead of performing medical treatment.110 However, many theorists have 
called for more fine-grained individuation of sexual offences, mainly based on 
considerations of fair labelling.111 Although the defendant lacks the complainant’s 
morally valid consent to sexual intercourse in each of the cases outlined above, the 
reason why is different in each case. I suggest that the law should acknowledge this 
difference. The best way for it to do this, I suggest, is through the finer grained 
individuation of offences, such as sexual-assault-by-lack-of-tokening-of-consent, 
sexual-assault-by-lack-of-validity-of-consent, and sexual-assault-by-acting-outside-the-
scope-of-consent. Indeed, sexual-assault-by-lack-of-tokening-of-consent should 
plausibly be subdivided further, to reflect the fact that a defendant might lack the 
complainant’s token of consent due either to the complainant’s condition not being 
satisfied (as was arguably the case in Linekar) or to the fact that the complainant never 
even conditionally tokened consent (as where the complainant is unconscious). 
 
110 The offence committed depends on precisely which acts the sexual intercourse involved. See n 79, 
above. 
111 For different suggestions about how to individuate sexual offences, see Gibson (n 57); Dougherty, 
‘Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence’ (n 23) 109–112; Amit Pundik, ‘Coercion and Deception in 
Sexual Relations’ (2015) 28 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 97; Victor Tadros, ‘Rape 
Without Consent’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 515. 
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How, then, should the law be extended to cover cases like Linekar? This depends 
on whether they are cases of moral scope restriction or conditional tokening. If they 
are cases of moral scope restriction, then the defendant’s behaviour should be 
criminalised using the offence that should be used to criminalise the defendant’s 
behaviour in Assange, namely, sexual-assault-by-acting-outside-the-scope-of-consent.112  
On the other hand, if they are cases of conditional tokening, then they should plausibly 
be criminalised using a different sexual offence, namely, the appropriate subdivision of 
sexual-assault-by-lack-of-tokening-of-consent. 
In applying the distinction between moral scope restriction and conditional 
tokening, I have in this essay focused on the law of conditional consent to sexual 
intercourse. But the distinction between moral scope restriction and conditionally 
tokening consent applies well beyond this. As a result, the distinction might also help 
us to understand how individuals place conditions on their morally valid consent in 
other contexts. Since I do not have space to pursue this issue at length here, a full 
analysis will have to wait for another occasion. 
 
112 We may wish to have a variant on these offences called rape-by-acting-outside-of-the-scope-of-
consent, etc, depending on precisely which acts the intercourse involves. See n 79, above. 
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Essay Three 
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Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together 
 
Abstract: Some influential theorists have recently argued that if sex 
is in some sense ideal, then each partner’s consent is unnecessary: even 
absent each partner’s consent, neither partner infringes the other’s 
moral rights. I challenge a key premise in their argument for this 
alarming conclusion. I instead defend the Commonsense View: If you 
have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe 
that person’s moral rights. In the course of defending the 
Commonsense View, I develop what I call the Hybrid Account of 
Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of two existing 
accounts of consent while avoiding their shortcomings.  I close by 
suggesting some benefits of my alternative picture and some 
implications for law reform. 
 
1. Consent, rights, and ideal sex 
If you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s 
moral rights. Uncontroversial, you might think. Yet John Gardner, Catharine 
MacKinnon, and Tanya Palmer disagree. All have recently defended views on which 
it is possible for you to have sex with someone, without their consent, without thereby 
infringing that person’s moral rights. Specifically, they defend what I will call the No 
Consent Thesis: 
No Consent Thesis. If sex is ideal, then consent is unnecessary. 
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To be clear, the claim that consent is unnecessary means that it is possible to have sex 
with someone without their consent, without thereby infringing that person’s moral 
rights.113 The No Consenter believes that if sex is in some sense ideal, then even absent 
each partner’s consent, neither partner infringes the other’s sexual rights. Ideal sex, 
according to the No Consenter, involves a particular kind of mutuality that makes it a 
joint action—something that sexual partners do together. Consent, by contrast, is 
something we give to the actions of other persons—to things that others do to us, rather 
than with us. Describing sex that exhibits the relevant mutuality as sex that women 
want, MacKinnon captures the No Consenter’s view in characteristically vivid 
language: ‘Consenting is not what women do when they want to be having sex… No 
one says, “We had a great hot night, she (or I or we) consented.”’114 
To see that Gardner, MacKinnon and Palmer each defend the No Consent 
Thesis, consider what each of them says about consent. MacKinnon claims that ‘when 
a sexual interaction is equal, consent is not needed and does not occur because there 
is no transgression to be redeemed.’115 Similarly, Palmer claims that  
while consent is clearly absent from the worst sexual encounters it will 
also be absent in the most positive encounters jointly instigated by 
mutually active partners, because both partners are in a state beyond 
 
113 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15); Catharine A MacKinnon, ‘Rape Redefined’ (2016) 10 
Harvard Law & Policy Review 431; Palmer (n 15). 
114 MacKinnon (n 113) 450. 
115 ibid 476. 
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consent, a state of active involvement rather than reaction or 
submission.116 
Finally, Gardner, after noting that in previous work he advanced the proposition that 
consent is insufficient to guarantee that sex is morally permissible, says this: 
Here I am advancing the more explosive proposition that, when the 
sexual going is good, consent is also unnecessary. Before you explode, 
bear in mind that my case proceeds, not from the thought that consent 
is too high an expectation for our sex lives, but rather that it is too low 
an expectation. Ideally, I suggest, the question of consent does not 
arise between sexual partners, for the question of consent belongs to 
sex individualistically, even solipsistically, conceived as something that 
one person does to another (even if, in the course of their sexual 
encounter, the individuals concerned take scrupulously equitable turns 
in being the doer and the done to). The proper antidote to this 
somewhat melancholy conception of sex, or of what sex can be, is not 
to replace what Lacey calls the “individualised notion of consent” with 
some refurbished (and perhaps less individualised) notion of consent, 
but rather to replace the emphasis on consent, which cannot but be 
individualised, with an emphasis on some less individualised notions. 
Teamwork is one such notion.117 
 
116 Palmer (n 15) 13. 
117 Gardner (n 1) 60 (footnotes omitted). 
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As Gardner explains, the argument for the No Consent Thesis proceeds from the 
thought that consent is too low an expectation for our sex lives. Partners engaging in 
ideal sex do not infringe one another’s moral rights because ideal sex involves 
something better than consent—namely, the kind of mutuality that makes sex a joint 
action.118 
While these three theorists’ claims differ in detail, then, all defend the No 
Consent Thesis: If sex is in some sense ideal, then consent is unnecessary. 
The Main Argument for the No Consent Thesis proceeds as follows: 
Main Argument 
(1) Ideal Sex Premise. If sex is ideal, then it is something two people do together.119 
 
118 I believe, as I argue in the main text, that each of the three theorists is committed to the No Consent 
Thesis. It is difficult to see how else to interpret what each of them says about consent in the text 
accompanying nn 115, 116, and 117, above. Independently of matters of interpretation, the essay should 
remain of interest for two reasons. First, each of the three theorists accepts at least the following more 
modest claim: we should reduce the focus on consent in sexual morality and rape law, because this focus 
on consent objectionably conceptualises women as sexually passive. (If this is the correct interpretation 
of their view, then it resembles the view of Rebecca Kukla. See Kukla (n 15).) I go on to argue that even 
this more modest claim is false. My argument against this more modest claim goes through even if, 
contrary to what I argue above, none of the three theorists is committed to the No Consent Thesis. 
Second, my arguments for the Hybrid Account of Consent likewise go through regardless of whether 
the three theorists are committed to the No Consent Thesis. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing all this out. 
119 Like Gardner, I restrict myself for simplicity to the two-person case, while recognising that ideal sex 
may involve more than two people. Speaking more generally, we might say that ideally, sex is something 
that its participants do together.  Gardner ibid 54, fn 18. 
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(2) Joint Action Premise. If two people do something together, then consent is 
unnecessary.120 
(3) No Consent Thesis. Therefore, if sex is ideal, then consent is unnecessary. 
To see that Gardner, MacKinnon, and Palmer accept the Ideal Sex Premise, we can 
ask, ‘What is ideal sex?’ For MacKinnon, ideal sex is equal sex, which she says involves 
‘mutuality, reciprocity, respect, trust, [and] desire…not one-sided acquiescence’.121 
For Palmer, ideal sex is mutually active sex. For Gardner, ideal sex is teamwork sex, where 
teamwork is a ‘particular kind of mutuality’.122 Although these three theorists might 
differ in the details of what constitutes ideal sex, their references to mutuality suggest 
that each of them accepts what I will call the Ideal Sex Premise: (1) If sex is ideal, then it 
is something two people do together. 
The Ideal Sex Premise is plausible, and I suggest that we should accept it. 
In this essay, I will argue against the No Consent Thesis. I will defend the 
Commonsense View: 
 
120 Does the Joint Action Premise commit its proponents to the view that non-consensual sex can be 
permissible? On one way of talking, it does not. This is because they are free to stipulate meanings for 
the terms ‘consensual’ and ‘non-consensual’. For example, they might say that ‘non-consensual sex’ 
picks out sexual offences, and that ideal or teamwork sex is ‘consensual’. On that way of talking, a sexual 
encounter can be consensual without the individuals involved giving consent. On that way of talking, 
the Joint Action Premise does not commit its proponents to the view that non-consensual sex can be 
permissible. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address this point. 
121 MacKinnon (n 113) 476. 
122 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 54. 
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Commonsense View. If you have sex with someone without their consent, 
you thereby infringe that person’s rights. 
I have already suggested that we should accept the Ideal Sex Premise. Accordingly, I 
will challenge the Joint Action Premise, which does the philosophical heavy lifting in 
the Main Argument for the No Consent Thesis.  
I will distinguish two plausible arguments for the Joint Action Premise. The first 
is an argument from the metaphysics of sexual joint action, whereas the second is an 
argument from its moral significance. The Metaphysical Argument, I maintain, rests on 
a mistaken metaphysics of sexual joint action―of what it is for two people to have sex 
together. I suggest an alternative picture. I then turn to the Moral Argument. The Moral 
Argument rests on the claim that engaging in sexual joint action is itself sufficient to 
waive each partner’s rights and thus that consent is redundant. I argue that this is a 
mistake, because ideal sex involves each partner’s consent. To make my case, I rely on 
a substantive account of consent. I first consider two influential accounts of consent, 
highlighting their shortcomings. Next, I propose what I call the Hybrid Account of 
Consent. The Hybrid Account retains the benefits of each of the existing accounts, 
while avoiding their shortcomings. If the Hybrid Account is correct, then there is no 
reason to believe that the Moral Argument is sound. We should therefore accept the 
Commonsense View: If you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby 
infringe that person’s rights. I close by suggesting some attractive features of my way 
of looking at things and some implications for law reform. 
 
- 103 - 
 
2. The Commonsense View and when consent is necessary 
Before turning to the two arguments for the Joint Action Premise, it is worth briefly 
outlining the view of consent and its relation to our moral rights that undergirds the 
Commonsense View. This will help us to understand the normative effect of consent, 
and thus to understand the circumstances in which consent is necessary. To help do 
this, I briefly contrast the Commonsense View with an alternative view of when 
consent is necessary, recently advanced by Michelle Madden Dempsey.123 
According to Dempsey, X’s consent to Y’s action is necessary—or, as she puts it, 
‘called for’—if and only if two conditions are met.124 First, Y’s action must ‘call for 
justification’—that is to say, Y must have a ‘non-trivial reason’ not to perform that 
action. Second, at least one reason in in virtue of which Y’s action calls for justification 
must be grounded in X’s wellbeing. 
However, as Richard Healey has convincingly argued, Dempsey’s view is over-
inclusive.125 To illustrate, Healey offers us two cases. In the first case, Y purchases the 
 
123 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this explicit. 
124 Dempsey (n 18) 15–17. 
125 Richard Healey, ‘Consent, Rights, and Reasons for Action’ (2019) 13 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
499, 506–507. I rely only on Healey’s claim that Dempsey’s view is over-inclusive. But Healey also 
argues that Dempsey’s view is under-inclusive, because it cannot accommodate cases of ‘harmless 
wronging’, in which Y infringes X’s rights without setting back any interest of X’s. It is difficult to 
evaluate the charge of under-inclusivity. The difficulty arises because it is contentious whether cases like 
the ones Healey adduces, such as non-consensual mouth swabs, are genuinely cases of harmless 
wronging. For example, on one view, if Y takes a mouth swab from X without X’s valid consent, then 
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last available cinema ticket, when X needs to see the film in order to complete a school 
project. Here, it is plausible that Dempsey’s two conditions are met. Plausibly, Y has a 
‘non-trivial reason’ not to purchase the ticket—namely, Y’s purchasing the ticket will 
frustrate X’s ability to complete his school project—and this will negatively affect X’s 
wellbeing. Nevertheless, it is implausible that X’s consent is necessary in this case. 
Healey’s second case is one in which Y casts the deciding vote for a political candidate 
whose policies adversely affect X. Again, it is plausible that Dempsey’s two conditions 
are met in this case. Y has a non-trivial reason not to vote for the candidate, and this 
reason is grounded in X’s wellbeing. Nevertheless, it is implausible that X’s consent is 
necessary in this case. 
We can summarise Healey’s diagnosis for why X’s consent is unnecessary in each 
of these cases: X lacks a claim right against Y’s action.126 In the first case, X lacks a 
claim right against Y purchasing the last cinema ticket. In the second case, X lacks a 
claim right against Y casting the decisive vote for a candidate whose policies are 
unfavourable for X. The general lesson from Healey’s critique of Dempsey, then, is 
that X’s consent to Y’s action is necessary only if X initially possesses a claim right 
 
Y sets back X’s interest in living autonomously, and thereby harms X. For this view of the relationship 
between autonomy and harm, see, e.g., Crisp (n 55) 81–84. 
126 To be clear, Healey is concerned with moral rather than legal rights. Healey’s account of moral 
rights, like my own, broadly follows Judith Jarvis Thomson (n 82). Thomson is building on Wesley 
Hohfeld’s the account of legal rights. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Walter Wheeler Cook ed, Yale University Press 1920). 
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against Y’s performing that action.127 Provided it is valid, X’s consent waives this claim 
right, thereby releasing Y from the correlative duty that Y owes X not to perform that 
action.128 The Commonsense View, as I understand it, presupposes this relationship 
between consent and its relationship to our moral rights. 
To be clear, the Commonsense View is concerned with moral rights. This raises 
a question: what is the relation between moral rights and the law?129 Tom Dougherty 
offers the following answer, which I take to be plausible. The state punishes those who 
commit sexual offences by depriving them of their liberty. According to liberal political 
morality, such deprivations of liberty call for justification. One plausible justification is 
that the offences they commit are proportionately objectionable, morally speaking. 
This raises the question of what makes such offences morally objectionable. A popular 
answer from within liberal political morality focuses on each person’s sexual rights. 
The default is that imposing sexual contact on someone infringes their moral rights, 
which makes it a moral wrong that should be criminalised. But valid consent waives 
the relevant moral rights, thereby displacing this default. Provided there is valid 
 
127 I claim merely that X’s consent is necessary only if X initially possesses a claim right against Y’s 
action. I do not claim that X’s consent is necessary if X initially possesses a claim right against Y’s 
performing an action. This is because, as we will see in our discussion of the Moral Argument in section 
4, it is sometimes possible for X to divest themselves of the relevant claim right via some mechanism 
other than consent, thereby rendering X’s consent unnecessary. 
128 I assume that for consent to be valid requires, at a minimum, that it is given by an adult of sound 
mind who is not induced by coercion or deception.  
129 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address this point. 
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consent, such sexual contact does not constitute a moral wrong that the state should 
criminalise.130 
Now that we understand when consent is necessary, we are in a better position 
to consider—and eventually reject—two arguments for the Joint Action Premise. 
3. The Metaphysical Argument 
There are two plausible arguments for the Joint Action Premise.131 The first such 
argument is the Metaphysical Argument. In this section, I first reconstruct the 
Metaphysical Argument and then go on to reject it. 
 
a. Reconstructing the Metaphysical Argument 
The first premise of the Metaphysical Argument is a widely accepted conceptual 
premise about consent. As it is sometimes put, ‘consent in the strict sense is always 
given to the actions of other persons.’132 This premise is often expressed in terms of 
 
130 See Dougherty, ‘Consent, Communication, and Abandonment’ (n 76) 387–388. The harm principle 
is often thought to provide an additional constraint on criminalisation. For a discussion of why the 
criminalisation of rape and sexual assault also satisfies the harm principle, see John Gardner, ‘The 
Wrongness of Rape’, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 29–30.  
131 The first argument is most plausibly attributed to Gardner, whereas the second argument is more 
plausibly attributed to all three theorists.  
132 A John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press 1979) 76. See 
also Peter Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to Criminal Conduct 
(Ashgate 2004) 3,  who describes one use of ‘consent’ in the criminal law as including (inter alia) all 
instances in which persons ‘choose for themselves, what other persons do to them.’ 
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X―the consent-giver―being passive, and Y―the recipient of consent―being 
active. The idea is that the very concept of consent presupposes that Y does something 
to X. For Y’s action not to infringe X’s rights, Y requires X’s valid consent.133 For 
example, when doctor Y injects patient X with a vaccine, this is something that Y does 
to X, and Y’s action is permissible only if X gives valid consent. This is the sense in 
which Y is active and X is passive. Gardner, MacKinnon, and Palmer all hold views 
on which the sexual context is no different.134 So, for example, MacKinnon claims that 
on the consent model of sex, ‘active [Y] initiates, passive [X] acquiesces or yields to 
[Y]’s initiatives… Intrinsic to consent is the actor and the acted-upon.’135 Similarly, 
Palmer claims that ‘a consent framework implies that sex always involves one (active) 
person doing something to another (passive) person.’136 Likewise Gardner claims that 
 
133 As I say in n 128, above, I assume that for consent to be valid requires, at a minimum, that it is given 
by an adult of sound mind who is not induced by coercion or deception. Much of MacKinnon’s work 
criticises courts’ willingness to find that a woman’s sexual consent was valid despite that consent being 
induced by coercion, deception, or egregious power inequalities. Nothing I say in this essay is meant to 
deny the force of that part of MacKinnon’s critique. 
134 For analogies between the medical case and the sexual case, see: Gardner (n 1) 57; MacKinnon (n 
1) 475; Palmer (n 1) 11, fn 21, citing  Robert M Veatch, ‘Abandoning Informed Consent’ (1995) 25 The 
Hastings Center Report 5; Michelle J Anderson, ‘Negotiating Sex’ (2005) 78 Southern California Law 
Review 1401, 1408–09; Sharon Cowan, ‘Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the Concept of 
Consent’ in Rosemary and Cowan Hunter Sharon (ed), Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law 
and Subjectivity 100. 
135 MacKinnon (n 113) 440. For clarity, I have replaced MacKinnon’s letters A and B with Y and X, 
respectively. 
136 Palmer (n 15) 13. 
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‘consent presupposes an asymmetry in activity—a doer and a sufferer.’137 The idea is 
as follows. It is only possible to consent to an action if it is something that another 
person does to you. If the action is not something another person does to you, then it is 
not possible for you to consent to it. If it is not possible for you to consent to an action, 
then it is unnecessary for you to do so. After all, it cannot be morally required to do 
something that is morally impossible. It follows that all three theorists must accept what 
we can call the Conceptual Premise: (1) Consent is necessary only if one person does 
something to the other. 
While many theorists accept the Conceptual Premise, few if any explicitly 
acknowledge that it is not a claim about how ‘consent’ is used in ordinary language. In 
ordinary language, the word ‘consent’ is used to pick out several distinct moral 
phenomena. Some of these phenomena presuppose neither the passivity of the 
consent-giver, nor that the consented-to action is something that is done to them. For 
example, in ordinary language we say things like, ‘Tracy consented to giving Sam a 
massage’. In respect of the massage, Tracy is active rather than passive—it is something 
she does to Sam. It is useful to think about the moral phenomenon here in terms of 
each person’s moral rights.138 Initially, Sam has no claim right to Tracy giving him a 
massage and, correlatively, Tracy owes no duty to Sam to give him a massage. By 
‘consenting’ to give Sam a massage, Tracy can change the structure of the moral rights 
and duties between them. Provided her ‘consent’ is valid, Tracy gives Sam a claim 
 
137 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 48. 
138 As I say in n 126, above, the account of moral rights here broadly follows that of Judith Jarvis 
Thomson. 
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right to her giving him a massage, and places herself under a correlative duty to do so. 
To distinguish this kind of ‘consent’—the kind in which one person gives another a 
claim right—from other moral phenomena that are also called ‘consent’ in ordinary 
language, some writers call this moral phenomenon an undertaking or even a promise.139 
Whatever we choose to call it, this kind of ‘consent’ is not the subject of the Conceptual 
Premise. 
Instead, the Conceptual Premise concerns cases in which one person waives a 
so-called ‘negative’ moral claim right over their person. A negative claim right is a 
claim right against another person doing something.140 A negative claim right over your 
person is a right against them doing something to you. For example, in the medical cases, 
your negative rights over your person include a claim right against your doctor 
injecting you with a vaccine. By consenting to her giving you the vaccine, you can—
provided your consent is valid—waive that negative claim right, and release the doctor 
from her correlative duty not to inject you with the vaccine. The Conceptual Premise 
concerns only this technical sense of ‘consent’ as intentionally waiving a negative claim 
right over your person. 
 
139 For ‘undertaking’ see, e.g., Oliver Black, ‘Two Theories of Agreement’ (2007) 13 Legal Theory 1. 
For ‘promise’ see, e.g., Liberto (n 16). See also Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 61. 
140 For a classic statement of the difference between positive and negative rights, see Charles Fried, Right 
and Wrong (Harvard University Press 1978) 110. Cécile Fabre draws attention to what she calls the duty 
distinction:  
‘some rights are negative in that they ground negative duties only while other rights are positive in that 
they only ground positive duties to help and resources.’ Cécile Fabre, ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ 
(1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 263, 263–64. 
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It is instructive to compare the sense in which ‘consent’ is used in the Conceptual 
Premise with the sense in which Healey uses ‘consent’. Recall that on Healey’s view, 
X’s consent to Y’s action is necessary only if X initially possesses a claim right against 
Y’s action. 141 The Conceptual Premise uses ‘consent’ in a narrower sense: X’s consent 
to Y’s action is necessary only if X possesses a negative claim right over their person against 
Y’s action. We can accommodate the latter sense within the former by saying that X’s 
consent to Y’s doing something to X is necessary only if X initially possesses a negative 
claim right over their person against what Y does to X. 
The second premise of the Metaphysical Argument concerns the metaphysics of 
joint action. It states that if two people do something together, then neither of them 
does anything to the other. Gardner makes this point explicitly. He says that in 
teamwork sex, 
The actions of the me and the you have to contribute constitutively to the 
actions of the we. In this situation, nothing is being done to anybody. 
What is done, including what is being done constitutively by me or you, 
is now being done with somebody.142 
Gardner’s point provides us with one way to interpret MacKinnon’s claim that when 
sex is equal or mutual, ‘there is no transgression to be redeemed’.143 On this 
interpretation of MacKinnon’s claim, there is no transgression to be redeemed because 
 
141  See text accompanying n 127, above. 
142 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 56. 
143 See n 115, above. 
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there is no transgression—because neither person is doing anything to the other.144 If this 
interpretation is correct, then Gardner and MacKinnon both accept what we can call 
the  Metaphysical Premise: (2) If two people do something together, then neither of them 
does anything to the other. 
We are now in a position to summarise the general structure of the Metaphysical 
Argument: 
Metaphysical Argument 
(1) Conceptual Premise. Consent is necessary only if one person does 
something to the other. 
(2) Metaphysical Premise. If two people do something together, then neither 
of them does anything to the other. 
(3) Conclusion. Therefore, if two people do something together, then 
consent is unnecessary. [Joint Action Premise of Main Argument.] 
I suggest that we may, for the sake of argument, accept the Conceptual Premise. But 
we should reject the Joint Action Premise. Accordingly, I will argue against the 
Metaphysical Premise. 
 
144 Palmer is less explicit, though perhaps she too can be interpreted as accepting the Metaphysical 
Premise. See text accompanying n 116. 
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b. Rejecting the Metaphysical Argument 
In this subsection, I argue that the Metaphysical Premise is false. It is not true that if 
two people do something together, then neither of them does anything to the other. 
Since Gardner defends this premise most explicitly, I focus primarily on his work. 
To see that the Metaphysical Premise is false, it is worth looking at Gardner’s 
examples of non-sexual joint action. These are winning a match, reroofing a house, 
and rescuing a hamster.145 It is true that in each of these cases, we do something 
together without doing anything to each other. We win the match together. We reroof 
the house together. We rescue the hamster together. But these joint actions—these 
things we do together—are partly constituted by actions that each of us does 
individually. The joint action of winning the match is partly constituted by my action—
passing the ball—and your action—scoring the goal. The joint action of reroofing the 
house is partly constituted by my action—attaching the slates—and your action—
doing the leadwork. The joint action of rescuing the hamster is partly constituted by 
my action—shining the torch—and your action—reaching into the sofa. In each case, 
the joint action is partly constituted by our individual actions.146 
Now, in each of these examples, the things we do individually are not things that 
we do to each other. As such, these examples do not involve our negative claim rights 
 
145 Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 51–52.  
146 It is not only joint actions that are partly constituted by individual actions. Many of our individual 
actions are also partly constituted by other individual actions. For example, my making an omelette is 
partly constituted by my cracking the eggs, my beating the eggs, my adding the spices, and my frying 
the mixture. 
- 113 - 
 
over our person.147 But in other examples of joint action, the things we do individually 
will be things we do to each other. As such, these other examples will involve our 
negative claim rights over our person. 
Famously, it takes two to Tango: 
Tango. Amelia and Bert Tango together by Amelia placing her hands on 
Bert’s shoulders and by Bert’s placing his hands on Amelia’s waist. 
Each of these actions—Amelia’s placing her hands on Bert’s shoulders, and Bert’s 
placing his hands on Amelia’s waist—partly constitutes their joint action of Tangoing 
together, and each of these actions is something that one does to the other. In respect 
of the act of Amelia placing her hands on Bert’s shoulders, Amelia is active and Bert is 
passive. In respect of the act of Bert’s placing his hands on Amelia’s waist, he is active 
and she is passive. So although neither person does the joint action to the other, the joint 
action is partly constituted by individual actions in which each of them does something 
to the other. 
It is for those individual actions that the question of consent arises, because it is 
against these individual actions that Amelia and Bert each have negative claim rights 
over their person. Amelia’s rights over her person include a claim right against Bert’s 
placing his hands on her waist. Amelia must consent not the joint action of their 
Tangoing together, but instead to this individual action of Bert’s. Similarly, Bert’s 
negative rights over his person include a claim right against Amelia placing her hands 
 
147 The same is true of Gardner’s examples of people keeping down a balloon together, playing jazz 
together, and meeting under the Paddington Station clock at noon. See Gardner (n 1) 52, 55, 61. 
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on his shoulders. Bert must consent not to the joint action of their Tangoing together 
but rather to Amelia’s action of placing her hands on his shoulders. 
The same is true in the sexual context. Individuals engaging in ideal sex need not 
consent to the joint action of having sex together. Instead, each must consent to the 
individual actions of their partner—the things their partner does to them—that partly 
constitute their joint action of having sex together. This is because these individual 
actions involve the negative rights that each person has against their partner doing 
something to them. To see this, consider the ‘straight sex’ scenario with which Gardner 
is primarily concerned, in which a cis-woman has penetrative sex with a cis-man. Let 
us first consider the woman’s rights. The woman has negative claim rights over her 
person. These include a claim right against her partner penetrating her vagina with his 
penis. Lest the man infringe that right, the woman must give her valid consent to his 
penetrating her vagina with his penis. If this correct, then the Metaphysical Premise is 
false, and the Metaphysical Argument is therefore unsound.148 
As we have just seen, the easiest way to reject the Metaphysical Premise is to 
point out that in Gardner’s ‘straight sex’ scenario, when the man and the woman have 
sex together, their joint action is partly constituted by something the man does to the 
 
148 In other words, in Gardner’s examples, X initially lacks a claim right against what Y does, and a 
fortiori initially lacks a claim right against what (if anything) Y does to X. Consequently, Gardner is correct 
that X’s consent—both in Healey’s sense and in the narrower sense used in the Conceptual Premise—
is unnecessary in each of these examples. But it does not follow from this that X’s consent is also 
unnecessary in cases such as X and Y having sex together, which do involve X’s negative claim rights 
over their person. 
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woman—namely, penetrate her vagina with his penis. Those who reject the 
Metaphysical Premise are not automatically committed to any view as to whether, in 
‘straight sex’, the woman does anything to the man. But it is overwhelmingly plausible 
that just as their joint action of having sex together is partly constituted by the man 
penetrating the woman’s vagina, that joint action is also partly constituted by 
something the woman does to the man—namely, ‘envelop’ his penis with her 
vagina.149 Thinking about the man’s rights, it is plausible that he possesses a right 
against such envelopment. Lest the woman in ‘straight sex’ infringe the man’s right, he 
must consent to the envelopment. One attractive feature of this picture is that it shows 
that the Conceptual Premise is compatible with the Commonsense View. The 
Commonsense View tells us that in ‘straight sex’, the man must consent or have his 
rights infringed. The Conceptual Premise tells us that he need consent only if another 
person does something to him. This picture identifies the act done to him—namely, 
the woman’s enveloping his penis with her vagina. 
To summarise, the Metaphysical Argument does not support the Joint Action 
Premise. This is because the Metaphysical Premise is false. We sometimes do things 
together by doing things to each other, as when we Tango together or have sex 
together. It is only for this kind of joint action—where we do something together by 
doing things to each other—that consent is necessary. For these joint actions, each 
person must consent not to the joint action but to the actions of their partner that partly 
constitute the joint action. 
 
149 The notion of ‘enveloping’ is from Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse (Secker & Warburg 1987) 81. 
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4. The Moral Argument 
Even if I am correct that the Metaphysical Argument is unsound, there is a second 
plausible argument for the Joint Action Premise. This second argument focuses not on 
the metaphysics of sexual joint action, but instead on its moral significance. 
Accordingly, I will call it the Moral Argument. The Moral Argument starts from the 
insight that consent is not the only mechanism by which it is possible for someone to 
divest themselves of a right. If someone divests themselves of a right using another 
mechanism, then that person’s consent is unnecessary. According to the Moral 
Argument, engaging in joint action is itself such a mechanism.  In this section, I first 
reconstruct the Moral Argument, and then go on to reject it. In the course of rejecting 
the Moral Argument, I rely on a substantive account of consent. To settle on the 
correct account of what consent is, I first outline two existing accounts of what consent 
is. I argue that each of these existing accounts faces problems. I develop a new account 
of consent that retains the benefits of each of the existing accounts while avoiding their 
problems. I then use my own substantive account of consent to challenge the Moral 
Argument. 
 
a. Reconstructing the Moral Argument 
The first premise of the Moral Argument is another conceptual premise about consent. 
Recall that the Conceptual Premise in the Metaphysical Argument claims that consent 
is necessary only if one person does something to another. But it does not follow that 
consent is necessary if one person does something to another. Indeed, it is not always 
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true that consent is necessary if one person does something to another—something 
against which that person initially has a negative claim right. This is because consent 
is not the only mechanism by which it is possible for someone to divest themselves of a 
right. Another such mechanism is forfeiture. The idea that it is possible for someone to 
forfeit their claim rights is familiar from debates about liability to defensive harm. 
Those debates take as their starting point that each of us has negative claim rights over 
our person, and that these rights include claim rights against others harming us. 
However, if you culpably threaten to kill an innocent person, you thereby forfeit your 
negative claim rights against them harming you in self-defence.150 The moral upshot 
of your forfeiture is this: if that person harms you in self-defence, they do not thereby 
infringe your rights, even if you do not consent. The lesson is quite general: If an 
individual forfeits their rights, then that individual’s consent is unnecessary. 
I assume that it is not possible to forfeit one’s negative sexual claim rights merely 
by engaging in ideal sex. For a person to forfeit their rights, that person must, at a 
minimum, engage in wrongdoing. But it is wholly implausible that an individual 
engaging in ideal sex is as such engaging in wrongdoing.151 Nevertheless, the discussion 
 
150 There are plausibly other requirements, such as that the self-defence is proportionate. Debates about 
the precise conditions under which you forfeit your rights is the subject of extensive debate in the 
literature on liability to defensive harm. 
151 Christopher Heath Wellman suggests that it might be possible for someone to forfeit their sexual 
rights in certain extreme cases. Even if Wellman’s suggestion plausible, it does not help the No 
Consenter, for (as I say in the main text) it is wholly implausible that it is possible to forfeit one’s sexual 
rights by engaging in ideal sex. See Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of 
Punishment’ (2012) 122 Ethics 371, 385. 
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of forfeiture illustrates the more general point that consent is not the only mechanism 
by which it is possible for someone to divest themselves of a claim right. If someone 
divests themselves of a claim right using another mechanism, then that person’s 
consent is unnecessary. We can call this insight the Second Conceptual Premise about 
consent: 
(1) Second Conceptual Premise. If a person divests themselves of their 
relevant rights using some mechanism other than consent, then that 
person’s consent is unnecessary.152 
The next premise of the Moral Argument is that doing things together—or as we might 
say, engaging in joint action—is just such a mechanism. The idea is that engaging in 
joint action is itself morally significant: in engaging in the joint action, each individual 
waives the relevant rights, making their consent unnecessary. Gardner illustrates this 
idea using an example of musicians playing jazz together. If two musicians play jazz 
together, then each musician’s consent is unnecessary. The best explanation for why 
consent is unnecessary, on this view, is because the musicians engage in joint action—
they do something together. In playing jazz together, each musician waives the relevant 
claim rights. On this view, having sex together is morally significant in just the same 
way as playing jazz together. If two people engage in sexual joint action—if two people 
 
152 There is an important question of precisely which rights a person divests. I claim only that, if X 
divests themselves of a claim right against Y’s ɸ-ing, then X’s consent is unnecessary: it is possible for Y 
to ɸ without X’s consent, without thereby infringing X’s claim right. 
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have sex together—each of them thereby waives the relevant rights against the other, 
rendering each person’s consent unnecessary.153 
Like Gardner’s other examples of non-sexual joint action, playing jazz together 
is unlike sexual joint action because it not something two people do together by doing 
things to each other.154 But we can replace Gardner’s example with one in which two 
people do something together by doing things to each other. As we saw in our 
discussion of the Metaphysical Argument, Tango is just such an example. In Tango, 
Amelia and Bert each initially possess negative claim rights against what the other does 
to them. If Gardner were to use this example instead, he could suggest that in Tangoing 
together, Amelia and Bert each divest themselves of their negative claim rights against 
what the other person does to them. To illustrate this Gardnerian view, it is useful to 
imagine the justifications that Amelia might offer to Bert if he were to complain that 
she had infringed his rights. Intuitively, when they Tango together, Amelia does not 
infringe Bert’s rights. But imagine that, after they have finished Tangoing together, 
Bert complains that Amelia did infringe his claim right against her placing her hands 
 
153 For Gardner’s analogy between sex and jazz, see Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15) 55–56. 
Thomas Macaulay Millar also makes the analogy between sex and jazz. See Thomas Macaulay Millar, 
‘Toward a Performance Model of Sex’ in Jaclyn Friedman and Jessica Valenti (eds), Yes Means Yes: Visions 
of Female Sexual Power and a World Without Rape (Seal Press 2008).  Just as it is possible for someone to be 
coerced into consenting, it is also possible for them to be coerced into performing a joint action: see 
Michael Bratman, ‘Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation’, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention 
and Agency (Cambridge University Press 1999) 132–133; Millar 40. I assume throughout that to 
successfully waive rights, joint action, like consent, must be morally valid (see n 128, above). 
154 See n 147 and accompanying text, above. 
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on his shoulders. What might Amelia say in response? She might say, ‘I didn’t infringe 
your right! You consented to me doing that to you!’ Here the explanation for why Amelia 
did not infringe Bert’s right is that he divested himself of that right by consenting. 
But if the Gardnerian view is correct, Amelia might instead offer a second 
response. She might say, ‘I didn’t infringe your right! We were Tangoing together!’ Here 
the explanation for why Amelia did not infringe Bert’s right is because he divested 
himself of that right not by consenting, but rather in doing something together with 
Amelia—in engaging in the joint action of Tangoing with her. We can state this in 
general terms as the Joint Action Explanation: 
(2) Joint Action Explanation. If two people do something together, then 
each person thereby divests themselves of their relevant rights.155 
The Joint Action Explanation provides an alternative interpretation of MacKinnon’s 
claim that if sex is ideal, then ‘consent is not needed and does not occur because there 
is no transgression to be redeemed’. On this interpretation, although each partner does 
things to the other, what each partner does to the other does not constitute a 
transgression—that is, a rights infringement—because each partner divests themselves 
of the relevant negative claim rights merely in engaging in joint action as such. 
 
155 To be plausible, the Joint Action Explanation must claim only that each person divests the relevant 
rights against the other. For example, if two people Tango together, each of them divests themselves of 
their rights against their partner touching them in ways that partly constitute their Tangoing together, 
but each of them retains their rights against the other stealing their property. The same is true of consent. 
If I consent to your giving me a haircut, I waive my rights against your cutting my hair, but I retain my 
rights against your stealing my property. 
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We are now in a position to summarise the Moral Argument. 
Moral Argument 
(1) Second Conceptual Premise. If a person divests themselves of their relevant 
rights by some mechanism other than consent, then consent is 
unnecessary. 
(2) Joint Action Explanation. If two people do something together, then each 
person thereby divests themselves of their relevant rights. 
(4) Conclusion. Therefore, if two people do something together, then 
consent is unnecessary. [Joint Action Premise of Main Argument.] 
I suggest that we should accept the Second Conceptual Premise. It is true that if an 
individual divests their rights using some mechanism other than consent, then consent 
is unnecessary. But we should reject the Joint Action Premise. It will be no surprise, 
then, that I plan to challenge the Joint Action Explanation. 
b. Rejecting the Moral Argument: What is Consent? 
The Joint Action Explanation is one possible explanation for why, in cases like Tango, 
neither person infringes the other’s rights. But there is a natural alternative 
explanation, namely, that each person in these cases consents. To adjudicate between 
these rival explanations, we need an account of what consent is. In what follows, I first 
I consider two existing accounts of what consent is, one favoured by MacKinnon and 
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another by Gardner.156 I argue that each of these accounts of consent faces problems. 
I outline a new account of consent which combines the insights of each of the existing 
accounts while overcoming their shortcomings. I then go on to use this account of 
consent to argue against the No Consenter’s Moral Argument. 
Before discussing each account of consent, it is worth making one clarification. 
There is considerable controversy over whether an act of consent requires 
communication. On one view, consent requires successful communication.157 On a 
second view, consent requires only attempted communication.158 On a third view, it is 
possible for someone to perform an act of consent purely mentally, without even 
attempting to communicate.159 In formulating each of the accounts of consent that 
follow, I assume for ease of exposition that the third view is correct—that it is possible 
for someone to perform an act of consent purely mentally. However, nothing hinges 
on this assumption, and I suggest alternative formulations in the footnotes for those 
who hold the other views. 
 
156 I will say little about Palmer in this section because she does not endorse any particular view of what 
consent is. While Palmer recognises that consent is an ‘ambiguous concept’, she goes on to say, ‘I do 
not, however, propose to develop a clearer definition of consent.’ Palmer (n 15) 5. 
157 Dougherty, ‘Yes Means Yes’ (n 25). 
158 Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21); Manson, ‘Permissive Consent’ (n 21). 
159 Hurd (n 22); Alexander, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ (n 85); Alexander, ‘The Ontology of 
Consent’ (n 85); Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd and Peter Westen, ‘Consent Does Not Require 
Communication: A Reply to Dougherty’ (2016) 35 Law and Philosophy 655; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ 13 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 397. 
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c. The Choice Account of Consent 
Perhaps the most initially plausible account of what consent is the Choice 
Account: 
Choice Account: For X to consent to Y’s action is for X to choose Y’s 
action.160 
Several authors defend versions of the Choice Account. For example, according to 
Peter Westen, a person consents if they ‘choose for themselves… what other persons 
do to them.’161 MacKinnon explicitly endorses Westen’s version of the Choice 
Account.162 Similarly, according to Heidi Hurd, for one person to consent to another 
 
160 The successful communication analogue of the Choice Account is the Successfully Communicated Choice 
Account. 
Successfully Communicated Choice Account: For X to consent to Y’s action is for X to both choose Y’s action 
and to successfully communicate that choice to Y. 
There are also intermediate possibilities, such as the Attempted Communication Choice Account. 
Attempted Communication Choice Account: For X to consent to Y’s action is for X to both choose Y’s action 
and to attempt to communicate that choice to Y. 
161 Westen (n 22) 3. Westen’s is an account of consent in the criminal law. Westen also claims that desire 
or acquiescence are also individually sufficient for consent. But desire and acquiescence are poor 
candidates for consent. For why acquiescence is a poor candidate, see Alexander, ‘The Ontology of 
Consent’ (n 85) 107. Desire is a poor candidate because it is possible both to desire that another person 
perform an action without consenting, and to consent to them performing an action without desiring it.  
162 MacKinnon (n 1) 440–41, citing Westen (n 22) 3. 
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person’s actions involves the first person ‘intending the actions’ of the second.163 
Intentions and choices are intimately connected. To form an intention ordinarily 
involves making a choice. For example, X’s forming the intention to buy eggs 
tomorrow involves X’s now choosing to buy eggs tomorrow. For our purposes, we can 
treat X’s choosing Y’s action as interchangeable with X’s intending that Y perform 
that action. For Westen and Hurd, the object of the X’s propositional attitude—
whether choice or intention—is Y’s action. Finally, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 can 
also be read as endorsing a version of the Choice Account. Under the Sexual Offences 
 
163 Hurd (n 22) 131. There has been much debate about whether it is possible for one person to intend 
the actions of another. On one hand, Luca Ferrero argues that one person can intend both the actions 
of another, and states of affairs more generally. On the other hand, Larry Alexander and Neil Manson 
deny that one person can intend the actions of another. But Manson’s own view of consent seems, at 
least prima facie, to require one person to intend the actions of another. On Manson’s view, a necessary 
condition for R’s consent is that ‘R intends S to recognise [R’s intention]’. This seems to be an example 
of R intending S’s action. Luca Ferrero, ‘Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?’ in David Shoemaker 
(ed), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 2013); Alexander, ‘The Moral 
Magic of Consent (II)’ (n 85) 166; Alexander, ‘The Ontology of Consent’ (n 85) 107; Manson, 
‘Permissive Consent’ (n 21) 3320–3321; ibid 3329. 
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Act, a person consents if he ‘agrees by choice’, where this seems to mean nothing more 
than ‘chooses’.164 In each case, the object of the X’s choice is Y’s action.165 
If the Choice Account is correct, then there is no reason to believe that the Moral 
Argument is sound. This is because, if the Choice Account is correct, then there is no 
reason to believe the Joint Action Explanation. Instead, the best explanation for why 
individuals do not infringe each other’s rights in cases like Tango is that each of them 
consents to what the other does to them. The easiest way to see this is to consider some 
general constraints on joint action. First, if X and Y perform a joint action, then each 
of them intends that they perform the joint action. For example, if Bert and Amelia 
Tango together, then Bert intends that he and Amelia Tango together.166 Second, if X 
intends to perform some joint action with Y, and X knows that their performing that 
joint action involves Y performing some individual action, then X intends that Y 
perform that individual action. For example, if Bert intends that he and Amelia Tango 
together, and Bert knows that their Tangoing together involves Amelia placing her 
 
164 Sexual Offences Act, s 74. This section also requires that they have the ‘freedom and capacity’ to 
make that choice. I take these to be conditions not on whether someone consents but on whether that 
person’s consent is valid. For discussion, see Ferzan and Westen (n 20). For further criticisms of the 
framing of section 74, see Jennifer Temkin and Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) 
Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 328; Tadros, ‘Rape 
Without Consent’ (n 111). 
165 As David Owens puts it, each of these choices ‘has a non-normative object’. Owens, Shaping the 
Normative Landscape (n 95) 168. 
166 See Michael Bratman, ‘I Intend That We J’, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency 
(Cambridge University Press 1999). 
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hands on Bert’s shoulders, then Bert intends that Amelia place her hands on his 
shoulders. If the Choice Account is correct, then this constitutes Bert’s consenting to 
Amelia’s placing her hands on his shoulders.  
Similar reasoning applies in Gardner’s ‘straight sex’ scenario. First, if the man 
and the woman have penetrative sex together, then the woman intends that they have 
penetrative sex together. Second, if the woman intends that they have penetrative sex 
together, then she intends that the man penetrate her vagina with his penis.167 If the 
Choice Account is correct, then this constitutes her consenting to his penetrating her 
vagina with his penis. 
On the Choice Account, then, the Joint Action Explanation is redundant, and 
there is no reason to believe it. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the Moral 
Argument is sound. 
But the Choice Account is incorrect. Though perhaps initially plausible, it faces 
two important objections, either one of which is sufficient to show that the Choice 
Account is incorrect. The first is that intending another person’s action is insufficient for 
consent. The second is that it is unnecessary. Consider first the objection that intending 
another person’s actions is insufficient for consent. This is familiar from cases of 
entrapment, in which X intends that Y performs the action and thereby wrong X. As an 
example of a case of entrapment, Govert den Hartogh discusses the legal case of Bink: 
 
167 Assuming that ‘penetrative sex’ here means sex that involves the man penetrating the woman’s 
vagina with his penis, and the woman knows this.  
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Bink.168 A prisoner collaborated with the police to entrap a fellow 
inmate, Bink, into a conviction for assault. The prisoner ‘actually 
intended Bink to attack him; he had only failed to express his 
intention, at least to Bink, for the obvious reason that this would have 
been the surest way to frustrate it.’ Bink attacked the prisoner. 
In Bink, the prisoner intended that Bink attack him without thereby consenting to 
Bink’s attacking him. If that is correct, then intending another’s action is insufficient 
for consent. 
Now consider the second objection to the Choice Account: that X’s intending 
Y’s action is unnecessary for X to consent to Y’s action. Victor Tadros offers the following 
case as one in which someone consents to another person doing something without 
intending that they do it: 
Borrow.169 Jess wants to skip class and go to a party, and asks to 
borrow Betty’s car. If Betty does not consent, Jess will go to class. 
Betty thinks it Jess’s decision whether to skip class, but wants Jess to 
go to class. Betty says to Jess: ‘take my car if you want to, but I really 
want you to go to class.’ 
 
168 See Govert Den Hartogh, ‘Can Consent Be Presumed?’ (2011) 28 Journal of Applied Philosophy 
295, 301. This case is based on New York v Bink 444 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1981). See also den Hartogh’s 
example of intending that someone take your car so that you can claim the insurance money. ibid. For 
another example of entrapment, see The High Ground in Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 210. 
169 Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 209. 
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In Borrow, Betty consents to Jess taking her car. She thereby waives her right against 
Jess taking her car, and releases Jess from the correlative duty. But Jess does this without 
intending that Jess take the car. Reflecting on Borrow, it is clear it is possible for one 
person to consent to another person’s action without intending that action.170 
Since intending another person’s actions is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
consent, the Choice Account is incorrect. Accordingly, we must look elsewhere for an 
account of consent. 
 
d. The Normative Power Account of Consent 
There is an alternative account of consent that avoids the two problems with the 
Choice Account. The alternative account is the Normative Power Account. 
Normative Power Account:  For X to consent to Y’s action is for X to choose 
that Y’s action not infringe X’s rights.171 
 
170 See also David Owens, who says that ‘consenting to ɸ-ing… involves... no intention that ɸ-ing 
occur’. Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (n 95) 173. 
171 The successful communication analogue of the Normative Power Account is the Successfully 
Communicated Normative Power Account. 
Successfully Communicated Normative Power Account:  For X to consent to Y’s action is for X both to choose 
that Y’s action not infringe X’s rights and to successfully communicate that choice to Y. 
There are also intermediate possibilities, such as the Attempted Communication Normative Power Account. 
Attempted Communication Normative Power Account: For X to consent to Y’s action is for X both to choose 
that Y’s action not infringe X’s rights and to attempt to communicate that choice to Y. 
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The Normative Power Account also comes in several variations. For example, 
according to Victor Tadros, for X to consent to Y’s action involves X ‘intend[ing] 
directly to release’ Y from a duty that Y owes to X not to perform that action.172 For 
Larry Alexander, the object of the intention is not the duty but the correlative claim 
right.173 For David Owens, for X to consent to Y’s action is involves X intending to 
thereby make it the case that Y’s action does not wrong X. The object of X’s intention 
the normative status of Y’s action.174 The general feature of the Normative Power 
Account is that the object of X’s intention is not Y’s action itself, but rather the 
normative status of Y’s action: whether Y’s action infringes X’s claim right, or breaches 
a duty that Y owes to X, or wrongs X. 
The Normative Power Account avoids the Choice Account’s problems with cases 
like Borrow and Bink. If the Normative Power Account is correct, then in Borrow it is 
possible for Betty to consent to Jess’s taking her car without Betty intending that Jess 
take her car. The object of Betty’s intention is not Jess’s taking the car, but rather the 
normative status of Jess’s taking the car. Conversely, in Bink, it is possible for the 
prisoner to intend that Bink attack him without consenting to Bink’s attacking him, 
because the prisoner intends that Bink’s attack wrong him. 
 
172 Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 211. For Tadros, X must also attempt to communicate that 
intention. 
173 See Alexander, ‘The Ontology of Consent’ (n 85) 107. 
174 For Owens, X must also intentionally communicate that intention. See Owens, Shaping the Normative 
Landscape (n 95) 165. 
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If the Normative Power Account is correct, then the No Consenter is correct: it 
is possible for X and Y to have sex together, without Y infringing X’s sexual rights, 
even if X does not choose the normative status of Y’s action. To see this, we can start 
by considering Patriarchal Marriage. 
Patriarchal Marriage. Enid and Frank are married in the 1950s. Like 
most people in their society, Enid and Frank falsely believe that a 
husband has a liberty right to have sex with his wife, and, equivalently, 
a wife has no claim right against her husband having sex with her. 
Consequently, Enid and Frank believe that Frank has a liberty right 
to have sex with Enid and, equivalently, that Enid has no claim right 
against Frank having sex with her. 
Perhaps it is plausible that much of the sex in marriages like the one in Patriarchal 
Marriage involved husbands infringing the sexual rights of their wives and thereby 
committing serious sexual wrongs. But it is implausible that all sex within such 
marriages involved husbands seriously wronging their wives in this way. To see this, 
consider a variation of Patriarchal Marriage with the details filled out as follows:   
Better Marriage. As in Patriarchal Marriage, but Frank has sex with Enid 
only when she initiates it, and he is guided entirely by her wishes. He 
would not dream of having sex with Enid against her will.175 
 
175 Tom Dougherty has independently conceived the same example in his The Scope of  Consent 
(unpublished manuscript). 
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Intuitively, in Better Marriage, it is implausible that Frank violates Enid’s right against 
him having sex with her. There are at least two considerations that support this 
intuitive judgment. First, we can ask whether a third party would be morally required 
to use force to prevent Frank from having sex with Enid.176 Surely not. Generally, 
though, if one person violates another’s sexual rights in this way, then a third party is 
required to use necessary and proportionate force to stop him from having sex with 
her.177 Second, even if the sex involved Frank penetrating Enid’s vagina with his penis, 
courts faced with Better Marriage would not hold that Frank commits the actus reus of 
rape.178 This is because it is implausible that Frank has infringed Enid’s right against 
his having sex with her. 
In Better Marriage, then, it is implausible that Frank infringes Enid’s sexual rights. 
However, as Victor Tadros persuasively argues, on the Normative Power Account, it 
is impossible for individuals like Enid to consent. Tadros explains that this is because 
these individuals cannot form the relevant intentions to consent. Accordingly, we can 
 
176 Considering what is morally required of a third party is a standard methodology for considering 
whether something amounts to a fact-relative wronging. For that strategy applied to the question of 
whether someone consented, see Alexander, ‘The Ontology of Consent’ (n 85) 105; Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, ‘The Bluff: The Power of Insincere Actions’ (2017) 23 Legal Theory 168. More generally, claim 
rights are the grounds of duties of assistance on the part of third parties. See Helen Frowe, ‘Claim Rights, 
Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications’ (2015) 89 Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 267. 
177 For the intervention to be required, perhaps there is an additional requirement that the intervention 
is not excessively burdensome for the third party. But even if it were burdensome, the intervention would 
remain permissible. 
178 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, s1(1). 
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call Tadros’s argument the Intentions Argument.179 The Intentions Argument 
proceeds as follows. On the Normative Power Account, for Enid to consent requires 
her to intend to waive the right. But Enid cannot form the intention to waive the relevant 
right. This is because she believes that she does not initially possess a claim right against 
Frank having sex with her, so she believes it is impossible for her to waive that right. 
Enid cannot form the intention to do something that she believes is impossible.180 
The Intentions Argument is sound. If the Normative Power Account is correct, 
then Enid cannot consent. Nevertheless, Frank does not infringe Enid’s rights. From 
this it follows that Gardner correctly diagnoses the following feature of the Normative 
Power Account: If the Normative Power Account is correct, then consent is 
unnecessary. But if consent is not the mechanism by which Enid divests herself of the 
relevant right in Better Marriage, then what is? The Gardnerian view suggests the Joint 
Action Explanation: it is not Enid’s consent, but instead her engaging in the joint action 
of having sex with Frank that functions to waive her claim right. Just as Amelia and 
Bert’s Tangoing together waives the relevant rights that each of them possesses against 
the other, so too in Better Marriage. 
While perhaps initially plausible, the Joint Action Explanation is unlikely to 
provide the most fundamental or most general explanation for why individuals in cases 
 
179 See Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 211. See also Westen (n 22) 31–32. 
180 Although I have formulated the Intentions Argument in terms of Enid’s inability to form the 
intention to waive a right, parallel formulations are available for the other variations of the Normative 
Power Account. For example, if Enid believes that Frank does not owe her the relevant duty, then Enid 
cannot form the intention to release him from that duty. 
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like Better Marriage do not infringe each other’s rights. To see why, consider a case in 
which the relevant action is not a joint action but simply something that one person 
does individually, such as Massage: 
Massage. Enid asks Frank to give her a massage, which he does. Both 
Enid and Frank believe that Enid does not have a claim right against 
Frank touching Enid. 
The massage is something that Frank does to Enid—something in respect of 
which he is active and she is passive, and something that involves her negative claim 
rights over her person. Intuitively, Frank does not infringe Enid’s rights over her person 
in giving her a massage. But is not plausibly described as a joint action. As a result, it 
cannot be explained using the Joint Action Explanation. This is true even though, as 
we saw in our discussion of the Intentions Argument, Enid cannot form the relevant 
intention to consent. 
On the Normative Power Account, if a person believes that they lack a certain 
claim right, then it is impossible for that person to waive that claim right by consenting. 
But this leads to counterintuitive results in cases like Better Marriage. The No Consenter’s 
explanation in these cases is the Joint Action Explanation—it is joint action rather than 
consent that is divesting the person of the relevant claim rights in each case. But this 
does not seem to be the correct explanation, because it is unable to explain cases such 
as Massage, in which there is no joint action but in which, intuitively, there is no rights 
infringement. It seems that whatever explains why there is no rights infringement in 
those cases is also likely to explain why there is no rights infringement in cases like Better 
Marriage. If that is so, then the Joint Action Explanation is redundant, and there is no 
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reason to believe it. If that is correct, then the Moral Argument provides gives us no 
reason to believe the Main Argument’s Joint Action Premise. 
e. The Hybrid Account of Consent 
We have seen that both the Choice Account and the Normative Power Account of 
consent face problems. A natural way to avoid the problems with each account while 
retaining its strengths is to suggest a Hybrid Account of Consent, which combines 
Choice Account and the Normative Power Account to provide two individually 
sufficient conditions for consent. In this subsection, I defend the Hybrid Account of 
Consent: 
Hybrid Account of Consent: X consents to Y’s action if and only if either: 
(1) X intends that Y’s action not wrong X; or 
(2) Both: 
(a) X has no intentions regarding whether Y’s action wrongs X; 
and 
(b) X chooses Y’s action. 
The Hybrid Account is a disjunction of two conditions. Condition (1) states the 
Normative Power Account. As such, all cases of consent according to the Normative 
Power Account are also cases of consent under the Hybrid Account. But Condition (2) 
avoids the counterintuitive consequences of the Normative Power Account in cases like 
Better Marriage. The intuitive result in these cases is that there is consent. The Hybrid 
Account delivers this result. This is because Condition (2)(b) of the Hybrid Account 
states the Choice Account. In cases like Better Marriage, X intends that Y perform the 
action in question. Now, we saw above that this feature of the Choice Account commits 
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it to counterintuitive results in entrapment cases such as Bink. On the Choice Account, 
the prisoner in Bink consented to Bink’s attacking him. But this is not the intuitive 
result. Intuitively, while the prisoner in Bink intended that Bink attack him, he did not 
thereby consent to Bink’s attacking him. This is because, in addition intending that 
Bink attack him, the prisoner intended that Bink’s attack wrong him. This is an 
intention regarding the normative status of Bink’s action. While the normative 
intentions in entrapment cases are a problem for the Choice Account, they are not a 
problem for the Hybrid Account. This is because condition (2)(a) of the Hybrid 
Account delivers the intuitively correct result that they are not cases of consent.181 
If the Hybrid Account of Consent is correct, then the No Consenter has no 
support for the Joint Action Explanation. The support for the Joint Action Explanation 
came from thinking of Better Marriage as a case in which there was no consent but in 
which Enid nevertheless waived her rights. But on the Hybrid Account, Better Marriage 
is a case of consent, so it does not support the Joint Action Explanation. Accordingly, 
there is no reason to believe that the Moral Argument is sound. 
 
181 There might be some circumstances in which both conditions (2)(a) and (2)(b) are met, but where 
intuitively X does not waive their right against Y’s action. The question here is not whether X consents 
to Y’s action—X does consent Y’s action—but rather whether X’s consent is morally valid. This will in 
turn depend on whether it is valuable for X to have the power to waive the right in such circumstances. 
For a sketch of considerations that bear on whether it might be valuable for X to have that power, see 
Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (n 95) 166–168. 
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This argument against the Joint Action Explanation depends on the adequacy of 
the Hybrid Account. Can the No Consenter reject the Hybrid Account? Here is one 
way they might try. Suppose X and Y engage in some joint action. In that case, X 
intends that Y perform some individual actions that partly constitute the joint action. 
On the Hybrid Account, if X intends that Y wrong X by performing these individual 
actions, then Y’s individual actions do actually infringe X’s rights. For example, if Bert 
and Amelia Tango together, then Bert intends that Amelia place her hands on his 
shoulders. If Bert also intends that Amelia’s placing her hands on his shoulders wrong 
him, then on the Hybrid Account, she does in fact infringe his right against her doing 
so. If this is incorrect, then there must be something wrong with the Hybrid Account. 
Though this might seem implausible, I suggest it is correct. This is easiest to see in cases 
in which we imagine Bert telling Amelia explicitly, ‘I intend both that you touch me in 
ways that partly constitute our Tangoing together, and that you wrong me by doing 
so.’182 If at this stage, Amelia Tangoes with Bert, she thereby infringes his rights. 
The same is true in the sexual case. It is possible for the woman in Gardner’s 
‘straight sex’ scenario to both intend that the man penetrate her vagina with his penis, 
and also intend that he wrongs her by doing so. On the Hybrid Account, the woman 
in this scenario does not consent to the man’s penetrating her vagina. It follows that if 
he nevertheless penetrates her vagina, he thereby infringes her rights. Again, this is 
easiest to see in cases in which we imagine her telling him explicitly, ‘I intend both that 
 
182 This is different from the case in which Amelia culpably deceives Bert into believing that she has 
consented. Amelia’s culpable deception is plausibly sufficient for her to forfeit the relevant rights. See 
Ferzan, ‘THE BLUFF’ (n 176). 
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you penetrate my vagina with your penis, and that you wrong me by doing so.’ If at 
this stage, he penetrates her vagina, he thereby infringes her rights.183 
When a person has rights against another person performing an action, the 
Hybrid Account prioritizes the rightholder’s normative intentions regarding that 
action—their intentions about whether that action wrongs them. This is a plausible 
feature, because a central function of the power of consent is to give rightholders direct 
control over the normative landscape—control over whether other people’s actions 
wrong them. But where the rightholder has no normative intentions regarding the 
action, the Hybrid Account does not simply assume that they cannot, by means of their 
choices, waive the relevant rights. Instead, the Hybrid Account asks whether the 
rightholder chooses the action. This is a secondary way in which the rightolder’s 
choices can affect whether the action infringes their rights. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this essay, I have argued against the No Consent Thesis, which states that if sex is 
ideal, then consent is unnecessary. I have claimed that the Main Argument for the No 
Consent Thesis rests on the Joint Action Premise, which states that if two people do 
something together, then consent is unnecessary. I have suggested that it is possible to 
 
183 Owens is therefore correct when he claims that ‘sex that has been chosen [can] constitute rape.’ 
Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (n 95) 181. See further, text accompanying n 184, below. Even if 
Owens is wrong about this, cases like these are little help for the No Consenter, as they do not exhibit 
the kind of mutuality that makes it ‘ideal’ in the sense that the Main Argument requires. 
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distinguish two arguments in support of the Joint Action Premise. The first is an 
argument from the metaphysics of sexual joint action, whereas the second is an argument 
from its moral significance. I have argued that both the Metaphysical Argument and 
the Moral Argument are unsound. Accordingly, I have argued, neither supports the 
Joint Action Premise. Consequently, the Main Argument gives us no reason to believe 
the No Consent Thesis. On the contrary, we should accept the Commonsense View: 
If you have sex with someone without their consent, you thereby infringe that person’s 
rights. 
The case against the Moral Argument and the Metaphysical Argument yields 
several valuable lessons. Consider first the case against the Moral Argument. In making 
this case, we have learnt that two influential accounts of what consent is—the Choice 
Account and the Normative Power Account—both face problems. One important 
lesson is that sexual offences law could not adopt either of these accounts without 
importing its problems into the law. 
As we saw from our discussion of Bink and Borrow, the Choice Account faces two 
problems: intending that an action occur is neither sufficient nor necessary for 
consenting to that action. Bink and Borrow concerned non-sexual actions, but the same 
is true for sexual actions. X’s intending that Y sexually penetrate X is insufficient for 
X to consent to Y’s sexually penetrating X. Owens acknowledges this explicitly. 
Thinking of rape as non-consensual sex, Owens says, ‘sex that has been chosen [can] 
constitute rape… Someone chooses to be raped where they intend that the rapist have 
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sex with them after they have explicitly refused their consent.’184 Owens is explicit, 
then, that it is possible for X to intend that Y sexually penetrate X without consenting 
to Y’s penetrating X. Conversely, it is possible for someone to consent to penetration 
without intending that it occur. To see this, consider Job Interview: 
Job Interview. Ursula really wants Tariq to penetrate her vagina with his 
penis. If Ursula does not consent to his penetrating her, then Tariq will 
prepare for his upcoming interview. While Ursula thinks it would be 
better for Tariq if he were to prepare for his interview, she thinks that 
whether he chooses to do this instead of penetrating her is ultimately his 
responsibility. She tells him, ‘I permit you to sexually penetrate me’ 
despite intending that he prepare for the job interview instead. 
Intuitively, Ursula consents to Tariq’s penetrating her vagina with his penis, even if she 
intends that he instead chooses to prepare for his job interview. If that is correct, then 
it is possible for someone to consent to their partner penetrating them without 
intending that their partner penetrate them. 
If the law were to adopt the Choice Account of consent, then it could not 
acknowledge that it is possible both for a person to consent to penetration without 
intending that penetration occur (as in Job Interview) and to intend that a person 
penetrate them without consenting to their doing so (as in Owens’ discussion). 
If on the other hand the law were to adopt a Normative Power Account of 
consent, then in Better Marriage Frank would commit the actus reus of rape. Since no 
 
184 ibid. 
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court faced with Better Marriage would hold that Frank commits the actus reus of rape, 
the law could not adopt a Normative Power Account of Consent. 
A second lesson from our discussion of the Moral Argument is that the Hybrid 
Account of Consent avoids the problem faced by the Choice Account and the 
Normative Power Account. Accordingly, the law could avoid importing the problems 
of the Choice Account and the Normative Power Account by instead adopting the 
Hybrid Account. 
Now consider the case against the Metaphysical Argument. In making that case 
we have seen the importance of being clear about precisely what a person consents to. 
We have learnt that when two people have sex together, each of them consents not to 
the whole of the sexual joint action but instead to those individual actions of their 
partner that partly constitute it, such as penetration and envelopment. Thinking about 
things this way has four attractive features. 
 First, it diffuses an important part of the No Consenter’s critique of 
conceptualising rape law and sexual morality in terms of consent.185 That critique 
proceeds as follows. Consent, as we saw above, presupposes that the consent-giver is 
passive in respect of the action to which they consent. If rape is non-consensual sex, 
then, a woman who consents to sex is passive in respect of the sex—sex is something 
that another person, typically a man, does to her. Conceptualising rape law and sexual 
 
185 This critique is present in Gardner, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (n 15); Palmer (n 15); MacKinnon (n 
113); Natasha McKeever, ‘Can a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?’ (2019) 13 Criminal 
Law and Philosophy 599; Anderson (n 134); Kukla (n 15). 
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morality in terms of women’s consent to sex with men, so goes the No Consenter’s 
critique, is objectionable because it involves conceptualising women as passive with 
respect to sex. 
Given that we now accept that each sexual partner must consent lest their 
partner infringe their rights, the No Consenter’s critique faces a puzzle.186 If both the 
man and the woman consent to the sex, then both of them must be passive in respect 
of the sex. In respect of the sex, it is not possible for either to be the active partner, the 
‘doer’. The puzzle for the No Consenter is this: If both the man and the woman consent 
to the sex, and consent presupposes the passivity of the consenter, then who is active 
in respect of the sex?187 
Being clear about what each person consents to solves the No Consenter’s puzzle. 
A woman having sex with a man does not consent to their having sex together. Instead, 
she consents to the things he does to her that partly constitute this joint action—most 
saliently, to his penetrating her vagina with his penis. Penetration is something that he 
does to her. Thinking that a woman is passive with respect to this action does not entail 
thinking about her as passive with respect to their joint action of having sex together, 
and so does not entail thinking of women generally as sexually passive. 
 
186 For example, it is now legally possible for a man to be the victim of rape. 
187 There are parallel puzzles that arise when neither partner is a woman. Similar issues arise with 
respect to MacKinnon’s views on pornography: How can pornography portray women as passive when, 
as in gay male pornography, it doesn’t portray any women at all? For discussion, see Leslie Green, 
‘Pornographies’ (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 27, 32–35. 
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The second attractive feature of thinking about things this way is that doing so 
explains why the law formulates the wrong of rape in terms of non-consensual 
penetration.188 Since penetration is something that another person does to you, it involves 
your negative claim rights over your person. Third, thinking about things this way 
highlights a potential risk of defining rape instead—as some theorists have suggested 
we should—in terms of non-consensual sex.189 To the extent that sex is a joint action, 
it is a category error to think that we consent to sex. It is not the joint action of having 
sex together to which each partner consents. Rather, each individual consents to those 
actions of their sexual partner that partly constitute their having sex together.  
A fourth attractive feature of thinking about things this way makes perspicuous 
an important case for law reform. While the law criminalises non-consensual penile 
penetration of the vagina as rape, it does not at present adequately criminalise non-
consensual vaginal envelopment of the penis. If the Commonsense View and the 
Conceptual Premise are both correct, then the man has a relevant claim right against 
what the woman does to him—namely, envelop his penis with her vagina. If that is 
 
188 The wrong of rape, which lawyers often call the actus reus of rape, is outlined in section 1(1) of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, which provides, in relevant part: ‘(1) A person (A) commits an offence if— 
he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, [and] 
B does not consent to the penetration’. 
189 David Archard, ‘The Wrong of Rape’ (2007) 57 The Philosophical Quarterly 374. 
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correct, then the law should plausibly criminalise non-consensual envelopment in a 
way that recognises it as a moral wrong of comparable seriousness to rape.190 
 
 
190 For suggestions along these lines, see McKeever (n 185); Siobhan Weare, ‘“Oh You’re a Guy, How 
Could You Be Raped by a Woman, That Makes No Sense”: Towards a Case for Legally Recognising 
and Labelling “Forced-to-Penetrate” Cases as Rape’ (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 
110. I take their arguments to be broadly in the correct vein, though I have my reservations about the 
details of their arguments and their proposals for law reform. 
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Children, the Unconscious, and the Dead: Consent and the 
Will Theory of Rights 
 
Abstract: In the debate between the Will Theory of Rights and its 
rivals, a key objection to the Will Theory concerns the possibility of its 
extensional adequacy. I call it the Impossibility Objection. If the Will 
Theory is correct, so goes the Impossibility Objection, then it is 
impossible for young children, the unconscious, and the dead to have 
moral and legal rights. I argue that the Will Theory can avoid the 
Impossibility Objection. I formulate the Contemporary Will Theory 
of Rights—a Hartian theory of the function of moral and legal rights. 
I argue that if it is possible for someone to give valid prior consent to 
actions that occur while they are unconscious or after they die, then 
according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for them to 
have moral and legal rights. Moreover, I argue that if it is possible for 
adults to give valid subsequent consent to actions that occurred when 
they were children, then according to the Contemporary Will Theory, 
it is possible for them to have moral and legal rights. Since the notion 
of valid subsequent consent is more contentious than that of prior 
consent, children provide, in MacCormick’s words, a ‘test-case’ for the 
Will Theory—though not in the way that MacCormick envisaged. 
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1. The Will Theory and its Rivals 
The Will Theory of Rights is one of the leading theories of the function of moral and 
legal rights. According to the Will Theory, the function of moral and legal rights is to 
endow those who have rights with normative control—that is, control over the moral and 
legal duties that others owe them.191 The main alternative to the Will Theory is the 
Interest Theory of Rights, according to which the function of moral and legal rights is 
to protect the interests of those to have rights—a person’s interest being an aspect of 
their wellbeing.192 To be sure, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory are not the 
only possible theories of the function of rights. Perhaps rights have some third function. 
Or perhaps they have more than one function.193 Each of these possibilities is plausible 
and deserves further consideration.194 But it is fair to say that the Will Theory and 
Interest Theory have dominated discussion of the function of moral and legal rights. 
 
191 Joseph Bowen, ‘Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights’ (2020) 50 Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 427. 
192 See Raz (n 5) 166. 
193 See, e.g., Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 223; Leif Wenar, 
‘The Nature of Claim-Rights’ (2013) 123 Ethics 202; Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘A Hybrid Theory of Claim-
Rights’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 257. There are also further possibilities. For example, 
perhaps moral rights have one function but legal rights have another. 
194 For doubts, see MH Kramer and H Steiner, ‘Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?’ (2005) 27 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 281. 
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 The debate between the Will Theory and the Interest Theory is long running, 
with powerful objections on against each theory. In this essay, I take up one objection 
against the Will Theory. 
In this essay, I shall defend the Will Theory of Rights against a specific charge 
of extensional inadequacy which I call the Impossibility Objection. According to the 
Impossibility Objection, if the Will Theory is correct, then it is impossible for young 
children, the unconscious, and the dead to have moral and legal rights. I shall argue 
that the Impossibility Objection does not succeed: the Will Theory can accommodate 
the possibility of young children, the unconscious, and the dead having moral and legal 
rights. If I am correct, then this leaves the Will Theory better off than is widely 
supposed. It leaves the Will Theory better with respect to the Interest Theory than is 
widely supposed with regard to possibility of each theory’s extensional adequacy. And 
it removes one significant motivation for looking for a different theory altogether of the 
function or functions of rights—namely, the Will Theory’s apparent inability to 
account for the possibility of young children (hereinafter simply ‘children’), 
unconscious adults, and the dead having moral and legal rights. This is not a knock-
down argument in favour of the Will Theory. However, I shall argue in this essay that 
the Will Theory is better able to respond than is widely supposed to the specific charge 
of extensional adequacy with regard to the possibility of children, unconscious adults, 
and the dead having moral and legal rights. 
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2. Hohfeldian Terminology 
The arguments that follow rely on some specialist terminology from Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld’s scheme for analysing rights. While Hohfeld limits his discussion to the 
analysis of legal rights, the Hohfeldian scheme has also been applied very successfully 
to the analysis of moral rights.195 For our purposes, we can assume that Hohfeld’s 
analysis applies to moral rights as well as to legal rights. With that assumption in mind, 
we can turn to Hohfeld’s terminology. 
Hohfeld distinguishes several jural relations—relations that obtain between 
different Hohfeldian incidents and their correlatives. For our purposes, it is important 
to distinguish three Hohfeldian incidents: claims, liberties, and powers. To understand 
these incidents, we need to understand their correlatives. If X has a claim against Y’s 
performing some action, then Y owes X a correlative duty not to perform that action. 
For example, if I have a claim against your entering my apartment, then you owe me 
a correlative duty not to enter my apartment. Conversely, if X lacks a claim against 
Y’s performing some action, then Y owes X no correlative duty not to perform that 
action. If Y owes X no duty not to perform an action, then Y has a liberty (with respect 
to X) to perform that action.196 For example, if I lack a claim against your walking in 
the park, then you owe me no duty not to do so. Since you owe me no duty not to walk 
in the park, you have a liberty (with respect to me) to walk in the park. Hohfeld might 
 
195 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (n 126). For a Hohfeldian analysis of moral rights, see Judith Jarvis 
Thomson (n 82). 
196 While Hohfeld himself uses the term ‘privilege’ rather than ‘liberty’ for this incident, I follow the 
widespread practice among contemporary rights theorists in calling it a liberty.  
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have put my lacking a claim against your walking in the park as my having a ‘no-right’ 
against your walking in the park. Accordingly, the correlative of a liberty is a no-right. 
However, it is better to express this idea as my having a no-claim against your walking 
in the park, for calling the incident a no-right is apt to prejudice the notion of a right. 
In any event, I shall treat my having a no-claim against your walking in the park as 
equivalent to my lacking a claim against your walking in the park.197 
Hohfeld’s scheme also involves various ‘second-order’ incidents—incidents 
that operate on first order incidents. For our purposes, the most important of these is 
the power. Powers operate on claims. X has a power over X’s claim against Y’s 
performing an action just in case it is possible for X to waive that claim. For example, 
I have a power over my claim against your entering my apartment just in case it is 
possible for me to waive that claim. Since claims and duties are correlative, we can also 
define a power in terms of duties rather than claims. We can say that X has a power 
over the duty that Y owes X just in case it is possible for X to waive that duty. I have a 
power over your duty not to enter my apartment just in case it is possible for me to 
waive that duty. The correlative of a power is a liability. If I have a power to waive the 
duty to enter my apartment, you are—as it were—‘liable’ to me waiving the duty you 
owe me. 
 
197 For recent debate regarding Hohfeld’s use of the term ‘no-right’, see Heidi M Hurd and Michael S 
Moore, ‘The Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights’ (2018) 63 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 295; 
Matthew H Kramer, ‘On No-Rights and No Rights’ (2019) 64 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 
213. 
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As our discussion of claims, liberties, and powers illustrates, correlatives in 
Hohfeld’s scheme merely—as Walter Wheeler Cook puts it in his introduction to 
Hohfeld’s work, ‘describe the situation viewed first from the point of view of one person 
and then from  that of the other. Each concept [claim, liberty, and power] must 
therefore, as a matter of logic, have a correlative.’198 Correlative to X’s claim against 
Y’s performing an action is the duty that Y owes X not to perform that action. 
Correlative to Y’s liberty with respect to X to perform some action is X’s ‘no-claim’ 
against Y’s performing that action. Correlative to X’s power over the duty that Y owes 
X not to perform some action is Y’s liability with respect X regarding that duty.  
 
3. The Will Theory of Rights 
We can use this Hohfeldian scheme for analysing rights to help us to formulate a 
version of the Will Theory of Rights. In this section, I do just that. I outline what I call 
the Contemporary Will Theory of rights. I take as my starting point HLA Hart’s classic 
statement of the Will Theory as an account of the function of legal rights. The 
Contemporary Will Theory is the result of modifying Hart’s Will Theory in two 
important respects. The first modification involves using Hohfeldian terminology to 
clarify the relation between various elements of Hart’s Will Theory. The second 
modification follows from the fact that, unlike Hart’s Will Theory, the Contemporary 
Will Theory aims to provide an account of the function not only of legal rights but also 
 
198 Walter Wheeler Cook’s ‘Introduction’ to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (n 126) 10. As Hohfeld puts it 
at page 38, ‘In other words, if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the 
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place.’ 
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of moral rights. To accommodate this increased generality, the Contemporary Will 
Theory jettisons those features of Hart’s Will Theory which apply only to legal rights. 
The Contemporary Will Theory is what emerges following these modifications to 
Hart’s Will Theory. As should be clear from what follows, I do not mean to suggest 
that the Contemporary Will Theory is the only contemporary version of the Will 
Theory.199 
a. Hart’s Will Theory of Legal Rights 
Hart’s classic statement of the Will Theory of legal rights has proved enormously 
influential, so it is worth quoting in full: 
 
‘The idea is that of one individual being given by the law exclusive 
control, more or less extensive, over another person’s duty so that in the 
area of conduct covered by that duty the individual who has the right is 
a small-scale sovereign to whom the duty is owed. The fullest measure of 
control comprises three distinguishable elements: (i) the right holder may 
waive or extinguish the duty or leave it in existence; (ii) after breach or 
threatened breach of a duty he may leave it ‘unenforced’ or may ‘enforce’ 
it by suing for compensation or, in certain cases, for an injunction or 
mandatory order to restrain the continued or further breach of duty; and 
 
199 See text accompanying n 204, below. 
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(iii) he may waive or extinguish the obligation to pay compensation to 
which the breach gives rise.’200 
 
In this passage, Hart identifies three elements that comprise the ‘fullest measure of 
control’ that it is possible for X to have over the legal duty that Y owes X. For reasons 
that will become clear later in the essay, I shall assume that for X to have ‘control’ over 
a duty that Y owes X is for X to have the power to waive that duty or leave it in force.201 
Hart’s reference to a ‘small-scale sovereign’ puts us in mind of the adage that 
an Englishman’s home is his castle. To illustrate what Hart has in mind, then, consider 
Rex’s legal right against Sarah’s entering his home. This right includes Rex’s legal 
claim against Sarah’s entering Rex’s home and Sarah’s correlative legal duty not to 
enter it. Rex’s legal right also includes, on Hart’s view, Rex’s legal power to waive 
Sarah’s legal duty not to enter. For example, Rex has the legal power to give legally 
valid consent to Sarah’s entering his home, thereby waiving Sarah’s legal duty not to 
 
200 HLA Hart, ‘Legal Rights’, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford University Press 
1982) 183–84. (Footnote omitted.) I focus on Hart’s Will Theory because this is the classic formulation 
of the Will Theory. However, there are other more recent defences of the Will Theory as an account of 
both  moral and legal rights. See, e.g., Carl Wellman, Real Rights (Oxford University Press 1995). 
Wellman’s discussion of the impossibility of fetuses having moral and legal rights makes clear that his 
version of the Will Theory (the ‘dominion theory’) is also subject to what I call the Impossibility 
Objection. See Carl Wellman, ‘The Concept of Fetal Rights’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 65. 
201 For discussion, see Hillel Steiner, ‘Working Rights’ in Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds and Hillel 
Steiner (eds), A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (Clarendon Press 1998) 240. 
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do so. (This raises an important question about what it takes for Rex’s consent to be 
legally valid. I assume that for Rex’s consent to be legally valid requires, at a minimum, 
that Rex is an adult of sound mind whose consent is not induced by coercion or 
deception.202) Rex’s legal power corresponds to Hart’s first element of control. 
Speaking generally, we can call this element of control the Waivability of Legal Duty: 
 
Waivability of Legal Duty. X has a legal right against Y performing an action 
only if X has the legal power to waive the legal duty Y owes X not to 
perform that action. 
 
Continuing with our illustration, we can now ask what happens if Sarah breaches her 
legal duty by entering Rex’s home. If Sarah breaches her legal duty not to enter Rex’s 
home, then Rex has what Hart characterises as the legal power to sue Sarah for 
damages or an injunction.203 This is Hart’s second element of control. We can call this 
the Waivability of Legal Enforcement of Duty: 
 
202 For a discussion of validity conditions, see, Emma C Bullock, ‘Valid Consent’ in Andreas Müller 
and Peter Schaber (eds), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018). See also Emma 
Cave, ‘Valid Consent to Medical Treatment’ [2020] Journal of Medical Ethics 1. 
203 According to James Penner, Hart is wrong to characterise this element of control as a legal power. 
What Hart calls the legal power to sue is instead, according to Penner, a legal liberty to sue and a ‘paired’ 
legal liberty not to sue. Penner seems correct on this point. However, this does not affect the 
Contemporary Will Theory because (as we shall see) the Contemporary Will Theory jettisons this 
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Waivability of Legal Enforcement of Duty. X has a legal right against Y 
performing an action only if X has the legal power to waive legal 
enforcement of the legal duty Y owes X not to perform that action. 
 
To complete our illustration, we can assume that Sarah’s breach of her legal duty not 
to enter Rex’s home generates an additional legal duty for Sarah to compensate Rex 
for that breach. However, Rex has the power to waive Sarah’s duty to compensate him 
for the breach. This power is an example of Hart’s third element of control. We can 
call this element the Waivability of Legal Compensation for a breach of legal duty: 
 
Waivability of Legal Compensation. X has a legal right against Y’s performing 
an action only if X has the power to waive the legal duty Y owes X to 
compensate X if Y performs that action. 
 
Having outlined the three elements of control, we can make three observations. First, 
on Hart’s view, if X has all three elements of control over the legal duty Y owes X not 
to perform some action, this is sufficient for X to have a legal right against Y’s 
performing that action. Paradigmatic legal property rights such as freehold ownership 
do indeed involve all three elements of control. For example, it is clear that on Hart’s 
 
element of Hart’s Will Theory. James Penner, ‘Legal Powers and the Will and Interest Theories of 
Rights’ in Mark McBride (ed), New Essays on the Nature of Rights (Hart Publishing 2017) 106. 
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view, Rex has a legal right against Sarah’s entering his home because Rex has all three 
elements of control over Sarah’s duty not to enter. 
We have just seen that, for Hart, X’s having all three elements of control over 
the legal duty Y owes X not to perform an action is sufficient for X to have a legal right 
against Y’s performing an action. The second observation concerns whether, for Hart, 
X’s having each of these elements of control is also individually necessary for X’s having 
such a right. Hart is unclear on this point. Let us assume that each element is 
individually necessary on Hart’s view. 
This brings us to the third observation. Hart speaks of these elements in terms 
of X’s control over Y’s duty. I have identified Hart’s notion of ‘control’ over a duty with 
the power to waive that duty or leave it in force. The reason for this is identification is 
twofold. First, this is how Hillel Steiner formulates his version of the Will Theory of 
Legal Rights, which is perhaps the most influential contemporary Hartian Will 
Theory.204 Second, identifying control over a duty with the power to waive that duty 
or leave it in force is dialectically generous to those who seek to challenge the possibility 
of the Will Theory’s extensional adequacy. To see why, consider an example. 
Plausibly, children have some control over the duties others owe them. For example, by 
putting themselves in harm’s way a child can plausibly place nearby strangers under a 
duty to save them. This need not be denied by those who believe the Will Theory 
cannot account for the possibility of children having moral and legal rights. Instead, 
these people are more charitably interpreted as claiming only that a child cannot waive 
 
204 See Steiner (n 201) 240. 
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the duties that others owe them. Accordingly, let us assume that according to the Will 
Theory, X’s having control over a duty in this context means X’s having the power to 
waive that duty or leave it in force. 
We can summarise Hart’s Will Theory of Legal Rights as follows: X has a legal 
right against Y’s performing some action just in case: (1) X has the legal power to waive 
the legal duty Y owes X not to perform that action; (2) X has (what Hart calls) the legal 
power to waive legal enforcement of the legal duty Y owes X not to perform that action; 
and (3) X has the power to waive the legal duty Y owes X to compensate X if Y 
performs that action. 
 
b. The Contemporary Will Theory of Rights  
In the essay from which the passage from Hart is taken, Hart’s goal is  limited to 
providing an account of the function of legal rights. The aims of the Contemporary 
Will Theory are broader. The Contemporary Will Theory aims to provide an account 
not only of legal rights but also of moral rights. In this subsection, I examine each of 
the elements of control that Hart identifies, modifying or eliminating those elements 
where necessary to achieve this broader goal. What results is the Contemporary Will 
Theory. Let us consider each of Hart’s elements in turn. 
It is clear that the first element of control—the power to waive the duty or leave 
it in existence—is also a feature of paradigmatic moral rights. Consider Patient’s moral 
claim against Doctor performing surgery on him, and the correlative moral duty that 
Doctor owes Patient not to perform surgery on him. This moral claim is protected by 
a moral power. Patient has the moral power to waive Doctor’s moral duty not to 
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perform sugery on him. Indeed, this is what Patient does when giving morally valid 
consent to surgery. (As with legally valid consent, I assume that to give morally valid 
consent, Patient must at a minimum be an adult of sound mind who is not induced by 
coercion or deception.205) Accordingly, it is possible for the Contemporary Will Theory 
to keep Hart’s first element. Accordingly, the first element of control, which in Hart’s 
Will Theory is Waivability of Legal Duty corresponds to the broader notion in the 
Contemporary Will Theory, which we can call Waivability of Duty: 
 
Waivability of Duty. X has a right against Y performing an action only if X 
has the power to waive the duty Y owes X not to perform that action. 
 
Hart’s second element of control is Waivability of Legal Enforcement of Duty. In the legal 
context, as Hart himself notes in the passage quoted earlier in this essay, this second 
element of control comprises what he characterises as a power to sue, whether for 
compensation or injunctive relief.206 However, the Contemporary Will Theory has a 
broader goal than Hart’s. The Contemporary Will Theory aims to provide an account 
of the function not only of legal rights, but of rights as such. In particular, the 
Contemporary Will Theory also aims to provide an account of moral rights. With 
respect to moral rights, it is unclear what it could mean have the power to waive or 
 
205 See n 202, above. 
206 See text accompanying n 200, above. 
- 158 - 
 
enforce the relevant moral duty.207 To accommodate this increased generality, the 
Contemporary Will Theory  jettisons the second of Hart’s elements of control over the 
duty, because that element applies only to legal rights. 
Hart’s third element of control is Waivability of Legal Compensation. Where the loss 
is monetizable, this element applies to moral rights just as it does to legal rights. If a 
stranger takes $10 from my wallet, they have a moral duty to compensate me for my 
loss. And I have the moral power to waive that duty. However, sometimes 
compensation for loss is not easily monetizable. For example, if a husband breaches 
his promise to his wife that he will not have sexual intercourse with others,  ‘it is likely 
that penitent deeds would be more appropriate than cash’.208 We can say more 
generally that the third element of control involves the power to waive the duty to make 
it up to you that the initial duty was breached. That is to say, the third element of 
control, according to the Contemporary Will Theory, is the Power to Waive the Duty to 
Make Amends, or Waivability of Amends for short: 
 
207 See Katharina Nieswandt, ‘Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right’ in David Plunkett, Scott 
Shapiro and Kevin Toh (eds), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford 
University Press) 320. 
208 Dougherty, ‘Yes Means Yes’ (n 25) 233. See also Rowan Cruft, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and 
Will Theory?’ (2004) 23 Law and Philosophy 347, 359. According to Cruft, ‘my aunt holds a right that 
I visit her only if she holds not merely a claim that I visit her, but if she also would hold a claim that I apologise 
or in some other way make amends were I to fail to visit her.’ (Original emphasis.) In a footnote, Cruft says, ‘Note 
that the forms that appropriate remedies can take are various, and need not be limited to a spoken 
apology or a compensation payment.’ 
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Waivability of Amends. X has a right against Y’s performing an action only 
if X has the power to waive the duty Y owes X to make it up to X if Y 
performs that action. 
 
If both Waivability of Duty and Waivability of Amends are satisfied, then the situation is as 
follows. First, X has a claim against Y’s performing some action. Second, X has a 
power to waive the duty that Y owes X correlative to that claim. These two incidents 
make up Waivability of Duty. Third, if Y breaches the duty correlative with X’s claim, X 
has an additional claim that Y make amends to X. Fourth, X has the power to waive 
duty to make amends that Y owes X correlative to X’s additional claim. The latter two 
incidents make up Waivability of Amends. 
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that the relation between 
Waivability of Duty and Waivability of Amends is not a relation of Hohfeldian logic. If it is 
not a relation of Hohfeldian logic, what kind of relation is it? I suggest the former is the 
defeasible ground of the latter. X’s claim against Y’s performing some action defeasibly 
explains and justifies why X has an additional claim that Y make amends if Y breaches 
the duty correlative to the first claim.209 To illustrate, consider an example. I have a 
claim against your entering my apartment. I also have the power to waive the duty you 
owe me, correlative to that claim, not to enter my apartment. Assume that I do not 
 
209 For a classic statement of the view that rights can be the grounds of both other rights and of duties, 
see Raz (n 5) 167–170.  
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waive that duty. If you nevertheless enter my apartment, you breach the duty you owe 
me and infringe my claim. This explains and justifies why I have a second claim against 
you—a claim that you make amends for breaching the duty you owed me not to enter 
my apartment. And I in turn have a power to release you from this second duty—this 
duty to make amends. 
If I am correct that relation between Waivability of Duty and Waivability of Amends 
is one of grounding, then it is a contingent relation. There will be occasions on which 
Waivability of Duty is satisfied but Waivability of Amends is not, because it has been defeated 
by some other factor. For example, imagine you promise to meet me at the pub and 
thereby give  me a claim to your doing so and a power over your correlative duty. 
Imagine you breach your duty to show up. Here it seems you breach your duty and 
infringe my right. And it seems that is true regardless of whether you owe me amends. 
Perhaps I have forfeited (i.e. defeated) my claim to amends by jilting you at the pub on 
previous occasions. Nevertheless, I suggest, you have infringed my right. 
If all that is correct, then it is possible for X to have a right against Y’s action 
even if Waivability of Amends is not satisfied. Accordingly, the Contemporary Will 
Theory requires only Waivability of Duty. We can therefore summarise the 
Contemporary Will Theory as follows: 
 
Contemporary Will Theory of Rights. X has a right against Y’s performing 
some action if and only if X is in a position to waive the duty Y owes X 
not to perform that action. 
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This formulation of the Contemporary Will Theory provides us with a way to 
understand the oft-quoted claim that the Will Theory is concerned with ‘normative 
allocations of freedom’.210 According to the Will Theory, the function of rights is to 
give individuals who have rights control over the duties that others owe them. Recall 
that Y’s having a liberty (with respect to X) to perform an action is equivalent to Y not 
owing a duty to X not to perform that action. Accordingly, we restate the point about 
duties in terms of liberties: the Will Theory is concerned with normative allocation of 
liberties. 
 
4. The Impossibility Objection to the Will Theory of Rights 
Now that we have outlined the Contemporary Will Theory of Rights, we are well 
placed to understand a key objection to the Will Theory. I shall call this the Impossibility 
Objection: 
 
Impossibility Objection. According to the Will Theory, if X is a child, 
unconscious adult, or dead, then it is not possible for X to have a right 
against Y’s f-ing. 
 
 
210 Steiner (n 201) 238. 
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The Impossibility Objection is made by those who reject the Will Theory in favour of 
one of its rivals, though Will Theorists themselves seem to accept that the objection at 
least correctly characterises the Will Theory. Consider first what Interest Theorist 
Matthew Kramer says about the Will Theory as an account of the function of legal 
rights: ‘A striking corollary of the Will Theory is that … infants, comatose people, senile 
people, and dead people do not have any legal rights.’211 It is not only Interest Theorists 
who raise the Impossibility Objection. For example, Leif Wenar, who rejects both the 
Will Theory and the Interest Theory, says this: ‘The limitations of the will theory are 
… evident in its inability to account for the rights of incompetent (e.g., unconscious) 
adults, and of children.’212 Indeed, even Will Theorists themselves tend accept that the 
Will Theory cannot account for the possibility of children, the unconscious, and the 
dead having rights. As Anna-Karin Andersson puts it, even Will Theorists ‘agree that 
it is at least a very controversial implication of the theory that it excludes from the class 
of rights bearers temporarily unconscious adults … and very young children’.213 
 
211 Matthew H Kramer, ‘Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights’ (2001) 14 Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 29, 30. Kramer is concerned only with the Will Theory as an account of the 
function of legal rights. Kramer also finds it striking that, according to the Will Theory, animals do not 
have rights. However, this is much this is much less striking than the other categories above. Indeed, it 
seems quite contentious whether animals have moral or legal rights. 
212 Wenar (n 193) 240. 
213 Anna-Karin Margareta Andersson, ‘Rights Bearers and Rights Functions’ (2015) 172 Philosophical 
Studies 1625, 1627. 
- 163 - 
 
According to Kramer, the proposition that these individuals cannot have legal 
rights is ‘jarringly and gratuitously at odds with ordinary patterns of discourse’ and 
Kramer ultimately takes this to be an important reason to prefer the Interest Theory 
to the Will Theory.214 Wenar likewise believes that this an important reason to reject 
the Will Theory. Indeed, Will Theorists themselves tend to accept that the 
Impossibility Objection correctly characterises the Will Theory, but downplay the 
extent to which this is a serious defect. That is to say, they accept that according to the 
Will Theory, if X is a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then it is not possible for X to 
have a moral or legal rights. However, they are willing to accept this counterintuitive 
consequence. I suspect that those who are not already convinced by the Will Theory 
are unlikely to find this response persuasive. I shall in due course argue this response is 
mistaken, and that the Impossibility Objection does not accurately characterise the 
Will Theory. 
Before we get to the defence of the Will Theory against the Impossibility 
Objection, it is important to understand the argument for the Impossibility Objection. 
To do this, it is helpful to focus on a particular version of the Will Theory. I shall focus 
on the Contemporary Will Theory. We can ask: according to the Contemporary Will 
Theory, what does it take for X to have a right against Y performing an action? As we 
saw above, one necessary condition is the element of control we identified as Waivability 
of Duty: X has a right against Y performing an action only if X has the power to waive 
the duty Y owes X not to perform that action. 
 
214 Kramer (n 211) 31. 
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Now, Waivability of Duty identifies a necessary condition for X to actually have 
a right against Y performing an action. However, we can also ask a more general 
question: according to the Contemporary Will Theory, what does it take for it to be 
possible for X to have a right against Y performing an action? The answer is that it must 
be possible for X to waive the duty Y owes X not to perform that action. Or, for reasons 
that will shortly become clear, we might say X must be in a position to waive the duty Y 
owes X not to perform that action. We can summarise this as the first premise in the 
argument for the Impossibility Objection. Let us call it the Waivability Premise: 
 
(1) Waivability Premise. According to the Will Theory, it is possible for X to have a 
right against Y’s f-ing only if X is in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not 
to f. 
 
The next premise in the argument for the Impossibility Objection is that if X is a child, 
comatose adult, or dead, then X is not in a position to waive the relevant duties. For 
example, as Kramer correctly observes, children, the comatose and the dead, are ‘not 
able to grasp what is involved in the enforcing or waiving of a duty’.215 Likewise, Wenar 
argues that ‘The will theory can acknowledge rights only in those beings competent to 
exercise powers, which incompetent adults and children are not. Incompetent adults 
and children therefore cannot on this view have rights.’216 Similarly, Andersson argues 
 
215 ibid 30. 
216 Wenar (n 193) 240. 
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that according to the Will Theory, for X to have a right against Y’s performing an 
action, X must have a ‘capacity for exercising agency’—a capacity which children, the 
unconscious and the dead do not have.217 We can summarise this premise as follows: 
 
(2) Inability Premise. If X is a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then X is not in a 
position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f. 
 
Now that we understand both the Waivability Premise and the Inability Premise, we 
are in a position to summarise the argument for the Impossibility Objection: 
 
 
217 Andersson (n 213) 1627. 
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The Argument for the Impossibility Objection 
 
(1) Waivability Premise. According to the Will Theory, it is possible for X to have a 
right against Y’s f-ing only if X is in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not 
to f. 
(2) Inability Premise. If X is a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then X is not in a 
position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f. 
(3) Conclusion. Therefore, According to the Will Theory, if X is an infant, 
unconscious adult, or dead, then it is not possible for X to have a right against 
Y’s f-ing. [Impossibility Objection.] 
 
At this point it is worth making two observations. First, both premises of argument for 
the Impossibility Objection include the phrase ‘X is in a position to waive the duty that 
Y owes X.’ That phrase requires some clarification. On a natural reading, it requires 
not only that X has the moral or legal power to waive X’s duty, but also that X has the 
ability to do so.218 If it did not require the ability to exercise the power, the Will Theorist 
could make a straightforward argument that it is possible for children, unconscious 
adults, and the dead have moral and legal rights. After all, the Will Theorist could 
claim that, in each of these cases, the individual has a moral or legal power to waive the 
relevant duty, but merely lacks the ability to exercise that power. This response might in 
principle help the Will Theorist. However, I do not propose to rely on it. I shall not 
 
218 Nieswandt canvasses some arguments along these lines. Nieswandt (n 207) 322–24. 
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rely on it because both Hart and the those pressing the Impossibility Objection 
presuppose that being in a position to exercise the right—that is, having the ability to 
do so—is a necessary condition for X’s having a right. If this were not what they had 
in mind, then the answer to the Impossibility Objection would be obvious when it 
comes to unconscious adults: Unconscious adults have the moral and legal powers to 
waive the duties that others owe them, but are simply not in a position to exercise those 
powers. Consequently, unconscious adults do have rights, but they are not in a position 
exercise those rights. However, this is not a Hartian response. According to Hart, ‘it is 
hard to think of rights except as capable of exercise’.219 Unconscious adults are not 
capable of exercising their rights. 
 The second observation concerns the strength of the Impossibility Objection. 
The Impossibility Objection is not merely that, according to the Will Theory, children, 
unconscious adults, and the dead do not have moral and legal rights. Rather, the 
Impossibility Objection is that the Will Theory cannot account for the possibility of these 
individuals having moral and legal rights. As it is sometimes put, the Will Theory rules 
out the possibility of such individuals having rights as ‘conceptually incoherent’,220  and 
it does so not through substantive moral or legal argumentation, but rather by 
‘definitional fiat’.221 
 
219 Hart (n 200) 184. (Original emphasis.) 
220 Cruft (n 208) 369. 
221 Cécile Fabre, ‘Posthumous Rights’ in Matthew H Kramer and others (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: 
Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) 226. 
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5. Challenging the Argument for the Impossibility Objection 
In the previous section, we outlined the argument for the Impossibility Objection. The 
argument looks sound. However, I shall argue that it is not. Rather, the argument for 
the Impossibility Objection depends on an equivocation between an only if  condition 
and an only when condition. It is true that, according to the Will Theory, it is possible 
for X to have a right against Y’s action only if X is in a position to waive the duty Y 
owes X not to perform that action. But it is not true that, according to the Will Theory, 
it is possible for X to have a right against Y’s action only when X is in a position to 
waive the duty Y owes X not to perform that action. Put slightly differently, each the 
premises of the argument for the Impossibility Objection ambiguous. On one 
interpretation, the Waivability Premise is true but the Inability Premise is false. On the 
second interpretation, the Inability Premise is true but the Waivability Premise is false. 
On neither interpretation, therefore, does the argument require us to accept the 
Impossibility Objection.222 




222 Temporal issues like the ones raised in this section also arise for the Interest Theory of Rights. For 
discussion, see Sandeep Sreekumar, ‘Some Conceptual Aspects of Temporality and the Ability to 
Possess Rights’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 330. 
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Current Waivability Argument 
 
(1A) Current Waivability Premise. It is possible for X to have a right against Y’s f-ing 
only if X is now in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f.  
(2A) Current Inability Premise. If X is a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then X is not 
now in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f. 
(3) Conclusion. Therefore, if X is a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then it is not 
possible for X to have a right against Y’s f-ing. [Impossibility Objection.] 
 
The Current Waivability Argument is valid. But the Current Waivability Premise is 
false. To see this, let us start return to the case of Rex and Sarah. Recall that Rex has 
both a moral and a legal right against Sarah’s entering his home. According to the 
Contemporary Will Theory, each of these rights consists in the conjunction of a claim 
and a power. Rex has a claim against Sarah’s entering his home, and Sarah owes Rex 
the correlative duty not to enter. Rex also has a power to waive Sarah’s duty. Rex 
exercises this power by giving Sarah his valid consent to his entering her home. But let 
us suppose that Rex does not exercise this power, as in the following variant of the case: 
 
Trespass. Sarah enters Rex’s home without Rex’s valid consent to her 
doing so. 
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In Trespass, Sarah infringes Rex’s claim against her entering his home and breaches 
her correlative duty not to enter. Now consider a variant of Trespass in which Rex is 
asleep when Sarah enters his home: 
 
Sleeping Trespass. Rex is asleep. Sarah enters Rex’s home without Rex’s 
valid consent to her doing so. 
 
I suggest that Sarah commits the same wrong in Sleeping Trespass as in Trespass: she 
infringes Rex’s claim against her entering his home and breaches her correlative duty 
not to enter. If that is correct, then the Current Waivability Premise is false. After all, 
in Sleeping Trespass, Rex is asleep. And if Rex is asleep, Rex is not now in a position to 
exercise the power his power to waive the duty that Sarah owes him not to enter his 
home. The same applies if Rex is unconscious rather than merely asleep when Sarah 
enters his home. 
 This style of argument is not limited to individuals’ rights over their property. 
It also extends to their rights over their person. Consider: 
 
Surgery. Doctor removes Patient’s appendix without Patient’s valid 
consent to her doing so. 
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We should all agree in Surgery, Doctor wrongs Patient. The  best explanation for why 
Doctor wrongs Patient in these cases is that he infringes Patient’s rights over his 
person.223 Among the rights that Patient has over his person, Patient has a right against 
Doctor removing his appendix. As we saw from our discussion of the Contemporary 
Will Theory, this  right consists in both a claim and a power. Patient has a claim against 
Doctor’s removing his appendix, and Doctor is under a correlative duty not to do so. 
Patient also has a power to waive Doctor’s duty. By giving her morally valid consent, 
it is possible for Patient to waive Doctor’s duty not to remove her appendix, thereby 
giving Doctor a liberty to do so. In Surgery, Doctor removes Patient’s appendix without 
his morally valid consent. Doctor thereby breaches his duty not to remove Patient’s 
appendix, and thus infringes Patient’s correlative claim. 
We can now imagine a variants of Surgery in which Patient is not in a position 
to waive Doctor’s duty because Patient is unconscious: 
 
Unconscious Surgery. Patient is unconscious due to general anaesthetic. 





223 To be clear, Doctor morally wrongs her Patient by infringing Patient’s moral rights, and legally 
wrongs Patient by infringing Patient’s legal rights. 
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I suggest that in Unconscious Surgery, Doctor commits the same wrong as she does in Surgery. 
Both in Surgery and in Unconscious Surgery, Doctor breaches her duty not to remove 
Patient’s appendix, thus infringing Patient’s correlative claim. 
I have suggested that in Unconscious Trespass and Unconscious Surgery, the 
explanation for why Y  breaches the duty to X and thereby infringes X’s claim is what 
we can call the Actual Consent Explanation: Y wrongs X because X does not actually 
give valid consent to what Y does—X does not actually waive the duty that Y owes X. 
It is important to distinguish  the Actual Consent Explanation from what we might call 
a Hypothetical Consent Explanation. According to a Hypothetical Consent 
Explanation, the explanation for why Y wrongs is that X would not have waived Y’s duty 
in certain hypothetical circumstances. For example, according to a Hypothetical 
Consent Explanation of Unconscious Surgery, the explanation for why Doctor wrongs 
Patient is this: Patient would not have waived Doctor’s duty not to operate on Patient 
if Patient had been awake.224 
However, appealing to hypothetical consent is an unpromising strategy for two 
reasons. First, such appeals are unlikely to explain all the relevant cases. For example, 
if Patient is unconscious following a heart attack, a defender of a Hypothetical Consent 
Explanation might want to say that Patient would waive Doctor’s duty not to use a 
defibrillator on Patient. But it is not true that, if Patient had been awake, Patient would 
have waived Doctor’s duty not to use a defibrillator on Patient (because Patient would 
 
224 For an interesting discussion of Hypothetical Consent, see David Enoch, ‘Hypothetical Consent and 
the Value(s) of Autonomy’ (2017) 128 Ethics 6.  
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not have needed one!).225 If we ask what Patient would have consented to prior to 
becoming unconscious, then it is  prior hypothetical consent that is doing the 
explanatory work. If prior hypothetical consent is sufficient to waive a duty, prior 
actual consent seems on surer footing. And this is sufficient to explain the cases I have 
in mind. After all, it is a familiar idea that surgery under general anaesthetic wrongs a 
patient unless he give his actual prior consent, and this consent is valid. 
The second reason the appeal to hypothetical consent is unpromising is that 
the Will Theory’s motivation is to protect the right-holder’s actual choices, not the 
choices that the right-holder would have made under other (albeit idealised) 
conditions.226 
Since the Current Waivability Premise is false, the Current Waivability Argument 
does not require us to accept the Impossibility Objection to the Will Theory. 
 
225 It may be possible to generate extensionally adequate results by considering different counterfactuals. 
As I go on to say in the main text, even if this is possible, this is not the most plausible position for the 
Will Theorist to take, for three reasons. First, it difficult to see what would motivate the use of some 
counterfactuals rather than others. Second, as I say in the main text, it seems that counterfactual (or 
hypothetical) consent is on less sure footing than prior actual consent. We frequently to prior actual 
consent in our everyday lives. The same is not true of counterfactual (or hypothetical) consent. The third 
reason is also one I give in the main text, namely, that the Will Theory’s motivation is to protect the 
right-holder’s actual choices, rather than the choices they would have made in certain (albeit idealised) 
conditions. 
226 Indeed, some theorists prefer to call the Will Theory the Choice Theory of Rights. See, e.g., JE 
Penner, ‘The Analysis of Rights’ (1997) 10 Ratio Juris 300; Adina Preda, ‘Rights: Concept and 
Justification’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 408. 
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This brings us to the second interpretation of the argument for the Impossibility 
Objection. I shall call this the Lifetime Waivability Argument, and I summarise it as follows: 
 
The Lifetime Waivability Argument 
 
(1B) Wide Waivability Premise. It is possible for X to have a right against Y’s f-ing only 
if X is ever in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f. 
(2B) Wide Inability Premise. If X is now a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then X is 
not ever in a position to waive the duty Y owes X not to f. 
(3) Conclusion. Therefore, if X is now a child, unconscious adult, or dead, then it is 
not possible for X have a right against Y’s f-ing. [Impossibility Objection.] 
 
This Lifetime Waivability Argument is also valid. However, the Wide Inability Premise 
is false. 
The easiest way to illustrate that the Wide Inability Premise is false is to 
consider prior consent. Provided it is valid, prior consent functions to waive the duties 
correlative with the claims of those about to undergo surgery under general 
anaesthetic.227 For example, in Unconscious Surgery, Patient is now an unconscious adult. 
However, immediately before becoming unconscious, Patient was in a position to 
waive Doctor’s duty not to operate on Patient. If Patient gave Doctor valid prior 
 
227 For a related discussion, see Westen (n 22). 
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consent to Doctor’s removing his appendix, Patient would thereby waive the duty that 
Doctor owed Patient not to do so. 
In this section, we have focused mainly on cases involving the unconscious. 
However, similar considerations apply to the dead. Recall that when Rex is asleep, his 
valid prior consent can release Sarah from the duty she otherwise owes him not to 
enter his home. Similarly, after Rex dies, his valid prior consent to Sarah’s living in his 
home can release her from the duty she otherwise owes him not to do so. Indeed, it is 
a familiar thought that Rex might leave a will to this effect. And recall that when 
Patient is unconscious due to anaesthetic, his valid prior consent can release Doctor 
from the duty she otherwise owes him not to remove his appendix. Similarly, after 
Patient dies, his valid prior consent—given while he was alive—to Doctor’s removing 
his organs can release Doctor from the duty she otherwise owes him not to do so. It is 
a familiar thought that valid consent to posthumous organ donation has just this effect. 
In this section, we have seen that according to the Contemporary Will Theory, 
it is possible for the unconscious and the dead to have moral and legal rights. Though 
the Contemporary Will Theory requires that these individuals are in a position to 
exercise a powers to waive the duties that others owe them, the Contemporary Will 
Theory does not require that they are in a position to exercise this power while 
unconscious or dead. Instead, the Contemporary Will Theory acknowledges the 
familiar practice of giving their valid consent prior to the loss of consciousness or life. 
By engaging in this familiar practice, individuals can exercise the relevant powers prior 
to loss of consciousness or life. Accordingly, it is possible for these individuals to have 
moral and legal rights. 
- 176 - 
 
 
6. The Impossibility Objection and Children 
The case of children is more contentious. Neil MacCormick famously claimed that 
children are a ‘test-case’ for the Will Theory of Rights. 228 On MacCormick’s view, if 
the Will Theory is correct, then it is not possible for children to have rights. However, 
MacCormick asserted, it is possible for children to have rights, therefore the Will 
Theory is not correct. I shall deny the first premise in MacCormick’s argument. If the 
Contemporary Will Theory is correct, then it is possible for children to have rights—
provided they can as adults give valid subsequent consent to actions performed when 
they were children. 
Let us return to the Lifetime Waivability Argument. To show that the Wide 
Inability Premise is false with respect to unconscious adults and the dead, it was 
necessary only to rely on the notion of prior consent. There is widespread agreement that 
it is possible to give valid consent to an action prior to its occurrence. However, to 
defend the possibility of children having rights, it is necessary to rely on the notion of 
subsequent consent. This is sometimes also known as retrospective consent. Like X’s prior 
consent, X’s subsequent consent—provided it is valid—waives the duty that Y owes X 
not to perform some action. However, subsequent consent is given after the action has 
occurred (or was due to occur). 
 
228 Neil MacCormick, ‘Children’s Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right’, Legal Right and Social 
Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1984). 
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While the notion of subsequent consent is much more contentious than that of 
prior consent, it does have its defenders.229 The purpose of this section is to make clear 
that the Contemporary Will Theorist can account for children having rights if she 
accepts the notion of subsequent consent. 
 Before going further, it worth addressing a concern about the very notion of 
subsequent consent. Some theorists have expressed scepticism about that notion. For 
example, according to Joel Feinberg, ‘There is very little that can be done, despite the 
ingenious efforts of some philosophers, to extract coherence from the strange notion of 
“subsequent consent”.’230 In a similar vein, Douglas Husak says, ‘It is unlikely that 
consent can be retrospective.’231 Talk of subsequent consent strikes many theorists as 
 
229 Eric Chwang, ‘A Defense of Subsequent Consent’ (2009) 40 Journal of Social Philosophy 117; John 
K Davis, ‘Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent’ (2004) 7 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
267; Westen (n 22) 254–61. Chwang’s is a discussion of subsequent consent in the moral domain, 
whereas Westen’s is a discussion of subsequent consent in the legal domain. See also Jonathan Witmer-
Rich, ‘It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective Consent, and the Foundation 
of Consent in the Criminal Law’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 377; Jacob E Gersen and 
Jeannie Suk, ‘Timing of Consent’ in Frank Fagan and Saul Levmore (eds), The Timing of Lawmaking 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2017). 
230 Feinberg, Harm to Self (n 73) 182. 
231 Douglas Husak, ‘Paternalism and Consent’ in Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds), The Ethics 
of Consent: Theory and Practice (2010) 114. (Emphasis original.) Donald Van De Veer also expresses 
scepticism about the notion of subsequent consent. Donald Van De Veer, ‘Paternalism and Subsequent 
Consent’ (1979) 9 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 631. Others have expressed scepticism not at the 
notion of subsequent consent, but rather at the idea that such consent would be valid in certain contexts. 
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‘somewhat odd because consenting, like giving permission and granting, is concerned 
with the present or future.’232 
 The objection underlying this scepticism seems to be that the notion of 
subsequent consent is incoherent. Eric Chwang, a defender of subsequent consent, 
summarises the objection as follows: ‘it is a conceptual mistake think that you can 
consent to something that has already happened. By the very meaning of the concept, 
consent is concerned with what is happening or will happen, not something that has 
already happened.’233 Call this the Incoherence Objection. 
Chwang claims that the Incoherence Objection arises from wrongly identifying 
the attitude of consenting with the attitudes of gratitude, welcoming, or approval. 
Chwang correctly argues that the attitude of consenting is distinct from the attitudes of 
gratitude, welcoming or approval. One the one hand, it is possible to consent to 
someone’s action without being grateful for that action, welcoming it, or approving of 
it. Consider a parent who consents to their child leaving the house after the child’s 
ordinary curfew. To consent, the parent need not be grateful for, welcome, or approve 
of the child leaving the house. On the other hand, it is possible to be grateful for 
someone’s action, to welcome it, or to approve of that action without thereby 
 
For example, Paul Jarvis argues that it is not possible to give valid subsequent consent to sexual 
intercourse in English law, given the phrasing of the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Paul 
Jarvis, ‘The Timing of Consent’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 394. 
232 Peter Gardner, ‘Paternalism and Consent in Education, or One Day You’ll Be Grateful’ (1983) 17 
Journal of Philosophy of Education 57, 63. 
233 Chwang (n 229) 119. 
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consenting to it. Consider my attitude towards the government changing its foreign aid 
budget. It is possible for me to be grateful for the change, to welcome that change, and 
to approve of it, without thereby consenting to that change.234 
 
234 Chwang’s own suggestion is to identify consenting to an action with the attitude of ‘not minding’ 
that action. ibid 121. This is similar to Kimberly Kessler Ferzan’s recent suggestion that the attitude of 
consenting to an action is the attitude of thinking to oneself that the action is ‘ok with me’. Ferzan, 
‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ (n 22) 398. Chwang’s and Ferzan’s views contrast with 
those of Michael Thompson. According to Thompson, ‘There is an obvious and intuitive difference 
between Sylvia consents to your doing B and Sylvia doesn’t mind that you’re doing B, the latter being a species of 
the more general type found in Sylvia doesn’t mind that E is happening. … It seems no description of what 
Sylvia doesn’t mind or what she would very much like to be the case will ever add up to your having her consent to 
your doing something.’ Thompson (n 19) 350–51. (Emphasis original.) 
My own view is that suggestions such as Chwang’s and Ferzan’s are ambiguous. There are at 
least four distinct senses in which someone might ‘not mind’ another person’s action. First, X might be 
said to ‘not mind’ Y’s action insofar as X takes Y’s action to be all-things-considered permissible. As an 
example of when X might hold this attitude, consider a case in which Y breaks a promise to meet X for 
lunch because Y remembers that he had earlier made a conflicting promise to take Y’s mother to the 
doctor at lunchtime. There is a sense in which X might ‘not mind’ Y’s breaking Y’s promise, because X 
recognises that it is all-things-considered morally permissible for Y to prioritise the earlier promise. 
Nevertheless, this is consistent with X holding the attitude that Y breached a duty to X. 
 This brings us to a second attitude that might be called ‘not minding’. X might be said to ‘not 
mind’ Y’s action insofar as X holds that Y’s action does not breach a duty owed to X, even if it breaches 
a duty owed to another. For example, X might not mind that Y breaches his promise to take Y’s mother 
to the doctor at lunchtime, because even though it is morally wrong for Y to breach his promise, it does 
not wrong X. 
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 A third attitude of ‘not minding’ is closely related. X might be said to ‘not mind’ Y’s action in 
some cases where X holds—perhaps mistakenly—that Y does not owe X a duty not to perform the 
relevant action to begin with. For example, X might ‘not mind’ that Y takes an umbrella from the stand, 
simply because X fails to realise that the umbrella belongs to X. (This is based on an example from 
David Owens. See David Owens, ‘Promising without Intending’ (2008) 105 The Journal of Philosophy 
737, 740.) 
Finally, X might be said to ‘not mind’ Y’s action in case a where, although X holds that Y did 
owe a duty not to perform the relevant action, X holds that Y’s non-performance is excused. For example, 
if Y breached his promise to have lunch with X because Y was in a cycling accident en route, X might 
excuse Y’s absence because under the circumstances X ‘doesn’t mind’ that Y did not show up. Here, X 
might recognise that Y has an excuse for wronging X, and so hold that Y is not culpable for doing so. 
Fortunately, Chwang helps us disambiguate these possible interpretations of what it means for 
X to ‘not mind’ Y’s action. According to Chwang, if X validly consents to Y’s action, then X ‘thereby 
rescinds her right to demand compensation for it.’ Chwang (n 229) 120. This is true. However, it seems 
that Chwang goes on to identify X’s consenting to Y’s action with X’s waiving the duty of compensation. 
If that is indeed Chwang’s view, then it is mistaken. After all, as we saw above, Waivability of Duty and 
Waivability of Amends are distinct. Indeed, for amends to be apt presupposes that the initial duty has 
been breached. 
Relatedly, Chwang leaves open the possibility that subsequent consent is equivalent to 
forgiveness. However, forgiving someone for breach of a duty presupposes that they have breached (or 
will breach) a duty. Consenting, by contrast, releases someone from the initial duty not to perform an 
action. If they perform the consented-to action, there is nothing to forgive (provided the consent is valid). 
For related discussions of forgiveness, see Pamela Hieronymi, ‘Articulating an Uncompromising 
Forgiveness’ (2001) 62 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 529; Nicolas Cornell, ‘The 
Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving’ (2017) 126 Philosophical Review 241. 
- 181 - 
 
 However—contrary to what Chwang claims—the Incoherence Objection does 
not rely on identifying the attitude of consenting with that of gratitude, welcoming, or 
approval. To see this, consider the simple intention view of consent. According to the 
simple intention view of consent, for you to consent to someone’s action is for you to 
intend that person’s action.235 
If the simple intention view of consent is correct, then given a plausible 
assumption, the Incoherence Objection arises again. On the simple intention view of 
consent, to consent to an action is to intend that action. For someone to intend an action, 
they must believe that it is possible for that intention to lead to action.236 However, 
ordinarily, individuals do not believe that their present intentions can lead to past 
actions having occurred. Ordinarily, then, individuals cannot intend a past action.237 
If an individual cannot intend a past action, then on the simple intention view of 
consent, the notion of subsequent consent is incoherent for that individual. The 
attitude of consent is such that it is impossible for that individual to form that attitude 
after the action to be consented to has already occurred. 
 
235 Hurd (n 22) 131. Larry Alexander objects to the simple intention view on the grounds that ‘one 
cannot intend another’s act … One can only intend one’s own act.’ Alexander, ‘The Ontology of 
Consent’ (n 85) 107. See also Alexander, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ (n 85) 166. It is worth stating 
that much of the literature on shared intention denies Alexander’s claim that one can only intend one’s 
own act. See, e.g., Bratman (n 166) 148–50. For related discussion, see n 163, above. 
236 Oded Na’aman, ‘Can We Intend the Past?’ (2017) 12 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 304, 
307. 
237 Na’aman (n 236). 
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However, the simple intention view of consent is incorrect. The following 
example from Victor Tadros helps illustrate: 
Borrow.238 Jess wants to skip class and go to a party, and asks to 
borrow Betty’s car. If Betty does not consent, Jess will go to class. 
Betty thinks it Jess’s decision whether to skip class, but wants Jess to 
go to class. Betty says to Jess: ‘take my car if you want to, but I really 
want you to go to class.’ 
In Borrow, Betty consents to Jess borrowing the car without intending that Jess borrows 
the car. On Tadros’s view, for Betty to consent to Jess borrowing the car, it is sufficient 
that Betty intends directly to release Jess from the duty she would otherwise owe Betty 
not to take the car.239 I believe Tadros is correct about this. 
 Let us assume that intending directly to release someone from a duty they owe 
you is sufficient to perform an act of consent. If that is correct, then it is plausible that 
you can also perform an act of consent by intending directly to release someone from 
a duty they owed you. Contrary to what some have suggested, this does not require 
‘backward causation’.240 It does not require any change in which actions have 
occurred. Rather, it involves you intending to make it the case that those past actions 
 
238 Tadros, Wrongs and Crimes (n 21) 209. 
239 ibid. (On other views, Betty may also need to communicate this intention.) 
240 Van De Veer (n 231) 638. 
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did not wrong you.241 If you can indeed release someone from a duty in this way, then 
the Incoherence Objection does not succeed. 
Let us take stock. In the preceding paragraphs, we have defended the notion of 
subsequent consent from the Incoherence Objection. The goal of this defence was to 
overcome scepticism about the very notion of subsequent consent. The more plausible 
the notion of subsequent consent, the more plausible it is that the Will Theory can 
accommodate the possibility of children having moral and legal rights. 
The main argument in this section has proceeded in two parts. First, I have 
argued that if it is possible for adults to give valid subsequent consent to actions that 
others performed when they were children, then the Contemporary Will Theory can 
accommodate the possibility of children having moral and legal rights. Second, I have 
argued that the notion of subsequent consent is not incoherent. As a result, it is at least 
somewhat plausible that it is possible for adults to give valid subsequent consent to 
actions that others performed when they were children. 
It is worth noting that while this substantially increases the extensional 
adequacy of the Will Theory, it might not do so completely. Some children die 
prematurely. Others live beyond infancy but lack the cognitive capacity ever to waive 
 
241 David Owens defends a similar view of prior and contemporaneous consent, though he does not 
address the possibility of subsequent consent. See David Owens, ‘The Possibility of Consent’ (2011) 24 
Ratio 402. 
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the duties that others owe them. According to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is not 
possible for such children to have moral and legal rights.242 
This will seem to many a significant cost. However, there are two lines of reply 
that may mitigate this cost. First, we can say that it is wrong to, for example, enter the 
homes of those who are never in a position to waive duties that others owe them not 
to do so—but for reasons other than infringing their rights.243 Indeed, the Will Theorist 
can even say that we infringe their moral and legal claims, but that these claims are not 
properly called rights because they are not conjoined with the relevant power. The 
second line of reply concerns our knowledge. We will often not be in a position to know 
whether a particular child will at some later point be in a position to waive the duties 
that others owe them. If that is true, then given the significant moral risk that we might 




The Will Theory of Rights can avoid the Impossibility Objection. According to the 
Contemporary Will Theory of Rights, it is possible for children, unconscious adults, 
 
242 There is some similarity between the Contemporary Will Theory and what Elizabeth Harman calls 
the Actual Future Principle. See Elizabeth Harman, ‘Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses 
and the Ethics of Abortion’ (1999) 28 Philosophy & Public Affairs 310. Thanks to Rae Langton for this 
observation. 
243 Indeed, on one reading, this is just what Hart says of children and nonhuman animals. See HLA 
Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175, 180–81.  
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and the dead to have moral and legal rights. If it is possible for an individual to give 
valid prior consent to actions that occur while they are unconscious or after they die, 
then according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for that individual to 
have moral and legal rights. It is possible for individuals to give such consent. So, 
according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for them to have moral and 
legal rights. Moreover, if it is possible for adults to give valid subsequent consent to 
actions that occurred when they were children, then according to the Contemporary 
Will Theory, it is possible for them to have moral and legal rights. Since the notion of 
valid subsequent consent is more contentious than that of prior consent, children 
provide, in MacCormick’s words, a ‘test-case’ for the Will Theory—though not in the 
way that MacCormick envisaged. 
 This is a surprising result. It is one that Interest Theorists, Will Theorists, and 
those who subscribe to neither theory had alike assumed to be false. Moreover, it leaves 
the Will Theory better off than has hitherto been assumed. This is because the Will 
Theory is significantly more plausible with regard to the possibility of its extensional 
adequacy. 
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Summary and Directions for Future Research 
 
Let us take stock. This thesis was comprised of four substantive chapters. Each of those 
four chapters was a freestanding essay on individual permissive consent. We are now 
in a position to summarise the findings of those essays, and to consider possible areas 
for future research. Let us consider each essay in turn. 
 The first essay was ‘An Introduction to the Importance of Consent in Our Sex 
Lives’. That essay provided an overview of the moral and legal importance of consent 
in our sex lives. It clarified the notion of one person giving morally valid consent to 
another person’s action. It explored whether such morally valid consent is necessary 
or sufficient for morally permissible sex. When considering the sufficiency of consent, 
one theme that emerged was that the arguments for and against the sufficiency of 
consent rely on appeal to intuitions about particular cases. Specifically, they rely on 
intuitions about whether one person wrongs another by having sex with them despite 
having that person’s morally valid sexual consent. Since people differ in their intuitions 
about those cases, I suggested that we should consider resorting to broader theoretical 
considerations. Specifically, I suggested that someone’s valid consent to you having sex 
with them is sufficient to avoid you wronging them only if the volenti maxim is true. One 
question for future research, then, is whether the volenti maxim is true.  
 The second essay was ‘Conditional Consent’. That essay was motivated by the 
developing doctrine in English law of so-called ‘conditional consent’ to sexual 
intercourse. I distinguished two ways for someone to place conditions on their morally 
valid consent to another person’s action. The first is moral scope restriction, whereby 
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someone waives some moral claim rights but not others. For example, it is possible for 
someone to waive their moral claim rights against another person performing surgery on 
them, while retaining their moral claim rights against that person having sexual intercourse 
with them. The second is to conditionally token consent. Where someone conditionally 
tokens consent, their action constitutes an act of consent to another person’s action if 
and only if the condition is satisfied. For example, we can imagine one person—
perhaps a philosopher—saying to another, ‘If and only if you visit your mother today, 
I hereby consent to you staying in my apartment tomorrow.’ I suggested that 
understanding the distinction between moral scope restriction and conditional 
tokening can help make progress with debates about conditional consent to sexual 
intercourse in English law, and in thinking more generally about how we place 
conditions on our consent. In making my case, I left open an important question: is it 
possible for someone to place any condition they like on their tokening consent to 
another person’s action? This is a difficult question, but one that should be addressed 
in future work on conditional consent. 
 The third essay was ‘Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together’. That essay 
looked at a view that challenged what in ‘An Introduction to the Importance of 
Consent in Our Sex Lives’ I called the Necessity of Consent. According to that view, 
if sex is in some sense ideal, then consent is unnecessary. That is to say, where sex is a 
joint action between its participants, it is possible for one person to have sex with 
another, without that person’s consent, without thereby infringing that person’s moral 
rights. I reconstructed what I called the Main Argument for this view. I suggested that 
one of the key premises of the Main Argument was itself supported by two arguments—
one from the metaphysics of sexual joint action and another from its moral significance. 
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I argued that neither of these supporting arguments is sound. As a result, the Main 
Argument is unsupported, and gives us no reason to accept the view that if sex is ideal, 
then consent is unnecessary. I instead defended what I called the Commonsense View. 
The Commonsense View states that if you have sex with someone without their 
consent, you thereby infringe that person’s moral rights. In the course of defending the 
Commonsense View, I surveyed two existing accounts of consent—the Choice 
Account and the Normative Power Account. I argued that each of these accounts faces 
objections. To avoid these objections, I developed the Hybrid Account of Consent. 
As well as developing the Hybrid Account of Consent, I suggested that my 
proposed picture yields several valuable lessons. Among those lessons is that my 
proposed picture highlights the need for law reform. I suggested that the law does not 
at present adequately criminalise the behaviour of a woman who uses her vagina to 
envelop a man’s penis without his morally valid consent to what she does. Recognising 
this point, both Natasha McKeever and Siobhan Weare have recently suggested that 
we should criminalise such behaviour as rape.244 However, I believe that their 
arguments are too quick. They do not rule out the possibility that it might be better to 
criminalise non-consensual envelopment as a distinct offence from rape. In 
‘Conditional Consent’, I suggested that fair labelling considerations generally favour 
the fine-grained individuation of sexual offences. For similar reasons, it may be better 
to have a distinct offence of non-consensual envelopment. Moreover, it seems this 
would be sufficient to assuage what seems to be McKeever’s and Weare’s key 
concern—namely, that the law portrays women as sexually passive by recognising 
 
244 McKeever (n 185); Weare (n 190). 
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women only as possible victims and not as possible perpetrators of the most serious 
sexual offences. I would like to explore the arguments for a new criminal offence in 
more detail in future research. 
 The fourth essay was ‘Children, the Unconscious, and the Dead: Consent and 
the Will Theory of Rights’. In that essay, I turned to a theoretical debate about the 
function of moral and legal rights. The two most influential positions in that debate are 
the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. According to the Interest Theory, the 
function of rights is to protect the interests of those who have them. By contrast, 
according to the Will Theory, the function of rights is to protect the will or the choice 
of those who have them. I highlighted a common objection to the Will Theory, which 
I called the Impossibility Objection. According to the Impossibility Objection, if the 
Will Theory is correct, then it is impossible for young children, the unconscious, and 
the dead to have moral and legal rights. I formulated what I called the Contemporary 
Will Theory, a Hartian theory of the function of moral and legal rights. 
I argued that the Contemporary Will Theory can overcome the Impossibility 
Objection. That case proceeded in two steps. The first step was to consider the 
unconscious and the dead. I argued that if it is possible for someone to give valid prior 
consent to actions that occur while they are unconscious or after they die, then, 
according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for the unconscious and the 
dead to have moral and legal rights. I suggested that it is possible for someone to give 
such valid prior consent. After all, individuals give valid prior consent to surgery that 
will occur while they are unconscious due to general anaesthetic. And individuals give 
valid prior consent to the use of their organs and their property after they die. The 
second step was to consider children. I argued that if it is possible for adults to give 
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valid subsequent consent to actions that occurred when they were children, then 
according to the Contemporary Will Theory, it is possible for children to have moral 
and legal rights. I suggested that the notion of subsequent consent is at least somewhat 
plausible, and can be defended from a prominent objection. Nevertheless, the notion 
of valid subsequent consent remains more contentious than that of valid prior consent. 
Accordingly, children provide a ‘test-case’ for the Will Theory—though not in the way 
that Neil MacCormick envisaged when he first used that phrase. 
The Impossibility Objection is only one of the objections against the Will 
Theory. As a result, even if the Will Theory can avoid the Impossibility Objection, this 
is not a knock-down argument for the Will Theory. To provide a complete defence of 
the Will Theory, there are others questions that must be answered. For example, can 
the Will Theory accommodate the possibility of rights that no one is ever in a position 
to waive? (Arguably, the right against being enslaved is like this.) Should the Will Theory 
accommodate the possibility of such rights? These are interesting questions for future 
research. 
- 191 - 
 
List of Academic References 
 
Alexander L, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent (II)’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 165 
——, ‘The Ontology of Consent’ (2014) 55 Analytic Philosophy 102 
Alexander L, Hurd H and Westen P, ‘Consent Does Not Require Communication: A 
Reply to Dougherty’ (2016) 35 Law and Philosophy 655 
Anderson MJ, ‘Negotiating Sex’ (2005) 78 Southern California Law Review 1401 
Andersson A-KM, ‘Rights Bearers and Rights Functions’ (2015) 172 Philosophical 
Studies 1625 
Archard D, Sexual Consent (Westview Press 1998) 
——, ‘The Wrong of Rape’ (2007) 57 The Philosophical Quarterly 374 
——, ‘Sexual Consent’ in Andreas Müller and Peter Schaber (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018) 
Aurelius M, Meditations (Maxwell Staniforth tr, New Ed edition, Penguin 2004) 
Barnett RE, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269 
Benn P, ‘Is Sex Morally Special?’ (1999) 16 Journal of Applied Philosophy 235 
Black O, ‘Two Theories of Agreement’ (2007) 13 Legal Theory 1 
- 192 - 
 
Bolinger RJ, ‘Moral Risk and Communicating Consent’ (2019) 47 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 179 
Bowen J, ‘Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights’ (2020) 50 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 427 
Bratman M, ‘I Intend That We J’, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency 
(Cambridge University Press 1999) 
——, ‘Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation’, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on 
Intention and Agency (Cambridge University Press 1999) 
Brown C, ‘Sex Crimes and Misdemeanours’ (2020) 177 Philosophical Studies 1363 
Bullock EC, ‘Valid Consent’ in Andreas Müller and Peter Schaber (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018) 
Cave E, ‘Valid Consent to Medical Treatment’ [2020] Journal of Medical Ethics 1 
Chadha K, ‘Sexual Consent and Having Sex Together’ (2020) 40 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 619 
——, ‘Conditional Consent’ [2021] Law and Philosophy 
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-020-09400-8> accessed 19 February 2021 
Chwang E, ‘A Defense of Subsequent Consent’ (2009) 40 Journal of Social Philosophy 
117 
Conly S, ‘Seduction, Rape, and Coercion’ (2004) 115 Ethics 96 
- 193 - 
 
Cornell N, ‘The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving’ (2017) 126 Philosophical Review 
241 
Cowan S, ‘Choosing Freely: Theoretically Reframing the Concept of Consent’ in 
Rosemary and Cowan Hunter Sharon (ed), Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with 
Law and Subjectivity 
Cowart MR, ‘Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act Theory to Help 
Resolve Moral Dilemmas and Legal Disputes’ 32 
Crisp R, ‘Medical Negligence, Assault, Informed Consent, and Autonomy’ (1990) 17 
Journal of Law and Society 77 
——, ‘Well-Being’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2017, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 2017) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/> accessed 27 
May 2020 
Cruft R, ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’ (2004) 23 Law and 
Philosophy 347 
Davis JK, ‘Precedent Autonomy and Subsequent Consent’ (2004) 7 Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 267 
Dempsey MM, ‘Victimless Conduct and the Volenti Maxim: How Consent Works’ 
(2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 
- 194 - 
 
Director S, ‘Consent’s Dominion: Dementia and Prior Consent to Sexual Relations’ 
(2019) 33 Bioethics 1065 
Doig GA and Wortley N, ‘Conditional Consent? An Emerging Concept in the Law of 
Rape’ (2013) 77 The Journal of Criminal Law 286 
Dougherty T, ‘Sex, Lies, and Consent’ (2013) 123 Ethics 717 
——, ‘Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication’ (2015) 43 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 224 
——, ‘Affirmative Consent and Due Diligence’ (2018) 46 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
90 
——, ‘Consent, Communication, and Abandonment’ (2019) 38 Law and Philosophy 
387 
——, ‘Coerced Consent with an Unknown Future’ [forthcoming] Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 
——, The Scope of Consent (Oxford University Press forthcoming) 
Dworkin A, Intercourse (Secker & Warburg 1987) 
Edgington D, ‘On Conditionals’ (1995) 104 Mind 235 
——, ‘Conditionals’ in Lou Goble (ed), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic 
(Blackwell 2001) 
Edwards J, ‘Harm Principles’ (2014) 20 Legal Theory 253 
- 195 - 
 
Enoch D, ‘Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy’ (2017) 128 Ethics 6 
Estrich S, Real Rape (Harvard University Press 1984) 
Fabre C, ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 
263 
——, ‘Posthumous Rights’ in Matthew H Kramer and others (eds), The Legacy of HLA 
Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) 
Feinberg J, ‘Legal Paternalism’ (1971) 1 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 105 
——, Harm to Self (Oxford University Press 1986) 
——, ‘Victims’ Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent’ (1986) 96 Ethics 
330 
——, Harm to Others, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 1987) 
Ferrero L, ‘Conditional Intentions’ (2009) 43 Noûs 700 
——, ‘Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?’ in David Shoemaker (ed), Oxford Studies 
in Agency and Responsibility, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 2013) 
Ferzan KK, ‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ (2016) 13 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law 43 
——, ‘The Bluff: The Power of Insincere Actions’ (2017) 23 Legal Theory 168 
——, ‘Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape’ 13 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law 397 
- 196 - 
 
Ferzan KK and Westen P, ‘How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape’ (2017) 11 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 759 
Fischel JJ, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice (University of California Press 
2019) 
Fried C, Right and Wrong (Harvard University Press 1978) 
——, Contract as Promise (Harvard University Press 1981) 
Frowe H, ‘Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications’ (2015) 89 Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume 267 
——, ‘The Just War Framework’ in Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford University Press 2018) 
Gardner J, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy 
of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
——, ‘The Opposite of Rape’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 48 
Gardner J and Shute S, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(Clarendon Press 2000) 
Gardner P, ‘Paternalism and Consent in Education, or One Day You’ll Be Grateful’ 
(1983) 17 Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 
Gardner S, ‘Appreciating Olugboja’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 275 
- 197 - 
 
Gersen JE and Suk J, ‘Timing of Consent’ in Frank Fagan and Saul Levmore (eds), The 
Timing of Lawmaking (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 
Gerver M, ‘Inferring Consent Without Communication’ (2020) 46 Social Theory and 
Practice 27 
Gibson M, ‘Deceptive Sexual Relations: A Theory of Criminal Liability’ (2020) 40 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 82 
Gilbert M, ‘Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?’ (1993) 90 The Journal of 
Philosophy 627 
Green L, ‘Pornographies’ (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 27 
Gross H, ‘Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights’ [2007] Criminal Law Review 220 
Harman E, ‘Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of 
Abortion’ (1999) 28 Philosophy & Public Affairs 310 
Hart HLA, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175 
——, ‘Legal Rights’, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford 
University Press 1982) 
Hartogh GD, ‘Can Consent Be Presumed?’ (2011) 28 Journal of Applied Philosophy 
295 
Healey R, ‘Consent, Rights, and Reasons for Action’ (2019) 13 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 499 
- 198 - 
 
Herring J, ‘Does Yes Mean Yes? The Criminal Law and Mistaken Consent to Sexual 
Activity’ (2002) 22 Singapore Law Review 182 
——, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 511 
Hieronymi P, ‘Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness’ (2001) 62 Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 529 
Hill TE, ‘Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism’ (2001) 18 Social 
Philosophy and Policy 300 
Hobbes T, Leviathan (WG Pogson Smith ed, Clarendon Press 1965) 
Hurd HM, ‘The Moral Magic of Consent’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121 
Hurd HM and Moore MS, ‘The Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights’ (2018) 63 The 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 295 
Husak D, ‘Paternalism and Consent’ in Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer (eds), 
The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (2010) 
Jarvis P, ‘The Timing of Consent’ [2019] Criminal Law Review 394 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press 1990) 
Kennedy C, ‘Criminalising Deceptive Sex: Sex, Identity and Recognition’ (2021) 41 
Legal Studies 91 
Kramer MH, ‘Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights’ (2001) 14 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 29 
- 199 - 
 
——, ‘On No-Rights and No Rights’ (2019) 64 The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 213 
Kramer MH and Steiner H, ‘Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?’ (2005) 27 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 281 
Kratzer A, Modals and Conditionals (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Kukla R, ‘That’s What She Said: The Language of Sexual Negotiation’ (2018) 129 
Ethics 70 
Liberto H, ‘The Problem with Sexual Promises’ (2017) 127 Ethics 383 
——, ‘Intention and Sexual Consent’ (2017) 20 Philosophical Explorations 127 
Locke J, Two Treatises of Government (Thomas Hollis ed, A Millar and others 1764) 
MacCormick N, ‘Children’s Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right’, Legal Right and 
Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1984) 
MacKinnon CA, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989) 
——, ‘Rape Redefined’ (2016) 10 Harvard Law & Policy Review 431 
Malm HM, ‘The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law on 
Rape’ (1996) 2 Legal Theory 147 
Manson NC, ‘Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account’ (2016) 173 
Philosophical Studies 3317 
- 200 - 
 
——, ‘How Not to Think about the Ethics of Deceiving into Sex’ (2017) 127 Ethics 
415 
Manson NM, ‘The Scope of Consent’ in Andreas Müller and Peter Schaber (eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent (Routledge 2018) 
McGregor J, Is It Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women’s Sexual Consent Seriously 
(Routledge 2005) 
McKeever N, ‘Can a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?’ (2019) 13 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 599. 
Mill JS, ‘On Liberty’, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol 18 (University of 
Toronto Press 1977) 
Millar TM, ‘Toward a Performance Model of Sex’ in Jaclyn Friedman and Jessica 
Valenti (eds), Yes Means Yes: Visions of Female Sexual Power and a World Without Rape (Seal 
Press 2008) 
Miller FG and Wertheimer A, ‘Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond 
Valid Consent’, The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press) 
Morgan S, ‘Dark Desires’ (2003) 6 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 377 
Na’aman O, ‘Can We Intend the Past?’ (2017) 12 Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 304 
- 201 - 
 
Nieswandt K, ‘Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right’ in David Plunkett, Scott 
Shapiro and Kevin Toh (eds), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and 
Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press) 
Owens D, ‘Promising without Intending’ (2008) 105 The Journal of Philosophy 737 
——, ‘The Possibility of Consent’ (2011) 24 Ratio 402 
——, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Pallikkathayil J, ‘The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with 
Coercion’ (2011) 11 Philosophers’ Imprint 1 
Palmer T, ‘Distinguishing Sex from Sexual Violation: Consent, Negotiation and 
Freedom to Negotiate’ in Alan Reed and others (eds), Consent: Domestic and Comparative 
Perspectives (Routledge 2017) 
Parfit D, On What Matters, vol 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed, Oxford University Press 2011) 
Penner J, ‘Legal Powers and the Will and Interest Theories of Rights’ in Mark McBride 
(ed), New Essays on the Nature of Rights (Hart Publishing 2017) 
Penner JE, ‘The Analysis of Rights’ (1997) 10 Ratio Juris 300 
Preda A, ‘Rights: Concept and Justification’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 408 
Primoratz I, ‘Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?’ (2001) 4 Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 201 
- 202 - 
 
Pundik A, ‘Coercion and Deception in Sexual Relations’ (2015) 28 Canadian Journal 
of Law & Jurisprudence 97 
Quong J, ‘Rights Against Harm’ (2015) 89 Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 249 
Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network, ‘Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics’ 
<https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence> accessed 12 May 2021 
Rape Crisis England and Wales, ‘Statistics about Sexual Violence’ 
<http://rapecrisis.org.uk/get-informed/about-sexual-violence/statistics-sexual-
violence/> accessed 12 May 2021 
Raz J, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 
Reid R, ‘Exploring the Controversial Fetish of Race Play’ Metro (3 November 2017) 
<https://metro.co.uk/2017/11/03/exploring-the-controversial-fetish-of-race-play-
7051288/> 
Ripstein A, ‘Beyond the Harm Principle’ (2006) 34 Philosophy & Public Affairs 215 
Saunders B, ‘Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle’ (2016) 125 Mind 1005 
Schaber P, ‘The Volenti Maxim’ (2020) 24 The Journal of Ethics 79 
Schulhofer SJ, Unwanted Sex (Harvard University Press 2000) 
Simester AP and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (6 edition, 
Hart Publishing 2016) 
- 203 - 
 
Simmons AJ, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University Press 1979) 
Sreekumar S, ‘Some Conceptual Aspects of Temporality and the Ability to Possess 
Rights’ (2015) 28 Ratio Juris 330 
Sreenivasan G, ‘A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 257 
Steiner H, ‘Working Rights’ in Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner 
(eds), A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (Clarendon Press 1998) 
Syrota G, ‘Rape: When Does Fraud Vitiate Consent?’ 25 Western Australia Law 
Review 334 
Tadros V, ‘Rape Without Consent’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 515 
——, ‘Consent to Harm’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 23 
——, Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford University Press 2016) 
——, ‘Appropriate Normative Powers’ (2020) 94 Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 301 
——, ‘Consent to Sex in an Unjust World’ (2021) 131 Ethics 293 
Tea Consent (Blue Seat Studios 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQbei5JGiT8> accessed 15 September 2020 
Temkin J and Ashworth A, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults 
and the Problems of Consent’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 328 
- 204 - 
 
Thompson M, ‘What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice’ in R Jay 
Wallace and others (eds), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz 
(Clarendon Press 2004) 
Tippett EC, ‘The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement’ (2018) 103 Minnesota 
Law Review 74 
Van De Veer D, ‘Paternalism and Subsequent Consent’ (1979) 9 Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 631 
Veatch RM, ‘Abandoning Informed Consent’ (1995) 25 The Hastings Center Report 
5 
Waldron J, ‘A Right to Do Wrong’ (1981) 92 Ethics 21 
Weare S, ‘“Oh You’re a Guy, How Could You Be Raped by a Woman, That Makes 
No Sense”: Towards a Case for Legally Recognising and Labelling “Forced-to-
Penetrate” Cases as Rape’ (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 110 
Webber J, ‘Sex’ (2009) 84 Philosophy 233 
Wellman C, Real Rights (Oxford University Press 1995) 
——, ‘The Concept of Fetal Rights’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 65 
Wellman CH, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment’ (2012) 122 Ethics 371 
Wenar L, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 223 
——, ‘The Nature of Claim-Rights’ (2013) 123 Ethics 202 
- 205 - 
 
Wertheimer A, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press 2003) 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed, Yale University Press 1920) 
Westen P, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defense to 
Criminal Conduct (Ashgate 2004) 
Witmer-Rich J, ‘It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective 
Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law 
and Philosophy 377 
 
- 206 - 
 
List of Legal References 
 
1. Case Law 
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin). 
New York v Bink 444 NYS.2d 237 (1981) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of New York). 
R (on the application of F) v DPP and A [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin). 
R v Clarence (1889) 22 QBD 23. 
R v Dica (Mohammed) [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. 
R v Flattery (1877) QBD 410. 
R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA 1699. 
R v Konzani (Feston) [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 
R v Linekar (Gareth) [1995] QB 250 (Court of Appeal, Criminal Division). 
R v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051. 
R v Papadimitropoulos (1957) 98 CLR 249 (High Court of Australia). 
 
2. Statute Law 
Sexual Offences Act 2003: 
—s 1. 
—s 2. 
—s 3. 
—s 74. 
